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Editor Foreword
Dear Colleagues,
Welcome to Norway, Oslo and the Norwegian Defence University College. 
The ISMS was created to build a network for creation, development, exchange 
and diffusion of research and knowledge about war, conflict management and 
peace support efforts. As editor of the Norwegian «Military Studies» I am pleased 
to help with the creation of this special edition with all the abstracts presented to 
the Conference 2017. Never before has so many different academic ideas about 
war and conflict been gathered in this journal in the same copy.
Journals like the Norwegian «Military Studies» have a role in developing the 
Military academies. It is one of multiple arenas to present academic writing and 
a very good entry point for young scholars or academics that write within narrow 
disciplines and may find it hard to be published internationally. Journals like 
this bring topics to the front, and give writers valuable experience and feedback.
The topic «Military Sciences – The Backbone of Military Educational Institutions?» 
will inform the debate on how to give soldiers the education and necessary skills 
to cope with an uncertain future. This is always relevant, but maybe even more 
in these times. Many institutions redefine their demands for education in light 
of new threats, new technology and the fact that the perception of the world 
again seem to be back to the historical normal, an uncertain future.
For the work of editing this special edition I will thank my co-editor Silje Fordal 
Nålsund and her two assistants Maria Syverstad Andreassen and Kristiane Friis 
Popperud. To all, good luck and have fruitful conference!
Thomas Slensvik 
Editor/Commander 
Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College
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Authors Foreword #ISMS17 Book of Abstracts
On November 15th–17th 2017 the Norwegian Defence University College 
(NDUC) will host the #ISMS17 conference in Oslo on behalf of the International 
Society of Military Sciences (ISMS).This #ISMS17 Book of Abstracts is to serve 
as an introduction to all of the abstracts submitted and presented at the 
conference.
The publication is organized according to the ISMS thematic Working Group 
structure which provides an overview of sub-disciplinary efforts of addressing 
issues of relevance within the field of Military Sciences. All abstracts contain 
institutional affiliation and contact information to the presenter. Therefore 
we believe that the #ISMS17 Book of Abstracts will be useful also as a tool 
for potential collaboration between the ISMS institutions with its research 
fellowship and among the wider ISMS community.
The invited theme of the #ISMS17 conference was (although not restricted 
to) ‘Military Sciences – The Backbone to Military Educational Institutions?’. We were 
looking for abstracts and paper proposals that explored the value of science 
in the sense of how can it play a meaningful role in military education – or 
not. Representing an interdisciplinary society, we specifically encouraged 
submissions that dig into the sub-sciences of Military Sciences in an attempt 
to describe, understand and explain how science can contribute to prepare 
military units and their soldiers for the life and tasks of conducting military 
operations. As such, we urged our fellow scholars, who teach at military 
educational institutions within all disciplines, to look into, elaborate on and 
argue how science (on its own, in concert with the arts or even in contrast 
to arts) plays a role in their discipline and/or teaching.
We are happy to say that we received approximately 100 abstracts from 
more than 25 nations across three continents. Two thirds of the abstracts 
are presented by scholars residing in nations with an ISMS membership and 
a third of the presenters are made up of scholars without such an affiliation 
to the ISMS. All the abstracts have been reviewed by one of the nine WG 
Chairs and allocated into two plenary sessions, five oral sessions totalling 
23 panels and one poster session with more than 15 posters indicating there 
will be four or five parallel panels running simultaneously throughout the 
two conference days.
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Table 1 gives an overview of the number of panels and presentations that 
are accepted for the #ISMS17 conference.
Table 1. Panels, oral and poster presentations at #ISMS17 distributed among the ISMS Working 
Groups.
Working Group Oral 
Panels
Oral Presen-
tations
Poster Pres-
entations
1. War Studies 4 13 2
2. Military History 2 6 1
3. Military Technology 1 4 0
4. Leadership, Command and Control and basic Competencies 2 6 2
5. Law and Ethics 1 4 0
6. Security and Defence policy and Strategy 5 16 1
7. Armed Forces and Society 2 10 0
8. Defence management and Economics 1 4 2
9. Military Education 5 23 9
23 86 17
We plan to publish a revised electronic version of this Book of Abstracts 
after the conference. The electronic edition will contain a working group 
summary from the Working Group Chairs.
Finally, we would like to extend our gratitude to all presenters for sharing 
their thoughts with the rest of us – hence providing us with new ideas, 
concepts and perspectives. We would also like to thank the participants of the 
#ISMS17 for contributing in the Military Sciences discourse – challenging 
our taken for granted presumptions, and the Norwegian Defence University 
College for providing the funds for publishing this Book of Abstracts and 
thus ensuring the preservation of the conference presentations.
Anders McD Sookermany, ISMS President and Norwegian ISMS Council member
Eystein L. Meyer, Head of the #ISMS17 Conference Committee
David M. Last, Canadian Council member and WG9 Chairperson
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Description of the ISMS Working 
Groups
1. War Studies
Military strategy, operational art and tactics, contemporary operations, 
conflict, future warfare, asymmetrical warfare, psychological operations, 
peace support ops, COIN, military support for civil authority, doctrine 
development, military theory and practice, lessons learned and identified, 
terrorism and counter-terrorism, organized crime, intelligence, military 
policing, international police operations, regional approaches, privatization 
of security, special forces.
Chair: Professor Dr. John David Young, Royal Military College of Canada 
E-mail: Young_j@rmc.ca
2. Military History
Chronological, geographical, component (army, navy, air force), thematic, 
military biography.
Chair: Dr. Douglas Ford, Baltic Defence College 
E-mail: douglas.ford@baltdefcol.org
3. Military Technology
Information systems, systems testing, impact of technology on operations, 
weaponry, interaction with human dimension, R&D agendas, industry 
connections, life cycles and defence acquisition, network centric warfare 
and network enabled capabilities.
Chair: Professor Dr. Hannu Kari, Finnish National Defence University 
E-mail: hannu.kari@mil.fi
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4. Leadership, Command and Control and Basic Competences
Sense-making, trust, stress, group cohesion and resilience, case studies, 
cultural awareness, gender, communication skills, mediation & negotiation, 
self-reflection, organizational culture, diversity management, temporary 
units, physical and psychological characteristics, human factors analysis, 
cognitive abilities, recruitment and selection, education and training, post-
traumatic stress, military medicine.
Chair: Dr. Soili Paananen, Finnish National Defence University 
E-mail: soili.paananen@mil.fi
5. Law and Ethics
International law of armed conflict, international humanitarian law, rules 
of engagement, jus in Bello, jus ad bellum, jus pos bellum, status of forces 
agreements, pre-emptive action, moral dilemmas, values and transmission 
of values.
Chair: Professor Dr. Maja Eriksson, Swedish National Defence College 
E-mail: Maja.ErikssonKirilova@fhs.se
6. Security and Defence Policy and Strategy
International organizations, actors, factors-threats, cooperation, security 
regimes, alliances and coalitions, interests, risk evaluation and management, 
international relations, scenario development, crisis management, security 
complexes, influence strategy, coercion, deterrence, modelling, game theory, 
defence diplomacy, etc.
Chair: BG Dr. Wolfgang Peischel, Austrian National Defence Academy 
E-mail: wolfgang.peischel@bmlvs.gv.at
19
MILITARY SCIENCES – THE BACKBONE OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS? – BOOK OF ABSTRACTS ISMS 2017
7. Armed Forces and Society
Nation-building, institutional gaps, military sociology, armed forces as 
societies, armed forces in society, civil-military relations, conscription and 
professional armies, gender-ethnicity-identity and minorities, military 
families, unions and soldier associations, social experimentation and social 
activism with armed forces, media, public opinion, democratic control of 
armed forces, security sector reform, international cooperation, privatization.
Chair: Prof. Dr. Rene Moelker, Netherlands Defence Academy 
E-mail: r.moelker.01@nlda.nl
8. Defence Management and Economics
Resource management, change management, transformation, cost-benefit 
analysis, logistics, defence acquisition, strategic personnel policy, accounting, 
defence administration, military industrial complex, measures of effectiveness, 
benchmarking, outsourcing, privatization, base closures, infrastructure issues.
Chair: Prof. Dr. Robert Beeres, Netherlands Defence Academy 
E-mail: rjm.beeres@nlda.nl
9. Military Education
Curriculum development, pedagogy, standards and evaluation, professional 
development, academic freedom, case studies/simulations/exercises, professional 
collegiality in military education.
Chair: Associate Professor Dr. David M. Last, Royal Military College of 
Canada 
E-mail: last-d@rmc.ca
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WG 1  
War Studies
How innovation theory can 
contribute to the military operations 
planning process
Kåre Dahl, major
Institute for Military Operations, Royal Danish Defence College
imo-ao02@fak.dk
Therese Heltberg, PhD.
Institute for Leadership and Organization, Royal Danish Defence College
anhe@fak.dk
Keywords: Military planning processes, innovation theory, COA development, 
perceptions of knowledge, military education
The research study considers how the application of innovation theory 
might contribute to military staff work planning processes and bring new 
perspectives to operational models of analysis such as NATO’s Comprehensive 
Operations Planning Directive (COPD) and the Danish Field Manual III.
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The aim of this presentation is to present some theoretical considerations 
and empirical findings from a preliminary research study investigating the 
information metabolism of military planning groups – commanders and 
their staff – in the operative planning process. The study considers the 
military staff work’s translation of information, capabilities, and desired 
strategic outcomes into operation plans and combines the empirical findings 
with innovation theory and theories on leadership. The background for this 
ambition is the need to increase agility and creativity of military planning in 
response to seemingly still more complex hybrid conflicts and operational 
environments in which the military is engaged (see Griffin 2016).
The research project explores the value of innovation theory for military 
planning processes and suggests areas where, according to our findings, it 
seems possible and valuable to integrate recent theoretical developments 
within the innovation domain into the military planning practice.
Approaches leaning on innovation theory have proliferated in social studies 
and organizational development projects in recent years. Innovation theory 
(according to some analytical distinctions; see for instance Mayland 2017; 
Roberts 2017; Darsø 2011 and 2012; Grigsby et al. 2011) comprises a number 
of central concepts and ‘reflection points’. These include for instance the 
concept of design thinking; the distinction between convergent and divergent 
thinking; the focus on embodied competences and taken-for-granted world views 
embedded in the performance of routine practices (such as the military 
planning process as depicted by NATO’s Comprehensive Operations Planning 
Directive, COPD1); the interest in meanings, i.e. norms, world views, and 
values that guide and saturate these practices; and the systemic attention on 
relations as well as the implicit ‘code of conduct’ implied in these relations. 
It is a central observation of the study that these factors may be influenced 
and enhanced by a number of leadership techniques.
The project was rooted in a social constructivist perspective. The research 
approach was qualitative with the aim to investigate military planning and 
operations development processes and illuminate subjective experiences 
of these processes. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted 
1 COPD is a NATO planning directive designed to facilitate a collaborative approach in mili-
tary planning
23
MILITARY SCIENCES – THE BACKBONE OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS? – BOOK OF ABSTRACTS ISMS 2017
and combined with an observational study in order to get knowledge about 
the research interests. The empirical data included interviews with central 
military staffs working with operational planning. Participants were selected 
on the basis of their experience as instructors and/or facilitators of military 
planning processes. All of them were well-experienced with taking part in 
the military planning process and COA development. The observational study 
followed the Danish officer training in the MA level course Joint Campaign 
Planning and parts of the course Advanced Land Operations conducted at 
the Royal Danish Defence College in 2016–2017. Furthermore the analysis 
included a literature study of Danish and NATO staff work guidelines and 
integrated this with innovation theory and theories on leadership.
Our findings pointed to at least four central themes where innovation theory 
may contribute to a further development of the military planning process:
• The challenge of getting planning staffs to switch to a divergent mindset 
when working within convergent thinking structures.
• Factors related to the importance of embracing and enhancing diversity as 
a condition for reflective, critical thinking. These factors included: the 
composition of staffs and the structuring of planning and analysis processes; 
the importance of staff working groups being capable of establishing an 
internal ‘cognitive disjunction’ in order to avoid groupthink (cf. Janis 1972); 
the importance of instituting an openness towards unruly perspectives 
and wild ideas (cf. Darsø 2011; Mayland et al. 2017); and the need for an 
organizational awareness of the dominant perception of knowledge. The 
perception of knowledge plays a key role in the effort to avoid internal 
antagonistic debate cultures where disagreement is perceived as ‘either-or’ 
rather than considered as an important contribution to create exploring 
dialogues that may improve the final outcome (e.g. the COA)
• The balancing of constraints and restraints. The COA development process 
may be regarded as the processual and conceptual center where the 
operational (or tactical) plan is forged. Our findings pointed however to 
the fact that sometimes the function of this center seems to be that of 
assembly rather than of innovation.
• The influence of the ‘time factor’ and what to do with it.
The main intention of the presentation is not to assert certain findings as facts. 
Rather we wish to present some preliminary observations and theoretical 
reflections in order to invite researchers and military professionals to engage 
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in a dialogue that expands and qualifies current perspectives on military 
staff work planning processes with the view to improve military education 
and organization. Questions such as the ones raised by Zweibelson (2015) 
concerning the (in)commensurability between military planning and design 
thinking, or the challenges in relation to instituting organizational changes 
as identified by Roberts2 (2017) will be interesting to explore in light of this 
theme.
References
Darsø, L. (2012). Innovation competency: an essential organizational asset. 
In: Høyrup, S., Hasse, C., Bonnafous-Boucher, M., Lotz, M., Møller, K. (eds.). 
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The evolution of operational 
intelligence causative Russian 
special services on the territory of 
the Republic of Poland
Beata Gostomczyk
Polish National Defence University
Beatka8blue@wp.pl
Due to its purpose, intelligence activities can be divided into two groups:
 – informational intelligence – traditional, providing the requested 
information;
 – causal intelligence – non-traditional, allowing influence on the opponent.
These types of activities are characteristic of offensive operations or information 
warfare.
The second type of intelligence will be the subject of my PhD dissertation.
The purpose of the proposed presentation is to present the results of the initial 
stage research and the problems with shaping the concept of the dissertation.
The history of the Soviet Union, and especially its security services since the 
late 1930s, has become impersonal. There were no individual people behind 
the events they have implemented. The tendency for anonymity in publicly 
available publications on the institution of the soviet state is particularly 
noticeable in the texts devoted to special services. Only in the 1990s began 
to appear information’s about staff cast of the state security services.
In the period of perestroika and glasnost gradually began to depart from the 
principle of confidentiality, and in the literature began to appear information 
about the facts of service officers. However, the selectivity and persistence 
of the presented information was related to the deliberate introduction of 
disinformation, which is also one of the basic methods of operational work 
today.
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The Russian state security organs, both in the past and at present, operate 
as a state in the state without limiting the ethical, legal or humanitarian 
framework. Their activity is inextricably linked to the currently set strategic 
objectives of the state and the operational objectives of the services, which 
are a common result.
Apart from the classical forms and methods Russian special services operations, 
over time, the education has been much more complicated, the success of 
which depends on the role of agents, their training, wits and intelligence 
as well as happiness. Many of the activities are also targeted at people with 
specific professional and intellectual skills, and psychological traits. It should 
be borne in mind that the intelligence activities of a foreign country carried 
out in the territory of a second country are always hostile and aimed at 
obtaining strategic information.
In accessible literature there is no available information on the risks arising 
from the identified operational activities of the Russian intelligence service for 
the Republic of Poland and the methods used to achieve a specific objective. 
There is also no information indicating modus operandi of Russian agendas. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to study collected data and to find answers to 
the questions that have been asked in the course of the study.
As a result of analyzes of available sources of information, a problem is 
identified which requires thorough research into the definition of modus 
operandi and the reasons for the application of specific operational techniques 
of the Russian special services depending on the emerging geopolitical, 
economic and internal situation against the Republic of Poland. Research will 
also seek to verify the thesis that the intelligence methods used so far have 
undergone a constant evolution in geometric progress, which is conditioned 
by the ongoing civilizational changes. On this basis, efforts will be made 
to identify methods to counteract intelligence activities, also taking into 
account the psychological conditioning of the individual. For these purpose, 
to make a diagnosis, will be used a comparative analysis.
The subject and scope of the study will be defined by the defined and disclosed 
public opinion of the activities of Russian special services in the territory of 
the Republic of Poland since the beginning of World War II.
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The characteristics of identified and disclosed public opinion cases of active 
intelligence activities in a dissertation will refer to cases that have ended in 
the court. However, it should be borne in mind that most of the identified 
activities of the Russian agencies end in a different way from the judicial 
decision.
The author of the dissertation will seek to answer the question of what dangers 
arise from the operational activities of the Russian special forces and how their 
methods of action for the Republic of Poland have changed according to the 
geopolitical situation, the ideological influence and the strategic objectives 
of the Russian Federation. Taking into account the accepted object, scope of 
the research and research problem, it should be assumed that the purpose 
of the research will be identification and identification of threats resulting 
from the operational and operational documents described in available 
operational documents of the Russian special forces in the territory of the 
Republic of Poland since the Second World War. The research process will 
be based on a case study. Based on preliminary research conducted using 
comparative analysis, the evolution of the information war in cyberspace 
has been determined as one of the methods of conducting information 
intelligence.
In addition, as a result of the initial literature research, it was found that 
in the intelligence operations, the focus is on the pursuit of action that is 
derived from the following elements:
 – great-power aspirations of individual states seeking international dominance 
– the more aspirational aspirations, the more a country strives to exert 
greater influence on its international environment, that is, to other states;
 – the state of international relations is a political (and often military) conflict 
between states or political camps – the worse the relationship, the stronger 
the conflict, the individual states (political and military blocs) are more 
determined to weaken and destabilize the situation in the enemy camp. 
To less and less closely look at the state of mutual diplomatic relations 
and, consequently, take increasingly radical steps (including diversion, 
sabotage, and assassins);
 – the situation in a given country or political camp, that is, strength or 
weakness, the worse the situation in a given country or political camp 
(weakness of power and military, international isolation, internal socio-
political and ethnic conflicts, the more it is exposed and susceptible 
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to activities conducted in the field of intelligence conducted by other, 
especially hostile states and political blocs.
In conclusion, it is worth to mention that the federal intelligence guidelines 
for the intelligence services leave no illusions about the aims and scope of 
their actions. The basic tasks of intelligence include supporting international 
interests of the Russian Federation through post-secret and secret activities. 
The aim is to implement the Kremlin’s political plans to ensure Russia the 
widest impact on the international scene.
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The proposed presentation is devoted to the alarming and increasing 
phenomenon of the homegrown violent extremism that recently manifests 
itself on the European continent in a form of terrorism employing non-combat 
low-tech, daily tools or «Do-It-Yourself» (DIY) technology. The author analyses 
approaches and looks for practices that prevent, counter or minimise the 
threat.
The discussed threat has been recently tragically exemplified by attacks 
in major European cities as Paris, Berlin, London or Stockholm, but also 
has been observed on a daily basis in Israel for the last couple of years. 
The trend is rising, what attracts attention of the Academia, and European 
security services overwhelmed by lack of pre-emptive response measures. 
It encourages to investigate the nature of the phenomenon and the ways to 
prevent and counter it.
The aforementioned terrorist incidents were conducted by Islamist extremists, 
yet the latter are not the only to constitute homegrown violent extremism (or 
domestic terrorism – the terms tend to be used interchangeably, contextually, 
though, might have different connotations – especially in the context of 
countering the phenomena) as examples of white-supremacists’ (or similar 
groups) attacks against Muslim or refugee communities are on the rise too. 
In recent years, though, Islamist extremism, due to its brutality and ultimate 
end-goals, remains one of the biggest threat to stability of European societies.
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Therefore, European homegrown Islamist extremism is most often associated 
with militant Salafism (similarly to extremism, which may be violent or 
not, Salafism too, most frequently, is not violent, yet some its offshoots are 
violent, thus they are called militant Salafists). This radical form of Islam is 
being spread in the West by the Arab Gulf-funded clerics and thrives thanks 
to freedom of communication and travel. These two elements are crucial 
in exacerbating the threat, as there is no ‘structure’ of militant Salafism 
and ties between various and numerous groups, associations and networks 
are loose, if not only ideological (Frazer Egerton, Jihad in the West: The Rise of 
Militant Salafism, Cambridge 2011). The exchange of ideology, ‘know-how’, 
finances, people remains fluent and almost invisible, what was well illustrated 
by the steady financial flows between extremist organisations and radical 
mosques in the USA under the guise of charities (Steven Emerson, American 
Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us, New York 2002) and even after tough 
post-9/11 countermeasures were put it place, some pseudo-charities and 
radical mosque still spread extremist ideology and channel terrorist funding 
(Steven Emerson, Jihad Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the US, New 
York 2006). In Western Europe, Islamist extremism is, similarly as in the 
United States, deeply enrooted in Muslim communities and profiting from 
Western freedoms. Yet, as the extremist elements are only marginal part of 
the communities, collaboration with Muslim societies is one of the most 
important element of successful counter-terrorism policy (Robert Lambert, 
Countering al-Qaeda in London: Police and Muslims in Partnership, 2011).
There are twelve radicalisation mechanisms (individual, group, and mass) 
– that pull and push people onto extremist path (Clark McCauley, Sophia 
Moskalenko, Friction. How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us, New York 
2011). To some, one might be enough, yet often it is a result of several factors 
that contribute to one’s radicalisation. An exemplary study of the Paris 
«Bataclan» attack of November 2015, shows that most of ten terrorists were 
European-born or lived many years on the continent, and thus obtained a 
citizenship or permanent resident’s permit, what qualifies them as «domestic» 
and «homegrown». Majority of them also travelled abroad (to Syria) for jihad 
training and remained in close contact between Paris and Brussels, what 
validates Egerton’s thesis that synergy of free communication and movement 
highly increases terrorists’ capabilities. Similar conclusions can be drawn 
from study of any other recent Islamist attack on the continent (Charlie Hebdo 
2015, Brussels 2014, Woolwich 2013, Toulouse and Montauban 2012, etc.) 
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– homegrown extremists, most of whom travelled for the training abroad 
(Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, etc.), committed terrorist acts against their own 
countrymen. Such profile of homegrown man, most of whom travel abroad 
for training, will be most common among Islamist terrorist in the West (Jason 
Burke, The New Threat From Islamic Militancy, London 2015). Due to the fact, 
that acquiring automatic weapons, explosive devices or bomb ingredients 
becomes harder, the terrorists tend to use common and daily tools such as a 
kitchen knife and a car in their attacks (e.g. Woolwich 2013, London Bridge 
2017, Paris Louvre Museum 2017). The number of casualties might be lower, 
but such a terror act is easier to commit and the outcome might not be lesser 
at all. It challenges the authorities’ abilities to act and prevent such attacks 
(for they are extremely hard to predict) – especially as they risk of becoming 
our daily routine. Close work with the communities and governmental and 
NGOs counter-narrative programmes seem to be solutions that can limit the 
scope of the threat, though, it will not be possible to eradicate it entirely.
The detailed conclusions and recommendations will be added upon completion 
of the research (due to October 2017).
The presentation will be a result of research being currently conducted by 
the author in Oxford and the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and 
Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews.
33
MILITARY SCIENCES – THE BACKBONE OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS? – BOOK OF ABSTRACTS ISMS 2017
An Integrated Multiplatform 
Approach To Joint Operations 
For Fighting Terrorism And Other 
International Threats
Jaana Kuula, PhD (ict/mil), PhLic (is/econ)
University of Jyväskylä, Faculty of Information Technology Finland
Jaana.Kuula@jyu.fi
Nowadays, governmental and fanaticism based provocation with ultimatums 
and threatening acts, as well as terrorism with CBRNE threats dominate 
international news. Also the use of electronic and information warfare are 
reported frequently. This kind of irresponsible behavior, veiled targeted 
information, electronic and cyber operations, and even direct violent acts 
towards other nations shake the line between the state of peace and war, 
and consequently, there appears to be at the moment an increased threat 
level on all over the world. Due to the situation, and possibly partly due to 
the fast development of technology and commercial interests of defence 
industry, new methods of warfare are taken in use increasingly. Especially, 
governments and defence industries invest currently heavily in robotics, 
autonomous systems and AI. These in turn increase the variety of capability 
requirements of military forces and defence, as the means of electronic 
warfare and RAS systems do not directly replace common warfare methods 
or the use of human force. Instead, new technologies and methods are 
at this stage added on the earlier armament and capability requirements 
become increased accordingly. For example, within the ground forces tanks 
are expected to stay as one of the key elements of armament for a long time 
ahead, and CBRN will stay as a significant threat in war, despite of being 
prohibited and banned globally by the declaration of the UN. Together with 
the development of technology and armament, there is an ongoing debate 
on whether the use of RAS and electronic warfare with robotized weaponry 
is ethic or even controllable at all. For example, automated systems are 
suspected to shoot people unselectively without human decision or to take 
power and control over humans. It has therefore been suggested that the 
UN should ban this kind of weaponry, even though the defence industry 
MILITÆRE STUDIER SE/2017
34
has already created them and is continuing to develop them further. This 
presentation discusses the described theme from the defensive and protective 
side by claiming that robotized and autonomous systems are, until certain 
point, necessary in military use for saving lives and for eliminating CBRNE 
threats before they are born. The claim is reasoned by introducing an 
integrated multiplatform operating concept for detecting CBRNE threats 
in all domains and at all stages of a potential CBRNE strike like an attack 
with a chemical weapon. It is urgent that the preparation, planning and 
use of this kind of WMDs is detected and prevented in advance and that the 
released toxic agents are identified safely before human forces enter the place. 
The described safe detection of CBRNE threats in all occasions entails that 
surveillance and reconnaissance can be carried out scalably from varying 
distances by using intelligent sensors with different manned and unmanned 
operating platforms. These include manned and unmanned aircrafts and 
ground vehicles, such as airplanes, helicopters, UAVs, UGVs and drones, 
as well as hand held, wearable and stationary detection devices including 
instruments that are used inside mobile laboratories in the field. There also 
are solutions for underwater and surface detection on water, and many of 
the unmanned airborne solutions can be used in addition to the ground 
forces by the navy. Although single CBRNE threats may be detected in small 
local releases with a single specialized device, it is necessary to be prepared 
also for larger, multi-source and escalating threats with highly developed 
multiplatform detection systems by minimizing simultaneously the need of 
using human force in exposed areas. This kind of scenarios are plausible in 
international joint operations in all over the world, and in a smaller scale in 
multi-authority operations in severe CBRNE incidents within one country. 
Due to the above mentioned unpredictable international situation and 
technological development there also is an additional question of whether 
some of the autonomous CBRNE detection systems should be equipped with 
arms. This question is, however, more relevant for international military 
operations and less likely in homeland security. In addition, potential arms 
would possibly not be mounted in detectors per se, but as an additional 
payload on common operative platforms. However, as in this presentation 
some models of the referred CBRNE detection technology utilize powerful 
light sources, such as laser beams, there might, theoretically speaking, be a 
chance that the same detection devices would be modified to operate in a 
two-way mode. One functionality of the device would in that case be able 
to detect a CBRNE threat, and another to stop parties who are preparing or 
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carrying out actions for harming innocent people, businesses and property 
with that threat. The referred integrated multiplatform operating concept 
for the detection of CBRNE threats has been created within a European 
Commission funded Toxi-triage project of eight countries for producing 
new technical methods for managing large-scale CBRNE emergencies. The 
outputs of the project are primarily aimed at the first responders’ use and 
for the dual use by military forces. The integrated multiplatform concept 
is created by the University of Jyväskylä as a part of the development of a 
hyperspectral CBRNE detection method and it is partly based on a recent 
doctoral dissertation research that was carried out in association with the 
National Defence University in Finland. The Toxi-triage project is led by UK 
and other partner countries are Finland, Germany, Norway, Greece, Spain, 
Czech Republic and the Netherlands.
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The aim of this presentation is to present a literature review that shows a lack 
in current literature when it comes to how strategic effects from strategic air 
attacks are measured. The review is produced as a part of the authors PhD 
and coves theory from airpower zealots, airpower conservatives as well as 
literature on operations assessment and performance measures. For decades, 
airpower theorists and military scholars of all sorts have debated the utility of 
airpower in offensive operations. Is it possible to influence decision-makers 
through kinetic offensive operations to such a degree that it would actually 
change the course of the war? Is it possible to create strategic effects with 
offensive airpower? The jury is still out when it comes to a clear answer, 
and current literature is divided into two positions. One side (e.g. Douhet 
and Warden), argues that airpower used correctly will be able to influence 
decision-makers and together with other instruments – or in some cases all 
alone – be able to deliver decisive strategic effect. The other side (e.g. Pape 
and Creveld) uses history as their primary argument and says it has never 
happened and it never will. Before we go deeper into the debate, it is necessary 
to appreciate the terms strategic effect and strategic attack. Once these terms 
are fully understood the next logical question – which also is the question 
that can put an end to the debate – or at least qualify it – is can we measure 
the strategic effect of strategic air attacks? If we can, we should be able to 
help the jury qualify the answer. If we cannot the debate appears to be based 
on assumptions, theories, and believes – some would say faith – and not 
facts. First, we need to establish what strategic effect and strategic attack is. 
In Allied Joint Publication 3.3(B) for Joint Air and Space Operations (NATO 
doctrine), NATO uses the phrase Strategic Attack. It defines Strategic Attack as: 
«A strategic attack is a JFT [Joint Task Force]-directed offensive action against 
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a target, whether military, political, economic or other, that is specifically 
selected to achieve military strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken 
the adversary’s ability or will to engage in conflict or continue an action 
and as such, could be part of a campaign, major operation, or conducted 
independently as directed by the Alliance. Additionally, these attacks may 
achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to achieve operational 
objectives as a precondition.» Though the actual paragraph in AJP-3.3(B) is 
slightly longer than the text above, this is about all NATO doctrine offers 
on the subject and the only definition of strategic attack in NATO doctrine. 
Strategic attack is also mentioned in AJP-01(E) Allied Joint Doctrine as a 
possibility, but without any further elaboration. USA goes somewhat further 
and the U.S. Air Force has issued Air Force Doctrine Document 3–70 for 
Strategic Attack. The AFDD 3–70 describes Strategic Attack as: «Strategic 
attack is offensive action specifically selected to achieve national strategic 
objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary’s ability or will to 
engage in conflict, and may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily 
having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition. [...] Strategic 
attack provides an effective capability that may drive an early end to conflict 
or achieve objectives more directly or efficiently than other applications of 
military power.» There is little doubt that the two actors’ air forces and air 
forces’ doctrines believe in the possibility to create strategic effect through 
offensive air operations. When looking at the two actors planning documents 
a similar agreement on how to plan offensive operations occurs. Both start 
with the desired end-state and plan backwards through strategic objectives, 
operational objectives and effects to actual actions, meaning that an action 
will create an effect. One or more effects will lead to an objective and one 
or more objectives will lead to an objective at a higher level or directly to 
the end-state. Lacking further NATO definition or doctrine on the matter of 
strategic attack (SA) let us take a look at AFDD 3–70 to learn how the USAF 
envisions the matter: «Unless the enemy’s military forces are deemed to 
be a strategic COG, they are not useful as SA targets. In fact, the goal of SA 
operations is to bypass the fielded forces to the maximum extent possible. A 
way to illustrate this concept is to think of the military as a tool being used 
by a nation or organization to enforce or force its will. It very often makes 
more sense to attack the person, nation, or organization using the tool rather 
than the tool itself. SA’s goal is to exert influence on the decision-maker 
rather than the tool being used by the decision-maker.» And now back to 
the main question; how can planners tell if they are successful in exerting 
MILITÆRE STUDIER SE/2017
38
influence on their opponents decision-makers through their actions? It is 
highly unlikely that future opponents’ decision-makers will provide NATO 
or the U.S. with a weekly status report on effects achieved on their will or 
ability to wage war. In fact, it is very unlikely that they will reveal anything 
at all if possible. Hence, those who plan offensive air operations in the form 
of strategic attacks must find ways to measure the effects of their actions and 
measure the strategic effect obtained on their opponents’ decision-makers. 
How this is accomplished remains however a mystery. One should think that 
airpower zealots, or more conservative views on airpower, or documents on 
operations assessment would offer insight to the subject. Nonetheless, the 
literature review shows that the two opposing sides offers no answers to the 
question, nor does literature on operations assessment. Neither former nor 
current airpower zealots and proponents of strategic attack and strategic 
effect offers any solutions or ideas for that matter, on how to measure the 
effect of their actions. In fact, they do not touch the subject in their writings 
and leaves their readers with a more theoretical than practical take on the 
subject. Airpower conservatives whom disregard the idea of strategic attack 
and strategic effect do also not cover the subject. In their writings, they use 
historical examples to support their arguments on airpower’s failed attempts 
to create strategic effects, but they too neglect to offer any insights on how 
strategic effects are measured during ongoing operations. Finally, NATO 
and U.S. documents on operations assessment offers practical ideas on how 
effects should be planned and measured, but when it comes to specifics on 
strategic effects created by strategic air attack they too lack clarity. The same 
is the case with other publications on performance measures and operations 
assessment. In short. There is a gap in current literature on assessment of 
strategic effect obtained by offensive air operations. A gap that if filled could 
help qualify the debate on the possibility to obtain strategic effect through 
offensive air operations.
39
MILITARY SCIENCES – THE BACKBONE OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS? – BOOK OF ABSTRACTS ISMS 2017
References
Ferrari, D. (1998): «The Command of the Air». Air Forces History and Museums 
Program.
Warden, J. A. (1988): «The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat». National 
Defense University Press. Pape, R. A. (1996): «Bombing to Win». Cornell 
University Press.
Creveld, M. v. (2011): «The Age of Airpower». Public Affairs.
NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.3(B) (2016): «Joint Air and Space Operations». 
NATO.
NATO Allied Joint Doctrine 01(E) (2017): «Allied Joint Doctrine». NATO.
U.S. Air Force Doctrine (2017): «Annex 3–70 Strategic Attack». U.S. Air Force.
MILITÆRE STUDIER SE/2017
40
Rapid British Amphibious Response 
as a Force Multiplier in the Nordic – 
Baltic Theatre
Eystein L. Meyer, Commander
Norwegian Defence University College, Norway
elmeyer@fhs.mil.no
British leadership in Northern Europe is welcomed by the Nordic – Baltic 
States for several reasons. However, the common interest in keeping the region 
stable and prosperous, based on democratic and liberal values, is clearly the 
foundation. Considering a more revisionistic and assertive Russia, that has 
made them the major security concern in the Nordic – Baltic countries, 
security solutions are clearly a key aspect of the willingness for increased 
cooperation and acceptance of leadership in the region. The Nordic – Baltic 
countries contributes to NATO, EU and the UK led Joint Expeditionary Force 
(JEF) because they expect a quid pro quo military support in the event of a 
Russian aggression towards themselves. That means that UK must possess 
available credible support to obtain legitimacy for leadership in Northern 
Europe.
In the event of a Russian aggression NATO’s Very high readiness Joint Task 
Force (VJTF) will have no or little utility in the Nordic – Baltic region and the 
JEF will have only British and Dutch forces available. This chapter will argue 
that the combined British – Dutch amphibious force should be employed 
rapidly to the most Northern area of Norway for optimized strategic effect. 
The main reasons are space to exploit superior ability to manoeuvre with 
the amphibious force and the proximity of the strategically most important 
area for Russia. The argument is based on the logic fact that the opposing 
part’s uncertainty increase proportionally with own freedom of action. 
Only increase in forces can fully mitigate the risk that follows increased 
uncertainty. Since the operational freedom of action with an amphibious 
force is larger in Northern Norway than in the Baltic, the force multiplying 
effect will be highest in Norway. Further, recommendations will be that the 
landing crafts in particular need an upgrade to high-speed and long-range 
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capabilities, that the host nation needs to locally prepare for the rapid 
establishment of necessary sea control and shaping for the insertion of the 
amphibious force, and that the range of manoeuvres will be tested, developed 
and demonstrated during exercises.
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Ethnic conflicts do not only produce domestic results, but also affect 
international relations and foreign policy. Thus, the political demands of 
some ethnic groups (eg secession) may affect the legitimacy of the state’s 
territorial borders. In some cases, other states consider it necessary for their 
own interests to intervene in domestic conflicts. In addition, ethnodiaspora 
organizations can also carry out such interventions from the outside to help 
the «ethnic compatriots». Ethnic conflicts have international feature in each 
of these cases.
The scientific approaches to the process of internationalization of ethnic 
conflicts in the Cold War was purely from a domestic aspect. It is not so 
difficult to realize this. Because the rigid bipolar system did not allow such 
confrontations to take violent character and expand. However, the bankruptcy 
of a rigid bipolar system has led to loss of control over ethnic controversies 
and threats to international interests. In particular, the intensification of 
local ethnopolitical conflicts in the complicated ethnic areas such as Balkans 
and the Caucasus, which have fallen into the global geopolitical alteration 
zone, have given them an international inter-state character.
As a result, we come to the conclusion that the internationalization of ethnic 
conflicts can have different consequences for each conflict:
• the conflict may be exacerbated by external interference;
• Conflict can be the result of the interference of foreign interests;
• mitigating conflict as a result of international care and pressure;
43
MILITARY SCIENCES – THE BACKBONE OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS? – BOOK OF ABSTRACTS ISMS 2017
• a mediation or interference of external forces may result in reconciliation 
between the parties to the conflict;
• Conflict inversion, that is, ethnic conflict can be non-ethnical due to the 
special interests of foreign partners and in general it can turn into another 
kind of conflict (for example, events that have taken place in Iraq since 
2003, Arab spring since 2011).
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This research is devoted to the relations between internal friction in Iraqi 
Kurdistan and the policy of external actors towards the Kurdish political forces.
The aim of the research is to find and explain the relationships between 
some of the internal problems in the Kurdistan region and the interests of 
external actors that directly or indirectly engage in aforementioned region. 
The purpose, however, will not be focused on finding the culprit of any event 
or crisis in the region or the vicinity thereof, nor to perpetuate stereotypes or 
to build an image or to evaluate the moral of any subject discussed directly 
or indirectly.
The issue has recently gained on popularity in the media due to the 
independence referendum held by Iraqi Kurds on 25 September 2017, despite 
the opposition of almost all the actors involved in the region. The topicality 
of these events and the lack of reliable sources of information is the reason 
why the analysis of such a phenomenon is difficult, so the author will discuss 
them only briefly and will show – where it is necessary – the continuity 
of certain processes.
In the first part of the speech, the author will briefly describe the Iraqi 
Kurdistan functioning and its legal fundaments and characterize two main 
political powers the Democratic Party of Kurdistan and the Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan as the main actors on the political scene in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
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In fact, both parties control separate parts of Iraqi Kurdistan armed forces 
(Peshmerga), other security services and administration (Dennis P. Chapman, 
Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Mazda Publishers, Costa Meza, 
California 2011). During the characterization the author will use selected 
elements of the theory of Reflexive Control.
In Reflexive Control theory, particular emphasis is placed on recognizing the 
ability to perceive oneself and others (including those who seek to gain control 
of their actions). The undoubted advantage of this theory is the assumption 
that the analyzed entities can have both material and non-moral benefits, 
such as the fulfillment of sacrificial acts to improve their own image in their 
own eyes and others(Vladimir A. Lefebvre, Lectures on Reflexive Game Theory, 
Leaf & Oaks Publisher, Los Angeles 2010). With this theory, the author will 
present friction between the main Kurdish political forces and their possible 
relations with external actors, taking into account both their own image 
and how they perceive each other (Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod, The 
Kurds: Nationalism and Politics, Saqi Books, Beirut 2006). The components of 
this image are also the interests, intentions and goals. The difference in the 
latter lies at the root of friction.
The intention of the author is to present the problem in graphic form with the 
systematic analysis (Janusz Kacprzyk, Andrzej Najgebauer, Piotr Sienkiewicz, 
Badania operacyjne i systemowe a zagadnienia społeczeństwa informacyjnego, bezpieczeństwa 
i walki, Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN, Warszawa 2008) which will allow to 
clearly show complex relations between conflicting parties and their nearer 
neighbors (the other parties in the KRG parliament, the central government 
in Baghdad) and the surrounding environment as neighboring states and 
international organizations (Renata Kurpiewska-Korbut, Społeczność międzynarodowa 
wobec Kurdów irackich, Societas, Kraków 2014). The analysis also includes trends 
(eg, the fall in oil prices, the plans to diversify the EU’s oil and gas supplies).
The author’s intent is not to determine whether the Iraqi Kurds are the 
object of information attacks. To articulate this thesis would require further 
research using specialized applications that analyze, for example, content 
flow in social media.
The presentation is a result of research which was conducted by the author 
in Iraqi Kurdistan.
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Soviet and Russian Military Science 
Concept
Professor Ryszard Szpyra
Head of Doctoral Study, National Security Faculty, War Studies University, 
Warsaw
r.spyra@gmail.com
The content and understanding of military science depends on the culture 
in which it operates. Since individual cultures may vary considerably, it 
should be assumed that the understanding of military science in particular 
cultures will vary. It should also be assumed that due to the very essence of 
the war, regardless of cultural differences, there will be common elements 
in the multicultural sense of military science.
In the study of these differences relatively less literature is devoted to the 
Soviet and Russian military science. Therefore, the content of this discussion 
will be the evolution of the understanding of military science in Soviet and 
modern Russia. The reflections will be based on an analysis of original doctrinal 
documents such as: Военная энциклопедия, Петербург 1912; Большая 
Советская Энциклопедия, третье издание 1969–1978; Министерство 
обороны Российской Федерации, Военный энциклопедический словарь, 
Воениздат, 2007; Д. Рогозин, Война и мир в терминах и определениях. 
Военно-политический словарь, Вече, 2011 and other connected doctrinal 
documents and scientific publications.
Traditional understanding of war is related to the so called Westphalian 
order existing among states. Even in this context, there is no one common 
definition of war. Legal definition is not the same as one coined from 
strategic point of view. We may agree that the military aspect is the essential 
feature of war and that military forces are still one of the most important 
instruments of international policy carried out by states to secure its both 
vital and less important interests. Therefore, in Russian doctrinal literature, 
military science is strongly linked to warfare, the essence of which is the 
use of armed violence.
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However, contemporary geostrategic environment makes this problem much 
more difficult. Nowadays, we face clear appearance of a many powerful non 
state actors. What is more, recent tool set of international politics is much 
more complex that it was even a few decades ago. Moreover, importance 
of some domains of competition or struggle raised. Clear example of this is 
the information’s domain and information security issues related to it. The 
extreme form of this phenomenon is information war which is waged to 
influence the consciousness of all social groups of adversary state to distort or 
change knowledge of basic social and natural phenomena, as a consequence, 
to weaken or destroy the foundations of society, which creates conditions 
for disorganization of counter aggression measures.
The former Soviet Union and Russia, they attached great importance to 
the information sphere of rivalry and confrontation. Currently, due to the 
informative nature of the present civilization importance of information 
struggle even more increased. Now we can observe an extensive Russian 
civilian and military theoretical and doctrinal activity aimed at studying 
the problems of information warfare and war. Russians are looking at a 
new ideas, theories and practical experiences to improve their information 
warfare and war, theoretical and doctrinal concepts.
In this situation the content of the proposed speech will be then also review 
of the opinions of different Russian theorists and concepts relating to the 
military sciences as well as characteristics of Russian doctrinal views on 
the subject.
Literature
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Intelligence Engineering: Operating 
Beyond the Conventional
Adam D.M. Svendsen, PhD
Intelligence and Defence Strategist, Educator, Researcher, and Consultant
adam@asgonline.co.uk
Contemporary defence and security efforts are open to being viably improved. 
With an overarching focus on ‘ways’, ‘means’, up and across to realising 
operational and strategic-ranging ‘ends’, this paper introduces a substantially-
structured, multi-scaler ‘intelligence engineering’ (IE)-based framework and 
‘step-by-step’ toolbox. That IE toolbox and its associated toolsets are useful for 
both deployment and employment for a multitude of purposes – essentially 
whatever is to be accomplished.
In sum, spanning both #2 Intelligence (e.g. G/J2) and #3 Operations (e.g. G/J3) 
areas of endeavour, IE encompasses: 1. intelligence-associated collection/gathering 
and analysis/ assessment (estimate) work; to 2. the further operationalised 
implementation of plans and intents generated by commanders and other 
high-level leaders and policy- to decision-makers.
As the presentation goes on to reveal, the IE framework can contribute 
towards helping progress several tasks. Notably, that effort includes – but is 
not limited to – the work of interest to this overall conference, for example, 
further advancing the Military Sciences and what they can offer the full-
spectrum of practitioners and stakeholders.
Enhanced ‘situational awareness’ to deeper-ranging ‘contextualisation’ 
extending to ‘event and development transformation’ assistance value is 
offered. A main aim is for better understanding and then addressing the 
complex uncertainty experienced both now 1 Adam D.M. Svendsen, PhD 
– ISMS 2017 (War Studies Track – WG1) Tuesday, 16 May 2017 and that 
anticipated in the future – for example, as encountered in battlespaces. There 
is a strong focus on positioning, with both a priori (before) and post facto 
(after) concerns and considerations featuring, for instance, trying to better get 
‘ahead of’ event and development ‘curves’ as they unfold, at times rapidly.
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Demonstrating how they can be best harnessed, the different process 
‘steps’ cover diverse areas such as, inter alia: ‘focus/topic selection’ (e.g., 
to assist in prioritisation and targeting tasks); which ‘federation or system 
of systems dynamics’ are chosen to employ or draw upon during analysis 
and assessment/estimate work (e.g. PMESII – Political, Military, Economic, 
Social, Intelligence/Information and Infrastructural – as used in NATO); the 
different ‘system variables/attributes’ and ‘levels’ (of experience and hence 
analysis) to consider; and the fashioning of ‘signifier node(s)’ for helping 
make decisions and for developing ‘where next?’ responses relevant to both 
now and for/into the future.
Concluding, the presentation highlights that the ‘whole is greater than the 
sum of its parts’, with the entire process involved facilitating: (i) greater risk 
appreciation; and then (ii) subsequent risk management; as well as even 
advancing (iii) risk engineering to resilience qualities, in overall defence 
and security enterprises and endeavours during an era of much uncertainty.
Remaining highly complex, many concerns stay in-play. However, overall 
strategic ranging ‘ends’ can be approached effectively both in and by 
following a ‘bite-sized’ ways and means manner. Several ‘edges’ benefit 
from their ‘extra sharpening’ via the methodology and approach of IE to 
gain advantage and comprehensively acquire and maintain the all-important 
initiative. Put another way, on attainable bases, IE provides viable alternatives 
to all problems looking like nails and to all solutions then being hammers. 
Equally, IE instead better equips anyone trying to ‘eat soup with a knife’. IE 
gives us essential innovation, and fast, enabling us to better operate beyond 
the conventional.
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Serious «Gaming for Peace» and 
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Warsaw, Poland
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The aim of the conference presentation and article is to introduce the basic 
premises, methodology and goals of the 2016–2018 Gaming for Peace (GAP) 
project, an initiative funded by the European Commission, led by Trinity 
College Dublin Department of Sociology, within a 14 European nations’ 
consortium. GAP aims to generate an online game-based training curriculum 
for personnel (military, police, civilian) involved in conflict prevention and 
peace building (CPPB) missions. The purpose of the research study is to develop 
a multiple player online role-playing game which simulates scenarios from 
CPPB missions and is intended for its current and future personnel. The 
game will be used for training in:
1. ‘Soft skills’ such as negotiation, cooperation and communication, crucial 
for successful CPPB missions where diverse organizations must work 
together and with local actors to achieve the mission goals.
2. Empathic understanding of other people and roles within a CPPB setting 
in order that players may better understand the roles and motivations of 
different people they may encounter in the field.
3. Gender awareness (both inside and between participating organizations 
and in the local context of the CPPB mission) and cultural competency 
(including religious, ethnic and national sensitivities).
The GAP project aims at creating a virtual environment within which 
CPPB personnel can experience realistic mission scenarios through role-
playing not only in their own, but also other organizations (known as 
the Proteus effect). This will increase their understanding, creativity and 
ability to communicate and collaborate. The presentation will also discuss 
the evaluation methodology of the VR effectiveness in military training 
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and the recent findings of the project the results of the recent 1 Yee, Nick 
and Jeremy Beilenson. „The Proteus Effect: The effect of Transformed Self-
Representation on Behavior». Human Communication Research 33 (2007) p. 
271–290 2 Trochowska, Kamila. „Cultural neuroscience and the military. 
Applications, perspectives, controversies» in: Faucher, Colette, Ed. Advances 
in Culturally-Aware Intelligent Systems and in Cross-Cultural Psychological 
Studies. Springer, 2017 (in print) research report performed by the author on 
the state of cross-cultural competence training for CPPB3, and the prospects 
of applying them in serious gaming for the military and civilians (as of 
November 2017), and in serious gaming beyond the project’s target audience. 
The project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 
research and innovation program under grant agreement No 700 670. More 
information on the project can be found at http://cordis.europa.eu/project/
rcn/202 705_en.html/ and http://gap-project.eu/.
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Deterrence and Escalation 
Control as Components of Conflict 
Management: The Theory-Analysis 
Nexus as Prior Requirement for 
Effective Operational Decisions in 
the Euro-Atlantic Theatre 2014–
2017
John Young
Royal Military College of Canada
young-j@rmc.ca
Keywords: deterrence, escalation control, missile defence, conflict management, 
nested theory of conflicts, critical thinking
As Kurt Lewin, the founder of modern social psychology, famously observed: 
‘There is nothing so practical as a good theory’. In keeping with this notion 
of the real-world usefulness of formalizations of abstract reasoning, the Paper 
assesses the Euro-Atlantic theatre during the period 2014–2017 and seeks to 
link the theoretical and conceptual nuclear-deterrence literature (Freedman 
2013) with analytical models as they relate to escalation dominance, especially 
in intra-crisis interactions that threaten a breach of non-conventional 
thresholds. A particular focus of the presentation sets out the role of BMD 
within the conflict matrix, given the centrality of the missile-defence issue 
on both sides of the current NATO-Russian divide and its role as a reciprocal 
driver of operational planning and field deployments. In addition, the 
argument is made that the current crisis, set in motion by the occupation 
of Crimea by the Russian Federation, is in many critical ways seen most 
constructively as a tiered or layered conflict that adheres to the nested model 
familiar in the conflict-management literature (Dugan 2015). This model posits 
that issue-specific conflicts are frequently embedded in more encompassing 
structural systems and sub-systems within which adversarial relations and 
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interactions play out. In appealing to this line of abstract thinking the Paper 
attempts to set out the tiered context of the deterrence-reassurance and 
escalation control components of both NATO (and NATO-partner) and Russian 
deployments and planning. Informed also by the modeling of conflict that 
advances the idea that escalating stages are endemic in conflict trajectories 
and that these stages in turn are characteristically marked by discrete 
triggering events followed by a chain of action-reaction cycles (Swanstrom 
& Weissmann 2005), the Paper seeks to apply these conceptual insights to 
the current conflict – one that not only has enveloped the greater part of 
the Euro-Atlantic theatre of operations but also reverberated globally to the 
effect of intensifying other conflict zones. Reference to the Conference Theme 
concludes the Paper when the case is made for academically and operationally 
solid conceptual and analytical reasoning, grounded in both deductive 
(modeling) and inductive (rigorous case studies) approaches, as an essential 
element of pre-deployment instruction and training for effective decision-
making at key inflection points of crisis situations. As the responsibilities 
attached to carrying out operations increase, so too should prior recourse to 
state-of-the-art military sciences, including the kind of exercises in critical 
thinking set out in the proposed Paper.
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Mediation In Modern Armed 
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Keywords: mediation, armed conflict, conflict resolution
Mediation is one of the oldest and most often used methods of conflict 
resolution designed to help conflicting parties find their own solutions. In 
traditional approaches represented by Oran Young mediation is defined as 
an action taken by an actor, who is not directly part of the conflict, in order 
to reduce and remove problems between conflicted parties and terminate the 
conflict. Mediation is also described by Christopher Moore as an extension 
and elaboration of a negotiation process, it involves an intervention of a 
third party which is acceptable by contending actors. The third party is also 
neutral and impartial, and has no authoritative decision-making power to 
assist contending parties in voluntary reaching their own mutually acceptable 
settlement. A broad approach to mediation presented by Jacob Bercovitch 
defined it as a process of conflict management and related to negotiations, 
where conflict parties accept assistance from an outsider to change their 
perceptions or behavior without physical force or invoking the law. The 
empirical study suggests that mediation is used in about 70 percent of all 
conflict. However it achieves some success in 34 percent of all cases.
In this article the author argues that a number of armed conflicts resolved 
by mediation will be reduced in subsequent years. This tendency is caused 
by the dynamic evolution of the nature of a conflict initiated after the fall 
of communism in Europe in 1989, which makes conflicts seem intractable 
by using only peaceful methods. This transformation has caused changes 
in manner of understanding international conflicts, which no longer are 
perceived as state-based armed conflicts (interstate and internal conflict), 
especially after 9/11. The participation of numerous nonstate actors in conflict, 
for instance terrorist groups, crime organizations, warlords, private armies, 
has led to developing new types of conflicts namely non-state and one-sided 
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armed conflicts where the last ones include actions against civilians committed 
by terrorist organizations. It needs to be stressed that the major shift in the 
nature of armed conflicts is characterized by complex causes i.e. ethnic and 
religious divisions, political, social, economic and cultural factors, natural 
resources. The number of violent conflicts reveals an asymmetric form of 
warfare based on blends of conventional warfare, irregular warfare and 
cyberwarfare as well as mass rape, torture, ritualistic violence, mutilation of 
civilian population. Moreover, genocide often used as war tools can rapidly 
escalate local conflicts to humanitarian disasters and entail states to collapse. 
A significant consequence of a conflict is a potential split over the war intro 
neighboring countries as well as destabilizing effect of refugee flows.
Considering all the transformations changes in armed conflicts a question 
arises: How can mediation effectively contribute to resolving modern armed conflicts?
The answer will be found by analyzing and comparing traditional and modern 
approaches to mediation, with having in mind the nature of modern armed 
conflicts. During this research there will be examined factors important for 
mediation process, namely the participants’ motives in mediation, the roles 
of mediators, mediation strategy. Likewise, there will be explored factors 
influencing mediation and indicating criteria of evaluating mediation. 
Finally, the study will lead to elaborate concept of mediation contributing 
to resolving modern armed conflicts.
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WG 2  
Military History
The Egyptian Antitank Layout in 
1973 Yom Kippur War – The Answer 
to Israel’s Armor Superiority
Dr. Dani Asher, B.G. (Res)
Israel Defence Forces
The use of antitank weapons by the Arabs – especially the Egyptians – is 
regarded as one of the main innovations of the Yom Kippur War.
The two aggressor armies in Yom Kippur War – Egypt and Syria – acted 
according to the Soviet warfare doctrine. Defense in general and antitank 
defense in particular were planned down to the last detail. Since armor was 
the main tactic that Israel was expected to throw against an attack, antitank 
weapons became the Arab assault forces – especially the Egyptians – basic 
defense at the bridgeheads and in their deployment against the Israeli 
counterattack.
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The Soviet doctrine held that antitank warfare should be based on secondary 
layouts that included static and mobile alignments. Well aware of their 
inferior maneuverability, the Egyptians developed their antitank defense 
mostly on a static layout. Over the years they had reinforced the layout, 
according to doctrinal recommendations, with troop concentrations and 
task-oriented weapons in strongholds, localities, and the dominating terrain 
inside infantry layouts. These layouts were made up primarily of antitank 
weapons. The Egyptians cleverly responded to the Israeli threat by dispersing 
the concentrations in almost equal proportion along the defense lines.
The Arabs’ solution to Israel’s armored superiority was to develop and train 
on a massive scale highly sophisticated antitank forces on both fronts. Most 
of the task-oriented units were equipped with antitank missiles (usually 
«Sagers,» or as NATO termed them – AT-3s) carried on foot or transported 
by special vehicle; personal rocket launchers – especially RPG-7(That were 
used massively by infantry); antitank cannons; recoilless cannons; and even 
obsolete assault cannons used for reinforcing the western canal front.
The Egyptians fully understood that Israel’s armor superiority posed a critical 
challenge to the assault force and bridgeheads on the eastern bank. The 
solution to this problem lay in meticulously planning and establishing an 
antitank layout, with special emphasis on antitank rockets.
The effective use of various antitank weapons – especially rockets – their 
integration into different layouts and concentration at the bridgehead fronts 
produced excellent results against the IDF’s tanks in the Yom Kippur War. 
The Egyptian solution in countering enemy armor forces is still studied in 
military academies and will remain a tactic worth emulating in the future.
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Figure 14: An Infantry Battalion Crossing the Canal from its Positions and Deploying at the 
Bridgeheads (captured document)
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«Graf Strachwitz’s Raid» in August 
1944: What and how we can learn 
from World War II experience?
Valdis Kuzmins
National Defence Academy of Latvia
valdis.kuzmins@gmail.com
The Paper will look at one of most renowned German tank commander 
Hyacinth Graf Strachwitz von Groß-Zauche und Camminetz (30 July 1893 
– 25 April 1968) and one of his last successful operations in August 19 – 
20, 1944 when in less than 48 hours improvised Panzer Division Strachwitz 
covered 65 km behind the enemy’s lines and liberated Tukums. Not only 
this attack was one of the last examples of the German Blitzkrieg style of 
mechanized warfare but an example where tactical success translated into 
strategic success as well by securing German Army Group’s «North» line 
of communications. So, it should become a natural choice for a case to 
teach the Latvian Armed Forces personnel how to use mechanized forces, 
especially taking in to account the terrain which did not change much over 
the last 70 years.
Unfortunately this raid is covered in urban legends and myths. We can 
read stories like «The Panzer Count radioed the cruiser Luetzow off the 
coast, and it blew away the Soviet tank battalion with its 280 mm guns» 
(«The German Defeat in the East, 1944–45, 2001 by Samuel W. Mitcham, 
Jr) and «En route he stumbled across two Russian infantry divisions and a 
tank corps who surrendered to him in the mistaken belief that they were 
surrounded» («Panzerkrieg: The Rise and Fall of Hitler’s Tank Divisions», 2002 
by Peter McCarthy and Mike Syron). So it is hard to understand what actually 
happened and how the battle evolved into success. Panzer Divison Srachwitz 
existed only for a couple of days and after Graf Strachwitz got injured in the 
traffic accident was renamed into Panzer Divison Lauchert which disbanded 
in early October 1944 without leaving any trace in the form of War Diary 
or official after action report. That is why the well-written biographies (for 
example «Generalleutnant der Reserve Hyazinth Graf Strachwitz von Gross-
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Zauche und Camminetz: Vom kavallerieoffizier zum Führer gepanzerte 
Verbände», 2011 by Hans-Joachim Röll) while being detailed about Graf’s 
earlier experience writes about August 1944 leaving details obscure. So even 
the Military History Research Office of the Bundeswehr is their official World 
War II history while acknowledging Panzer Divison Strachwitz’s attack as a 
tactical success did not provide much detail how this success was achieved. 
On the other hand, within last two years Russian Federation published online 
lots of original wartime documents showing what happened on the other 
side and of course, we today know that Panzergraf himself did not meet a 
single Red Army tank on its way to Tukums.
Finding what happened in those fateful 48 hours was only one part of the 
task. Academically correct reconstruction of the historical event is not enough. 
To achieve personal development simple narrative should be turned in to 
the tool, so the students not only learn what happened but enhance their 
skills which are applicable in the military profession. One way is to turn 
historical narrative into the decision-forcing case, the method advocated by 
Dr. Bruce I. Gudmundsson and used in the Marine Corps University (Base 
Quantico, Virginia, USA). This method is very effective in forcing the students 
to present the solution to the problem as if they are a character from the 
past. Decision-forcing case method demands that everything presented as 
a problem should be historical to the detail which creates some problems.
Today much of the training, for example for the Junior Staff Officers, is about 
using the right terms in the right places with precise meaning. It is not the 
solution to the problem or decision itself important but how this decision 
is presented in the plan or order. For example, if we take Panzer Division 
Strachwitz order for the upcoming attack on August 19, 1944 (published in 
«Panzeroperationen Sommer 44 – „Doppelkopf» und „Cäsar», 1987 by Gerd 
Niepold) it will present the NATO officer with some unanswered questions 
– what is our area of interest, where is our FLOT etc. We can ask only for 
the solution and leave the technical details out. On the other hand, can we 
«translate» Graf Strachwitz’s order into the divisional order written according 
to the NATO standards, so the students not only search for the core of the 
problem presented but also enhance usage of the correct terminology? Will 
this «translated» order with the addition of contemporary details still be 
historical and in accordance with the decision-forcing case method?
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The paper will present the compromise achieved between the historical 
narrative, the decision-forcing case, and usage of the right terms in the 
right places.
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Three Seas Initiative as the Polish 
geopolitical concept
Piotr Lewandowski
War Studies University; Warsaw
p.lewandowski@akademia.mil.pl
The purpose of the paper is to present the historical and political determinants 
of Polish geopolitical thought in the aspect of the Three Seas Initiative. The 
Three Seas Initiative now appears as a concept whose functioning is possible 
thanks to the involvement of all political actors in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Around the whole idea of the Three Seas Initiative, there have been 
many myths and false beliefs. Poland as the main actor and director of the 
Three Seas Initiative.
The paper aims to present Polish cooperation plans under the Three Seas 
Initiative. Poland appears in this program as the main actor and director of 
the entire geopolitical concept. In this connection, it is important to grasp 
and define the aspects of cooperation between Central and Eastern European 
countries under the Three Seas Initiative.
The Three Seas Initiative is now understood as an idea of working together 
to tighten relationships. Unfortunately, it does not yet have an appropriate 
framework for involving actors. It is not an alternative to the EU and is not 
a military project either. At present, the Three Seas Initiative is an idea that 
requires an exchange of ideas and a series of strategic actions to make it 
happen.
The paper will present the historical, political, social and cultural determinants 
of the implementation of the Three Seas Initiative concept. He will try to 
answer what conditions must be met to establish cooperation between Central 
and Eastern European countries. He will also seek to work out appropriate 
levels of cooperation on which the whole idea and concept of the sea are 
firmly based.
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Longbows, Coercion-Extraction, 
and General Maximus: The Military 
Revolution of Pre-Modern and Early 
Modern Europe and the Modern 
Officer
Ethan S. Rafuse
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ethan.s.rafuse.civ@mail.mil
Professional military education (PME) institutions play a critical role in the 
ability of mid-career officers to successfully negotiate the phase in their career 
when the focus of their efforts shifts from the tactical level of war to the 
operational and strategic levels of war. One of the most important tools for 
helping officers make this transition and better understand the challenges 
they will face in the dynamic operational environment of the present and 
future is the study of the history of warfare and diplomacy. Few periods 
in European history saw such profound changes in the art and science 
of war and diplomacy as the one that saw the Western World experience 
what historian Michael Roberts famously labeled the «military revolution.» 
During this time Europe and its militaries entered the Early Modern Period, 
experiencing and driving profound changes in war and society that would 
have global implications and effects on doctrine, organizational structures 
and cultures, and tactics that endure to this day—and are certain to exert 
powerful effects on the operating environments of the future.
Drawing from the author’s extensive experience working with officers from 
over a hundred nations, ranging from major powers like the United States and 
Great Britain to smaller nations such as Poland, Canada, Belgium, Estonia, 
and Singapore, this paper is designed to offer ideas and stimulate discussion 
among multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary professionals in the field of 
military science. It will do so by addressing how lessons, ideas, and teaching 
techniques employed in the PME system in the U.S. can be relevant and useful 
for those who work in PME institutions in smaller nations and thus enhance 
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cooperation between the U.S. military and its allies and partners. It will offer 
observations and analysis of how the study, teaching, and preparation of 
curriculum on the military history of the Early Modern Period can be made 
relevant to and effectively engage military leaders and other students of 
military science in an age of smartphones and precision-guided munitions.
This presentation will be organized largely around two major concepts that 
are major concerns for teachers and students of military science today. The 
first is the debate over whether there is a «Western Way of War» that shapes 
not just how the U.S. military operates and thinks about war, but how its 
allies and partners among the states of Europe do as well. This presentation 
makes no presumption of offering the final word on this subject. Rather, it 
will be designed to serve as a point of departure for cross-disciplinary working 
group discussion and debate that addresses how the concept of the Western 
Way of War can be useful to teachers and students of military science. Among 
the directions such a discussion could take is to consider how the Western 
Way of War (and the concept of ways of war in general) can be used to help 
students develop a stronger appreciation of the ties between war and society. 
The second underlying theme in this presentation will be how the study of 
Early Modern Warfare can be approached from a pedagogical standpoint to 
facilitate student understanding of the causes, consequences, and contexts 
of revolutionary change in warfare—and in ways that provide common 
points of reference for U.S. officers and their allies and partners and thus 
enhance cooperation among nations in the conduct of military operations. 
Regardless of whatever nation’s military they serve, it is certain that one of 
the most important responsibilities PME institutions have today is to offer 
effective instruction and courseware that enhances the ability of officers 
to understand the relationship between war and society and the dynamics 
of change in warfare, for this has been and will continue to be critical to 
those facing the challenges of the complex operational environment of the 
21st century.
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Military History in Portugal.  
Post-Graduate Teaching in 
Military History in the University 
of Lisbon and the network with the 
Portuguese Military Schools
Vítor Luís Gaspar Rodrigues, PhD
Facultade da Universidade de Lisboa
José Varandas, PhD
Facultade da Universidade de Lisboa
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Keywords: Military History; Military Education; Post-Graduated training; 
Network in Military teaching
This paper intends to be integrated in the working groups: Military History 
and Military Education, and will analyze the process of integrated, graduate 
and postgraduate training centered at the University of Lisbon, which, in 
addition to other universities (University of Coimbra, University of the Azores 
and University of Madeira), brings together the Portuguese Military Academies: 
Naval Academy, Military Academy, Air Force Academy and Military University 
Institute). Date of 2012 the beginning of an interuniversity program in 
Military History which emphasizes objective analysis and critical thinking, 
rigorous research skills, an understanding of the particular sources used 
and a high standard of writing ability. Military history is not only a small 
subdivision of History, or just history of battles or operational research, but 
instead offers a framework through many aspects of historical events and 
human behavior can be understood, including economics, politics, social 
issues, among other subjects.
This MA program intends to deepen and upgrade knowledge and competences 
acquired in a Master’s Degree in History (or other kind of training). To develop 
the ability to work with and critically evaluate different types of sources, 
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to match data (albeit contradictory) obtained from such sources, to address 
complex issues in broad and multidisciplinary contexts, taking stock of 
their implications and both ethical and social responsibilities. It intends to 
develop the ability to report to a diversified audience the results of a study, 
as well as the knowledge and rationale behind it. Also aims to provide a 
high-level training that can be used as basis for developing original research, 
while allowing for sound judgment in contexts of limited or incomplete 
information. Finally intends to develop competences for enabling students 
to find autonomous ways of lifelong learning.
The mission of these joint academic and military institutions in this MA 
of Military History program is to provide students with a base of historical 
knowledge within the field of military history; build an awareness of differing 
historical interpretations; build the ability to synthesize diverse types of 
historical knowledge; build and refine student research, writing, analysis, 
and presentation skills. It is intended to develop both basic skills and a 
theoretical capacity to discuss the presented contents. In parallel intends to 
provide students with a foundation for developing a professional identity as a 
historian in the field of Military History. The aim is that the student acquires 
skills and competences to develop innovative work and independent research, 
using the methodologies and models of interdisciplinary approach. This 
program intends to train people with high-level capabilities of: 1) Creatively 
applying and integrating their knowledge in the solution to problems and 
in the proposal of hypotheses to explain the phenomena being studied; 2) 
Selecting sources and bibliography while considering their pertinence and 
credibility; 3) Applying concepts and other instruments for analysis from the 
Social Sciences in the construction of their assignment projects; 4) Developing 
critical reasoning about the past so as to identify cultural crossings and to 
avoid the critical traps of models such as the ones of national states or of 
religion, and to provide reading guidelines alternative to those of divisions 
among states or of civilisational clusters; 5) Designing research projects 
with the potential to expand the horizons of knowledge, while meeting the 
requirements imposed by academic quality and integrity standards.
This program comprises an interdisciplinary team made up of university 
professors, specialists in Military History, and officers of the different military 
academies, professors in those institutions and specialists in Military Sciences. 
In the paper to be presented we will give account of the research work 
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developed, thesis produced and interdisciplinary actions, such as national 
and international colloquia, book publishing and development of online 
resources for research in Military History.
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The epistemology of Danish military 
history – A historiographical 
overview of the use of military 
history in Danish officer education 
and its scientific implications
Anna Sofie Schøning 
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Keywords: Use of Military history History of science Military education 
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In 1975 a conference was held in Denmark to bridge the gap between academic 
military history and military history used in officer education – two subjects 
that at the time had been marginalised within their own fields. However, 
what this conference made evident was how different the understanding 
of military history was in the two circles. Military history, as taught in the 
officer education, was utilised in a very foreign way compared to academic 
history, since military history in officer education at the time was primarily 
used as a means to teach officers strategic and tactical principles or used in 
the absence of war experience. Nevertheless, the theoretical understanding 
of the use of military history is left out of the scant literature on the use 
of military history in officer education. How military history is used for 
learning purposes in the Danish officer education will therefore be examined 
in this paper. The paper commences with a historiographical analysis on the 
descriptions of military learning using military history in officer education 
found in journals, educational plans, and textbooks. It will single out the 
different trends in the literature that will subsequently undergo a thorough 
analysis in order to uncover the underlying epistemological and scientific 
understandings of the uses of military history in Danish officer education. 
Within the scarce literature on this topic, primarily written by educators in 
Denmark, there seems to be an almost unanimous understanding about the 
fact that the study of military history can prepare officers for future tasks and 
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can help shape them in becoming professionals. Yet, the understanding of 
how they can learn and what they can learn differs depending on the authors 
underlining view of military theory, though often not expressed explicitly. 
What is also not expressed explicitly is how the process of learning from 
others experiences takes place. Among the few exceptions of literature that 
does describe the epistemology of use of military history in officer education, 
are articles written by Norwegian Lieutenant colonel Dr. Harald Høiback 
and Finnish Adjunct Professor Mika Kerttunen. Kerttunen, however, argues 
against the use of military history in officer education. 2 Military history 
has had a bad reputation in academic circles because of how it was utilised 
in the military for two main reasons: One reason is founded on political 
and ethical discomfort with military history based on the perception that 
military history glorifies war. This reputation is often associated to the Danish 
academic history tradition that had strong ties to the pacifist political party 
Radikale Venstre. The other reason is methodologically and theoretically 
based. Military history was used as a tool to prove theoretical principles of 
warfare and thus, almost changing into a nomothetic science leaving the 
ideographic nature of history behind. Even for those with a different underlying 
understanding of military science, that mean they do not subscribe to the 
nomothetic notions of firm principles guiding war, military history is special. 
Since the abovementioned conference in 1975, military history in officer 
education and academic history have evolved, which calls for further studies 
on this subject. The understanding that history is studied with a purpose 
outside that of knowing more about history does not necessarily constitute 
a methodological problem for newer academic history. This paper will 
build on history theory regarding the use of history from, amongst others, 
the research group Memory and Uses of Pasts at Roskilde University with 
associate professor Bernard Eric Jensen and professor Anette Warring at the 
helm. Different theories of knowledge will also be used in order to further 
explain some of the concepts of learning presented in the historiographical 
part, including Michael Polanyis’ concept of Tacit knowledge. By describing 
how the views presented in the historiography of the Danish literature differ 
from international literature on the topic and the theoretical and scientific 
implications of this, the present will function as a preliminary study for my 
PhD-thesis. My PhD-project will investigate how the Danish Defence uses 
history in education and doctrine development to prepare for future wars 
and conflict. This paper will test some of the methodological concepts of the 
future thesis and seeks to give a preliminary understanding of how military 
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experience is transferred to learning using organizational and history theory 
focused on the use of history. References that contextualizes the topic – 
Murray, Williamson & Richard Hart Sinnreich (ed.) (2006): The Past as Prologue. 
The Importance of History to the Military Profession. Cambridge University 
Press (2006). – Høiback, Harald: Kan vi lære av historien? Et studie i militær 
kompetensefilosofi. Forsvarsstudier (2003). – Jensen, Bernhard Eric 2009. 
«Using a Past. Magistra Vitæ Approaches to history.» In: 3 Negotiating Pasts 
in the Nordic Countries, eds Anne Eriksen and Jon Vidar Sigurdson. Lund: 
Nordic Academic Press. – Polanyi, Michael: The Logic of Tacit inference. 
In: Philosophy. Vol. 41, no. 155 (1966). – Kerttunen, Mika: An Abstract 
approach. Rational non-sense to replace historical nonsense in educating 
leaders». Journal of Military Studies Vol. 2, no. 1 (2011). Summary The 
purpose of this study is to investigate how military history is used in Danish 
officer education. The paper will focus on the process of transferring past 
institutionalised experiences into learning. The paper commences with a 
historiography of military history in Danish officer education. The different 
viewpoints presented in the historiography on using military history in 
officer education will undergo a theoretical analysis that serves to give a 
new understanding of the underlying scientific implications on how to learn 
from military history.
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The Establishment of the Military 
Academy at Wiener Neustadt at 
1751 from Empress Maria Theresa 
and the Battle of Kolin at 1757
Dr. Andreas Steiger 
Theresan Military Academy
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Keywords: Organisation and training content, Empress Maria Theresa, Austrian 
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Fieldmarshall Daun, Military Maria-Theresan Order, Frederick II of Prussia
In Austria (and also may be in Europa) we are celebrating the 300 years 
birthday of Empress Maria Theresa. In 1751 she established the first military 
academy in the world – the so called „K.K. Theresanische Militärakademie» 
in Wr. Neustadt.
Maria Theresa of Austria (1717 – 1780) was the reigning Archduchess of 
Austria, Queen regnant of Hungary, Croatia and Bohemia, and Holy Roman 
Empress by marriage. She was married to Francis of Lorraine, Duke of Lorraine 
in 1736 at the age of 19 for love. She had 16 children with him.
Maria Theresa became dowager empress after the death of her husband Francis 
I, Holy Roman Emperor and accession of her son Joseph as emperor in 1765.
Maria Theresa helped initiate financial and educational reforms, promoted 
commerce and the development of agriculture, and reorganized the army, 
all of which strengthened Austria’s resources.
Continued conflict with the Kingdom of Prussia led to the Seven Years’ War 
and later to the War of Bavarian Succession.
The war of Austrian Succession began when Frederick II of Prussia (The 
Great) invaded and occupied Silesia. While Bavaria and France also invaded 
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Austria’s western territories, it was Frederick the Great, who became Maria 
Theresa’s foe during her reign.
After having been defeated in the First and Second Silesian War, Maria Theresa 
began to modernize her realms with the assistance of Frederick Wilhelm 
Graf von Haugwitz. She increased the size of the army by 200 per cent and 
increased taxes in order to guarantee a steady income for the government, 
and in particular for the military. These reforms strengthened the economy 
and the state of general.
One of the lessons learned by Maria Theresa in the wake of repeated defeat 
by her arch-foe Frederic II of Prussia was the need for a well-rounded training 
for her officer corps. Thus the far-sighted and prudent Empress deigned to 
order on 14th December 1751, that a Military Academy of Cadets’ house for 
Noblemen be established in the old Babenberg Castle of Wiener Neustadt. 
Being socially minded, she also admitted commoners of officer training and 
improved her soldiers’ rations.
The Cadets’ house for Noblemen consisted of two companies with 100 boys 
each, one for cadets of aristocratic descent and one for cadets of officers. 
Minimum age of admission was 14.
In order to provide for a constant influx of cadet aspirants, Maria Theresa 
founded a Military Seminary (so called „Pflanzschule») in Vienna for 100 
(from 1755 on for 200) sons of impoverished officers, aged 7 to 13 years. In 
1796 these two establishments, were amalgamated.
The officer training commenced on 11th November, 1752 with a first batch 
of 191 cadets. The first graduation in Wr. Neustadt was celebrated in 1755.
In the curriculum at that time, a distinction was made between the acquisition 
of knightly skills or military virtues and the «scientific» teaching in the 
classroom. The subjects of dancing, fencing, riding, saddling, fencing and 
packing, vaulting, and shooting with gun and pistol included the acquisition 
of knightly skills and military virtues. Furthermore, the «officer’s office» with 
the partisan, the rifle of the flag and the like, the stocking out of the camp 
and the guard service. The subjects of the lesson included the fortification, 
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the artillery classes, the arithmetic, the languages: French, Italian, Bohemian, 
geography and the doctrine of Christianity.
Under the Directorate-General, Fieldmarshall Anton Graf Colloredo, the 
teaching subjects were retained or supplemented in 1775. As was the case 
with teaching subjects, there was a distinction between the military virtues 
and the «scientific» teaching in the classroom. The following subjects were 
taught primarily in the classroom: Religion, Languages: German, Latin, 
French, Italian, Czech, History, Geography, Arithmetic and Alegbra, Geometry, 
Applied Mathematics, Natural History, Natural History, Differential and 
Integral Computation, Artillery science, practical geometry, field attachments, 
permanent attachment, nature and morality philosophy, situation drawing, 
letter style and tactics. To acquire the military craft for officers, the subjects 
included dancing, fencing, riding, vaulting and shooting with the gun and 
gun. Furthermore, there were the exercises and exercises, the unloading of 
the camp, guard and patrol service, and the terrain survey.
Under the Directorate-General, Field Marshall Anton Graf Colloredo, the 
teaching subjects were retained or supplemented in 1775. As was the case 
with teaching subjects, there was a distinction between the military virtues 
and the «scientific» teaching in the classroom. The following subjects were 
taught primarily in the classroom: Religion, Languages: German, Latin, 
French, Italian, Czech, History, Geography, Arithmetic and Algebra, Geometry, 
Applied Mathematics, Natural History, Natural History, Differential and 
Integral Computation, Artillery science, practical geometry, field attachments, 
permanent attachment, nature and morality philosophy, situation drawing, 
letter style and tactics. To acquire the military craft for officers, the subjects 
included dancing, fencing, riding, vaulting and shooting with the gun and 
gun. Furthermore, there were the exercises and exercises, the unloading of 
the camp, guard and patrol service, and the terrain survey.
For Maria Theresa, the founding of «her» military academy had to lay or 
create the germ cell of a corresponding «forward-looking» officer image.
The first Director of the military academies was Field Marshall Count Leopold 
Daun. He was also the commander of the Austrian troops at the battle of 
Kolin in 1757.
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At the battle of Kolin, on 18th June, 1757 – near Prague – Austrian troops 
fought against the Prussian troops. The commander of the Prussian troops 
was Frederick the Great. The k.k. „Austrian» army won this battle.
At Kolin the imperial «Austrian» infantry was better managed than those 
of the Prussians. There was a superiority of the imperial cavalry and above 
all the artillery. The Austrian victory was due to the good position selection 
in the field and the numerical superiority. A decisive factor was also the 
better reconnaissance and the possible counter-measures of the Austrian 
troops against a Prussian maneuver. For the first time the Austrian troops 
had already been trained by the first graduates of the military academy in 
Vienna. Neustadt.
As a result the Military Maria-Theresan Order was founded. This order 
(decoration) of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was founded by the Empress 
Maria. It was one of the prestigious and eagerly sought-after military awards 
that the Austro-Hungarian monarchy could bestow. It was specifically given for 
„successful act of essential impact, of a campaign that was undertaken on the 
officer’s own initiative, and might have been omitted by an honourable officer 
without reproach. This highest accolade of the Austro Hungarian monarchy 
came in three categories: Knight’s Cross, Commander’s Cross and Grand Cross.
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Today, it is not only feasible to read brain signals, decode them and use for a 
simple control of devices, but also to extract the information which remains 
‘hidden’ and subconscious in our brain. Furthermore, brain stimulation creates 
novel means of altering man’s mental and physical capabilities, behaviour, 
as well as her mood and emotions. Overall, neuro-technologies have the 
potential of merging brain and machine in a close and empowering interplay. 
As such neuroscience is one of the most promising fields of prospectus 
military human enhancement aiming ultimately to create super-soldiers.
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Science fiction helps to realize the potential of present-day advances in 
science and technology. Most importantly, it brings them to their future 
logical conclusions. There are many probable paths of development that 
technoscience can take and there are plentiful social, economic and political 
consequences, ethical dilemmas, and risks that they can respectively give 
raise to. It is thus welcome that fascinating though gloomy visions of the 
near-future are increasingly and refreshingly brought into public awareness 
by literature, movies, video games and TV series. One of the most interesting 
and challenging television anthology is stirring Black Mirror created by Charlie 
Brooker and first broadcasted in 2011. This paper is an attempt to review how 
plausible is the vision of neuro-high-tech future soldier depicted in one of its 
episodes: Men Against Fire (2016). As a thought experiment, it may help grasps 
the main directions of US military research and development in neuroscience.
In the movie, high-tech brain-machine interface (BMI) is the grim fulfilment 
of centuries-old military aspirations to turn man into top performer soldier. 
The core of the story in Men Against Fire is brain-computer interface called 
‘MASS’ used by the commanders to program the performance and behaviour 
of soldiers, reward or punish them, and prevent combat-related PTSD. It thus 
serves four intertwined functions. The first is the dehumanisation of the 
enemy. The second is making the killing emotionless, automatic and hence 
more effective. The third function is the prevention of mental disorders 
through memory management. And the last, though not the least important 
is rewarding good performance. How much science is in this SF vision? How 
close is the US military in achieving these goals?
Well, cyborg technologies no longer belong to the realm of science fiction 
only. In 2016 Elon Musk, a famous entrepreneur and innovator, set up a new 
research company called ‘Neuralink’ with the aim of designing a technology 
to biologically merge human brain with computer through a fully functional 
invasive brain interface, based on the neural lace technology. The ultimate 
goal is to be able to use thoughts to interact with the increasingly artificially-
intelligent machines. Other companies including Facebook and Kernel are 
also known to be working on systems to connect brain with computers. Yet, 
the most advanced in this field and best suited to succeed in developing this 
breakthrough technology is the US military. Since the turn of the 21st century 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has been pursuing 
numerous neuroscience programs. The military counterpart of Elon Musk 
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venture is, in fact, DARPA’s most recent program Neural Engineering Systems 
Design (NESD). Its ambitious goal is to ‘develop an implantable system able to 
provide precision communication between the brain and the digital world.’ In 
a word, the US military seeks a high-resolution, implantable neural interface.
DARPA’s past neuroscience programs included, for example, Neuroscience 
for Intelligence Analysis and Cognitive Technology Threat Warning System (CT2WS) 
which were based on the idea of extracting unconscious information from 
the brain which has crucial military application for enhancing the ability to 
analyse satellite images and to accurately recognise threats in the battlefield 
environment. The agency’s other research has been on brain-machine 
interfaces to control machines such as drones with brain signal, as well as 
experiments with brain-to-brain interfaces which open prospects for direct 
brain-to-brain military communication (Silent Talk and ‘thought helmets’). 
Further to this, the US Naval has been recently testing brain stimulation 
technology that would zap soldiers’ brains with electricity to boost their 
cognitive skills.
Yet, interfacing technology with human brain raises some ethical concerns 
which are important to discuss not only in the context of the military but also 
commercial setting as these technologies are dual use and similar applications 
would sooner or later be used in the civilian world. Will members of a society 
invested with superhuman abilities to see what normally remains unseen, 
recognise what normally remains unrecognised, and interact with increasingly 
‘intelligent’ devices by mind-controlling them become true cyborgs? Neural 
interface may not only revolutionary alter how we how we communicate 
and interact with machines and our fellow humans. It may change how 
we understand what it means to be human. And most importantly of all, 
it might represent the next step in human evolution towards posthuman 
(cyborg) condition.
As melding biotechnology with human brain raises myriad ethical concerns, 
it is even more worth bringing in science fiction visions to the debate on the 
consequences of employing neuroscience to the conduct of war.
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Privacy protection is vital in military operations. Besides the traditional 
encryption of communication, it shall cover issues like protecting our identities, 
what kind of transactions we are performing, as well as where and when we 
are. Sometimes, even our existence should be hidden. In many cases, the 
only available communication channel is wireless one. This means that the 
last three privacy categories, i.e., location, time, and existence privacy, are 
endangered. Thus, the privacy protection issues in wireless communication 
in military battlefield is literally matter of life and death.
Threats in wireless communication in military operations can be divided 
into two main categories external and internal ones. Usually, only the 
external threats caused by the external adversaries are considered as they 
may eavesdrop, disturb, modify, or otherwise utilize our communication 
for their malicious purposes. Internal threats may be caused by our own 
devices or our fellow entities that behave erratic, irrational, or for malicious 
purposes. These can be due to malfunction of the software or hardware, 
human error, or compromised nodes and persons.
Traditionally, wireless communication is protected against external threats 
using various technologies and methods varying from frequency hopping 
at the radio level to encryption of radio packets, messages or content on 
various protocol levels. These solutions tackle partially the external threats 
but leave the internal ones open. External adversaries are still capable of 
disturbing wired and wireless communication with various ways. And in 
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the worst case, the adversary can utilize our own nodes in their attack by 
replaying or modifying messages in the wireless ad hoc networks. A typical 
example is to corrupt a stream of IPsec packets on the way from the original 
sender to final destination somewhere on the path. Since the packets can be 
verified only by the final destination, it is impossible to detect where in the 
network the corruption has occurred. Simple protection can be done against 
corruption on the radio level encryption or with frequency hopping, but 
those solutions are of no use, when internal attacks occur. In the worst case, 
such a compromised node can jam the radio network and drain batteries 
of other nodes not only at the vicinity of that node but also over the entire 
ad hoc network.
Digital signatures and public key algorithms have been used already several 
years in protecting digital communication. With these techniques, it is 
possible to create «digital envelopes» into which messages can be sealed. In 
such an envelope, either the message integrity, its confidentiality, or both 
can be protected. The envelope also contains undeniable proof of the original 
creator (originator) of the message. Traditionally, these digital envelopes are 
intended to the final destination (recipient) that can perform all these above 
mentioned checks. This is rational, when the digital envelope is delivered 
in pieces (such as IP packets) and constructed only at the final destination. 
The two main reasons why the verification is not done at every node on the 
path from the originator to recipient are the computational complexity of 
the traditional public key algorithms and the size of the keys. For example, 
it is not practical to put enough strong RSA keys in every IP packet to enable 
intermediate relays to verify every packet. On the other hand, setting up 
security association with every node over the path is unfeasible in dynamic 
ad hoc networks. In addition, if message integrity is performed with shared 
secret methods due to computational efficiency reasons, it does not guarantee 
undisputable proof of the originator, as also the one that performs verification 
can sign the messages.
Alternative public algorithms have been developed in which the key lengths 
are reasonable and that are more suitable for hardware accelerators. Examples 
for these are elliptic curves and hyper elliptic curves. Some years ago at 
Helsinki University of Technology, a research project demonstrated a proof-of-
concept implementation of both the protocols and the hardware accelerator 
modules that are capable of performing some 200 000 digital signature 
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operations (signing or verification) per seconds. It was also demonstrated 
that the solution is scalable for high capacity networks capable of verifying 
«at wire speed» of 10 Gbit/s core network traffic with a single chip solution. 
Since the elliptic curve keys are much shorter (some 260…300 bits), it is 
possible establish a similar «digital envelope» concept at the IP-packet level 
what has been previously available only at the higher levels (such as emails). 
This demonstrator (PLA, Packet Level Authentication) was implemented as 
an IP-extension that provides full transparency to higher level protocols. 
It is also fully interoperable with all IP-level routers as well as lower level 
transport technologies.
Since PLA carries in every packet among other things also the public key 
of the sender, any node that receives that message can send right away an 
encrypted message to that node as a single message. This obsoletes complicated 
security association negotiation what is needed for example in IPsec and 
HIP protocols. In practice, this means that an expandable node can beacon 
its existence on the battlefield, while an important node needs to send its 
message as one short message that is relayed further without endangering the 
location, time and existence privacy of that important node. Even most of the 
acknowledgements can be omitted. Once the message reaches far enough from 
the originator, the message can be broadcasted with high power to deliver 
it further. Thus, the adversaries can detect this high powered transmission 
of the expandable node but cannot locate the originator.
Typically public key algorithms are considered energy consuming due to 
additional computation requirements and also due to extended packet length. 
In military environment, PLA actually protects network also against power 
drainage of adversary’s replay attack messages and packet manipulation. 
This is done by including time stamp and sequence numbers in PLA header 
of every packet.
In a military environment, trust management differs significantly from the 
commercial environment. For the wireless battlefield, it is quite straightforward 
to establish trust relation between the nodes by presetting the trust relation 
before the operation, while in commercial systems setting up trust relation 
is a big challenge. On the other hand, risk of compromising nodes at the 
battlefield is much higher. PLA is capable of handling trust management 
well in both of these environments. Especially, compromised nodes can 
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be excluded easily with PLA even in large networks with wide coverage 
broadcast messages.
With this presentations, we intend to rise discussion of the importance of 
the concept level development in military sciences. The new technologies 
shall have dramatic impacts on the operations. They may open new ways to 
do things or obsolete the old ones. This is also matter of saving money, when 
all alternative technologies are not implemented if they are not first proven 
to be useful. We would like to emphasize that the concept development 
ensures the young officers to understand how technology will impact military 
operations and reshape our future.
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We introduce a mathematical model to describe asymmetric frontlines that 
are formed if a nation closes their national networks. When considering 
defence, the model gives the capability as a probability for denying adversarial 
operation in a friendly network. The closing process is a well-documented 
course of development as Russia is likely to implement RuNet 2020. The model 
may be used to form and improve situation awareness as the process evolves.
We propose a model to describe the change in capability caused by asymmetric 
frontlines between closed and open national networks. The capability is 
presented as a probability for denying adversarial operations in a friendly 
network. In summer 2016, almost at the same time as NATO recognized 
cyberspace as a military domain, Russia declared that RuNet – the Russian 
segment of the Internet – would be disconnected from the global Internet 
by 2020 (Ristolainen 2017). The de facto process of closing national networks 
is referred to as a closing process. We have continued research in order to 
improve situation awareness of the closing process, analysed its military 
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aims and impacts. We have deduced that the military motivation behind 
Russia’s network closing process is related to improving its military capabilities 
in cyberspace, namely traditional elements of combat power: protection, 
(relative) maneuverability and (relative) firepower. Hence, the motive behind 
a closed network nation is to achieve higher operational capability than an 
‘open network society’. On the other hand, the motive for introducing RuNet 
may also be related to challenging the current world order.
Figure 1. Schematic outline of open society network’s asymmetry to a closed national network. 
The closed network is presented by a solid lined eclipse on the right and is enclosed by an 
open network society (i.e. the Internet). The dotted cloud represents an open national network. 
[Figure from: Kukkola et al 2017a]
Potential impact of the closing process
We have analyzed the outcomes of closing process from an open network 
society’s perspective and shown how a closed network nation is able to shape 
the cyber domain. The purpose of shaping the cyber domain is to gain an 
advantage and consequently, to control the cyber domain. There is a danger 
of open network societies being forced into a reactive mode. In our earlier 
study, we analysed the choices facing open network societies and their 
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consequences in the case of escalation and even potential confrontation 
(Kukkola et al 2017a).
Maybe one of the most interesting results of the closing process is the 
formation of asymmetric frontlines in the cyber domain. In the paper we 
discuss how the fragmentation of global network is progressing towards the 
formation of national segments of cyberspace. These national segments will 
be walled with ‘digital borders’ and will enforce the concept of digital 
sovereignty; e.g. by closing their national networks. In the earlier study, we 
argue how the conventional asymmetry in cyberspace originates from the 
problem of attribution, and is challenged or even made obsolete by the 
concept of digital sovereignty. We demonstrated how ‘digital sovereignty’ 
is achievable by innovatively applying current technology and protocols. 
There is an obvious impact of the digital sovereignty and the resulting 
asymmetric frontlines to the (near) future cyber battlefields (Kukkola et al 
2017b).
Figure 2. A simplified outline of the frontlines of a closed network. The largest ellipse 
represents the closed subspace and the smaller one demonstrates the ‘border crossing-
point’ and ‘digital customs’ (cf. Streltsov & Pilyugin 2016) between the open subspace and 
the closed subspace. Since similar frontlines are absent in the open network it results in 
asymmetric frontlines. In the open national network all the safety measures are essentially 
conducted within or at the borders of the specific IT-system (marked as T=target in the figure). 
In the figure, one decision making router RSDN is actually a set of several routers that may be 
centrally controlled [Figure from Kukkola et al 2017b].
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Obviously there is a need for more specific research on this subject. We 
reviewed our previous studies in a NATO IST-145 publication (Kukkola et al 
2017c) pertaining to adversarial cyber operations aiming to the fragmentation 
of the global network. The motivation for writing the review article was to 
address the network closure process and its potential impacts on the open 
network society. We would like to guide the resources of the scientific 
community to work further with this problem.
There is a need for mathematical, technological and military research for 
considering the network closing problem. In the current research we provide 
mathematical analysis considering the problem related to closed national 
networks. The proposed model presents a probability based view of the 
military capability of closed and open networks.
Probabilistic Model
Probabilistic models of war have been proposed in the literature (Cioffi-Revilla, 
1989; Cioffi-Revilla and Dacey, 1988).]. In this paper we use conditional 
probabilities to model asymmetric cyber-attacks and defence between closed 
and open national networks. The method is based on our earlier work on 
technology forecasting and capability modelling (Kuikka and Suojanen 2014; 
Kuikka, et al. 2015a/b; Kuikka 2016).
Military capabilities can be modeled with basic probability theory using 
conditional probabilities. Our modelling is based on a system of systems 
concept, where a system can be described as parallel and serial sub-systems 
with a desired granularity. The highest level of modeling can be comprised 
of capability areas or a subset of functionalities from one or more capability 
area. Functionalities are assumed to be independent – and if this does not 
hold, they should be further separated until the functionalities have no 
interceptions.
The general idea is to model the operation as multiple phases or levels. 
Typically, two taxonomies exist for the classification of attacks and defence 
actions. These two taxonomies may have common functionalities but usually 
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the probabilities of success are different depending on the scenarios and 
other environmental factors (Suojanen, et al., 2015).
In our first schematic model we have a structure for functionalities where 
inner levels are conditional to all outer levels of action. In a general form 
we express the model mathematically for the probability of successful 
operation as follows:
P = 1–(1–p
1
|0)(1–p
2
|0∧1)(1–p
3
|0∧1∧2) ... (1–p
n
|0∧1∧2...n–1),  (1)
where  p
i
, i = 1,...,n describe the probabilities of success in n tasks. These 
tasks or sub-functionalities together describe an operation. The nested 
structure shows up with the conditional probabilities denoted by 0, 0∧1, 
...,0∧1∧2...n–1. Conditional probability is a measure of the probability of 
an event given that another event has occurred, for example, p
2
|0∧1 is the 
probability of successfully carrying out a second task given that tasks or 
events i=0 and i=1 have happened. The event i=0 is the presumption that 
the operation occurs at all.
In the following, we use the short hand notation p
i
=p
i
|0∧1...i–1). If at any 
level  i=1, ...,n, alternative systems or operational procedures exist, the 
formula is modified accordingly. For example, the probability for task i 
having j alternatives is p
i
 = 1–(1–p
i,1
)(1–p
i,2
)...(1–p
i,j
).
If at any level i = 1, ..., n, multiple functionalities are necessary for a successful 
task i, the probability is p
i
 = p
i,1
p
i,2
...p
i,j
.
The idea is generalized for sub-level functionalities and at the same level 
both alternative and necessary structures may exist.
As an example, we describe a defensive operation (from a closed national 
network perspective):
P
defense
 = 1–(1–p
Deny Reconnaisance
)(1–p
Deny Unauthorized BC
)(1–p
Deny Adavancement
) (1–p
Deny Cyber Attack
), (2)
where p
Deny Reconnaisance
 stands for the probability of denying reconnaissance, p
Deny 
Unauthorized BC
 unauthorized border crossing, p
Deny Adavancement
 denying adversarial 
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advancement within the closed networks and p
Deny Cyber Attack
 denying cyber-attack 
on or within the system itself.
The description for a corresponding cyber-attack operation is then:
P
attack
= p
Reconnaisance
 p
Border Cros sin g
 p
Advancement
 p
Cyber Attack
  
= (1–p
Deny Re connaisance
)(1–p
Deny Unauthorized BC
)(1–p
Deny Adavancement
) (1–p
Deny Cyber Attack
). (3)
Figure 3. Illustration of a defensive operation (in the closed networks’ perspective) of Equation (2).
When a cyber operation is conducted in the other direction, namely from 
the closed network toward open national networks, similar frontlines do not 
exist (by definition). This has been discussed in our earlier research (Kukkola 
et al 2017b) and the outcome is the formation of asymmetric frontlines.
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Conclusion
We have presented, to the best of our knowledge, the first mathematical 
model to describe the imbalance of cyber operations between closed and 
open national networks. The effect on the military capabilities of the closed 
and open networks has been analysed with the model. The closing process 
is a well-documented course of development and will be de facto in 2020 as 
Russia is likely to implement RuNet 2020. As the closing process continues the 
understanding of it needs to progress as well. We are further developing the 
model and also otherwise constructing situation awareness of the process. We 
encourage the scientific community in general to further study the problem.
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Advance technologies of the information age, recognized also as digital 
age, have significantly influenced all domains of social life as they have 
constantly demonstrated new capabilities allowing evolution of every area 
of mankind activities. Their evolutionary character looks like unlimited set 
offering endlessly new solutions which are encouraging their adaptation to 
fully exploit emerging opportunities. The new technological discoveries have 
found very quickly military applications becoming an inherent component of 
contemporary military operations with huge potential to change the future 
battlefield as of continuous research. Among them autonomous systems 
caught attention of military industry and armed forces. The development 
of unmanned vehicles is constant and dynamic process led by developed 
nations. It has influenced military operations by innovative approach to 
new weapon concepts supported by funds, technology and research sectors. 
The unmanned platforms have been verified in combat operations and the 
have been recognized as valuable tools to support soldiers when fighting 
conventional and asymmetric enemies. The paper is to discuss current 
developments of unmanned ground platforms pointing out tendencies but 
also mentioning their advantages and disadvantages. Currently, US is not 
only country developing unmanned capabilities as those were recognized 
by other nations and extremist organizations. Among them, Russia has been 
active lately, within modernization of armed forces, to move innovative 
programs ahead recognizing that it is behind in that domain.
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Russian decision makers, theoreticians, academics made decisions after 
analysing the utilisation of unmanned vehicles, especially in the air, by the 
US and other nations in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Following guidance 
of leadership the country has decided to do more. The Russians were shaken 
by the war in 2008, when Georgian forces used Israeli drones, demonstrating 
Russia’s lack of well-developed solutions. It presented that the armed forces 
and national industry were behind the Western technological and conceptual 
approach toward UGV applications in the modern warfare. As the result, 
there are new concepts of unmanned platforms already in development 
undertaken by research institutes and they are being verified during tests 
and exercises. Russia began experimenting in the field of UGVs from the 
1920s and 1930s, but this stopped for many years, except for unmanned 
air vehicles (UAVs). Russia’s armed forces showed some increase of interest 
in unmanned systems at the beginning of the 2000s but it was short lived 
attempt. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu’s intention ‘to spend 320 billion 
roubles (about US$8.8 billion) by 2020 on a programme to supply the Russian 
armed forces with unmanned aerial vehicles’ suggests Russia is now trying 
to catch up. The development of UAVs took off again with the programme 
‘Development of prospective military robotisation until 2025’ under the 
Ministry of Defence’s auspices. Parallel, military scientific and research 
centres under the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation 
started to develop concepts of UGVs’ tactical employment. The importance 
of such a trend was highlighted by President Putin during a meeting of the 
Military-Industrial Commission in January 2017. He said that ‘the direction 
of autonomous robotic complexes are important and promising. They are 
able to fundamentally change the whole system of armament and we need 
our own effective achievements in this field.’
The paper will present general tendencies, classification and characteristics 
of unmanned ground systems. Their utilization and progress by nations is 
to be covered briefly. Next, it will discuss Russian concepts of UGVs. It is 
based on following the current programmes and their implementation into 
the Armed Forces, National Guard and other security related services. It will 
present UGV programmes under development and will give an overview 
on the UGVs introduced into the land forces. The ongoing projects will be 
presented highlighting variety of proposed solutions and competitions among 
national military industry companies. Russia is significant progress in the 
development of unmanned land combat systems, but it is also working on 
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their conceptual utilisation in warfare. It is, however, limited by international 
sanctions as there is shortage of necessary technologies to further continue 
progress.
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Article is focused on problematice of czech artillery fire support officers 
practical preparation in context of available preparation options of czech armed 
forces personell. The goal of this article is to set up an options of practical 
education of artillery fire support officers which are consistent to requirements 
imposed on the work they conduct on fire support coordination centers (fire 
support cells) of brigade task forces. Additional goal is to harmonize these 
options with czech armed forces internal rules and regulations. To fulfill these 
goals there were performed current status analysis to asses current status 
of officers corps education and available options of practical preparation 
during active duty in czech armed forces. This focus is based especially 
on completition of different specialized courses provided by czech armed 
forces training centers as well as training centers of different NATO armies. 
Article presents new solutions of artillery fire support officers preparation 
in coordination of joint fires. Particular emphasis is based on content of 
this practical preparation and need to cover close air support requesting 
part. Designed solution offers possibility of practical education of artillery 
fire support officers in requesting, adjusting and controling of artillery and 
close air support units. Resulting conception of military officers preparation 
enables to cover those areas, which are not contained current educational 
or training areas of military centers involved in military officers education 
process. Main benefit of theis article is definition of possible ways of artillery 
fire support officers preparation which graduate on military high school of 
czech armed forces as well as those who got their univerzity degree outside 
of ministry of defence, in civilian sector. Result of this article is definition 
of common framework of practical education, which would provide the 
same knowledge for artillery fire support officers no matter what king of 
univerzity or previous training they finished.
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The complexity in the planning and conduct of military joint operations 
has increased the last 20 years, embedding a wide span of actors and special 
advisors.
The use and involvement of these actors in different parts of the decision 
making process will thus have a large impact on the commander’s decisions 
and the quality of joint head quarter products.
Two central processes in the head quarter staff work are partly the formal 
leading and planning process, and partly a number of identified but informal 
processes. The leadership carried out in the staff thus appears to play a vital 
role regarding a successful integration of formal and informal processes.
Formal doctrines and procedures have a cognitive heel, which may counter 
an agile interaction between the formal and informal processes.
This study thus investigates different aspects of formal and informal leadership 
processes in a military joint head quarter at the operational level, focusing 
on the decision making processes, leadership functions, and to what extent 
special function areas exercise more influence on these processes than other.
The aim of the study is to reveal knowledge which contributes to increased 
insight and the development of leadership processes and products in a 
military joint head quarter.
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Background: Psychology finds a number of applications in the military 
environment, both in individual and in interpersonal level, because a 
healthy psychological state is one of the most important military supplies 
but also group leadership requires a deep knowledge of group psychology. 
Psychological resilience is a variable that can help individual adjust with new 
facts and situations, a variable very common in the military environment. 
Psychological resilience refers to the process of coping with or overcoming 
exposure to adversity or stress (Meredith et al, 2011) which is more than an 
individual personality trait, but mainly it is a process involving individual’s 
interaction depending individual’s life experiences, and current life context. 
Resilience is the capacity to adapt successfully in the presence of risk and 
adversity (Jensen and Fraser, 2005). It is rather a process of individuation 
through a structured system with gradual discovery of personal and unique 
abilities (Rutter, 2008) adjusting with family or relationship problems, health, 
financial or problems coming from workplace.
Purpose: The aim of this study is to present the Military Resilience Scale. Three 
Studies are presented. Study 1 the Manipulation test of the scale. Study 2 
the 1st test of the scale. Study 3 the 1st retest of the scale.
Material and Methods: This new scale includes 20 items rated on a six-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) and includes 
statements expressing attitudes about military psychological resilience.
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Results: A manipulation test of the scale has been addressed to 100 (N=100) adults 
in the military environment, in order to verify that individuals understand 
in a proper way the scale, the items are clear and straightforward and also 
examine the topics for which they are designed and theoretically examine. 
One hundred ninety six (N= 186) participants having a strong relation with 
the military participated in the questionnaire fist investigation. One hundred 
ninety five (N=185) participants of the same strong relation with the military 
participated in the first retest of the scale. The reliability of the scale was 
very strong and Cronbach’s alpha rated from.85 to.94.
Conclusions: The Military Resilience Scale is a very useful and extremely 
reliable scale. Repeated measurements need to be made in a variety of 
military populations over a long period of time.
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Morale is a widely known construct in the industrial context as well as in 
military, medicine and educational settings. Usually it describes the workers’ 
motivation and enthusiasm to achieve some type of task or mission related 
goals or objectives (Britt & Dickinson, 2006, p. 164). As for today, the construct 
includes elements of confidence, optimism, enthusiasm as well as a sense 
of common purpose (Peterson, Park & Sweeney, 2008). Morale is used to 
describe individuals and groups, more precisely individuals in the groups 
and it is widely used in other settings besides the military ones, despite the 
slightly different meaning for the other disciplines (Peterson, Park & Sweeney, 
2008). For instance high morale is understood in the educational settings as 
energy and enthusiasm (Mayer, 2009) and on the other hand in the medical 
context as satisfaction, purposefulness, optimism and self-esteem (Weakliem 
& Frenkel, 2006).
Among the different definitions one of the simplest will be that morale is a 
strong sense of enthusiasm and dedication to a commonly shared goal that 
unifies a group (Manning, 1991). Therefore, as the researchers has shown 
(Britt & Dickinson, 2006), the military morale is a motivational construct, 
which is influenced by 1) individual factors, such as inclination towards 
optimism (Carver & Scheier, 2002), hardiness, self-efficacy (reason for self-
confidence) (Bandura, 2000), trust and military identity; 2) unit factors, such 
as collective efficacy (Shamir, Brainin, Zakay & Propper, 2000), unit cohesion 
and esprit de corp (Manning, 1991); 3) leadership factors, such as setting up 
clear and meaningful tasks, instilling efficacy and trust mostly through a 
personal example and organizing adequate trainings, emphasizing positive 
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outcomes and recognizing superior performance (Gal, 1986; Gal & Manning, 
1987; Bliese & Britt, 2001; Chen & Bliese, 2002).
The aim of the present article is to adopt the instruments measuring directly 
the morale in military settings into Estonian language and evaluate empirically 
the factors influencing this construct (theoretically). Three different instruments 
were administrated: direct items (asking directly what your level on morale 
is); six items instrument referring respondents’ motivation and enthusiasm 
for accomplishing mission objectives (Britt & Dickinson, 2006, p. 164); and 
multidimensional morale instrument with its core dimensions: dedication, 
vigour, cynicism and emotional exhaustion (van Boxmeer, Verwijs, Bruin, Duel 
& Euwema, 2007; Parmak, 2010). The sample of study consisted of Estonian 
military personnel (N=350) including conscripts and professionals. The study 
variables were measured over three times during one year training period. 
We used quantitative strategy to collect the data and statistical analysis 
included descriptive statistics (SPSS), explorative- and confirmative factor 
analysis (LISREL), and structural equitation modelling (LISREL). The results 
indicated that translations of morale instruments were valid and reliable to 
use in Estonian language, additionally factors proposed to influence military 
morale were assessed over the training cycle. The value of this study for the 
military education were also discussed in the last part of the paper.
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Most leaders could be described as mid-level leaders in the sense that they 
have superiors above themselves and subordinates below. Leadership along 
the hierarchical chain of command is a complex issue and could be described 
as follows: (1) a high-level leader reflects on what he or she thinks should 
be done, (2) the high-level leader acts, (3) mid-level leaders experience the 
high-level leaders action and image, (4) the mid-level leaders reflect on what 
they think should be done, (5) the mid-level leaders act, (6) the co-workers at 
the lower level experience the action of their mid-level leader as well as the 
image of the high-level leader and the mid-level leader, (7) the co-workers 
at the lower level reflect on what they think should be done and (8) the 
co-workers act. The scheme is obviously a simplification but it illustrates 
that we have come a long way from the thesis of the classic management 
school implying that the boss thinks and the people acts (Larsson et al., 2005).
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The present study focuses on mid-level leaders which means that the steps 
3–5 above come to the foreground. These steps involve the containing 
ability of the mid-level leaders. The mid-level leader should be able to 
perceive, evaluate and contain the information from higher levels before 
they pass them on downwards in the hierarchy (sensemaking; Weick, 1995). 
The containing also includes a transformation of the message from the higher 
level in such a way that it becomes meaningful for co-workers at a lower 
level, without distorting the content of the message (sense giving). The other 
way around is also relevant. Mid-level leaders should be able to receive and 
contain messages from «the floor» and pass them on to higher-level leaders 
in a constructive way (Larsson, Lundin, & Zander, 2017).
The aim was to explore military mid-level leaders’ so called containing 
function in terms of their sensemaking ability of messages from higher 
hierarchical levels and their sense giving ability when passing these messages 
on to lower hierarchical levels. The aim was also to investigate the association 
between these abilities and organizational result and work satisfaction. Data 
was collected in 2017 using a questionnaire among Captains and Majors/
Naval Lieutenant-Commanders, attending courses at the Swedish Defence 
University and among Majors/Naval Lieutenant-Commanders at the Norwegian 
Defence University College. Responses were obtained from 110 officers (about 
67% response rate). Using statistical mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013), the 
main result was that the containing function sense giving, in itself as well 
as combined with general leadership behavior, contributed to a favorable 
organizational result including effectiveness as well as work satisfaction. The 
containing function sensemaking contributed to a lower degree.
We suggest that the results point to an important and underestimated aspect 
of leadership. The main conclusion is that mid-level leaders’ containing ability 
when it comes to sense giving, combined with their general leadership ability, 
has important consequences for organizational results and work satisfaction. 
If they handle the containing function well, the likelihood increases that 
subordinates experience a higher degree of organizational identification. If 
they handle the containing function poorly, they may contribute to a gap 
between the higher levels and the operative units. A practical conclusion is 
that, as the function sense giving, consists of behaviors, what you say and 
do, it is more open to development through personal reflection and practice.
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Annotation. The most effective and modern studying technologies used in the 
specialists training for the Missile Forces and Artillery (MFA) of the Armed 
Forces of Ukraine (AFU) are considered. The experience of warfighting in 
the East of Ukraine is taken into account. The types of self-developed, used 
and developing technologies of artillerymen training, based on modern 3D 
Information Technology, are described.
The armed conflict in the East of Ukraine made it possible to reveal the true 
state of affairs in the AFU, to uncover a number of problems without the 
resolution of which it is impossible to restore the combat readiness of the 
units and subunits of the MFA. The most difficult and most pressing was 
the problem of highly qualified specialists shortage, a low level of personnel 
training of all levels.
The theoretical knowledge and practical skills that officers, sergeants and 
soldiers of the MFA of the AFU had proved to be insufficient in modern 
conditions for competent planning and successful performance of combat 
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tasks. A superficial study of the material part of the missile and artillery 
armament (MAA) models, a lack of practical aspects of its operation, a lack 
of coherence of subunits’ and units’ actions against the background of the 
most severe resources saving led to large losses of MAA and casualties in the 
first months of the conflict.
This situation in the AFU was due to the fact that from the beginning of 
Ukraine’s emergence as a sovereign state, the probabilities of external threats 
were not considered by the establishment. Financing of the AFU consuming 
needs has been decreasing every year, especially in training and retraining 
fields of active military formations and future military specialists. The MFA 
also has not become an exception, having undergone destructive processes, 
both in material and technical and intellectual spheres.
The specifics of the combat missions, carried out by the MFA, require special, 
painstaking training of personnel, using staff weapons and military equipment, 
conducting plenty of exercises, training and combat firing. Therefore, the 
qualitative training of the MFA specialists, who are capable of performing 
the assigned tasks correctly in the zone of combat operations for a minimum 
time, is a priority task.
Insufficient funding (inability to conduct combat and training firing regularly, 
to provide technical training, to study missile and artillery armament models 
on real objects) forces us to search, research, develop and introduce modern 
methods of military specialists training on a theoretical and practical level. 
The authors see a solution to the problem that has arisen in the development 
and use of modern Information Technology and 3D computer graphics in 
the MFA specialists training.
The experience of using our own developments in the MFA specialists training 
process, who are studying under the reserve officers training programs, shows 
that the tools that give the desired result include: 3D training models and 
animation of MAA models, interactive simulation training complexes and 
remote-acting training systems. A detailed description of the modern means, 
that are being developed and used in the specialists training system of the 
MFA of the AFU, is given in the paper with the presentation.
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Thus, the introduction and usage of such technical solutions in the training 
process allows to reduce the time and improve the quality of training 
(retraining) of the MFA specialists at different levels (both officers and 
sergeants, soldiers and cadets), students who undergo training under the 
reserve officer training program. The proposed methods of training are 
also relevant in conditions of external aggression, when it is necessary to 
train a highly qualified specialist in a short period of time, who is capable 
of carrying out all the assigned combat tasks successfully.
The MFA specialists training model is being used and studied by the authors. 
It is flexible and multifunctional. This training model is easily applicable in 
the military specialists training of other armed forces branches, especially 
in the military-technical field. The created model of training on the modern 
informational 3D technologies basis can be applied to the development of 
any weapon models and military equipment, including weapon models 
and military equipment that are found in the arsenal of the NATO member 
countries armies.
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Subordinates motivation is one of the greatest challenges of today’s military 
officers, as a society is affected by global culture of individualism and self-
actualization. In the environment where multinational companies offer 
personal and professional fulfilment, promotion of entrepreneurship proposes 
self-satisfaction in start-ups, the ability to motivate followers is challenged. 
Both junior as well as senior military officers’ leadership is confronted by 
subordinates’ self-centred demands. Nevertheless some of the leaders are 
exceptionally effective by meeting new needs and building their units into 
motivated teams. Therefore key questions are: what types and techniques 
of leadership are most efficient and how this evidence based practice could 
be developed in leadership education and training; to what extend self-
actualization is important in diverse military organization, where conscripts, 
professional military service personnel and volunteers are serving?
This paper seeks to contribute to the discussion on leadership development 
by focusing on findings in leader–subordinate relationships research 
where the most challenging and transforming element is subordinates’ self-
actualization. Accordingly, the aim of the paper is to identify and analyse 
key shifts in leadership practice that make positive impact on subordinates’ 
motivation and are recommend taking into consideration in leadership 
training and development.
The structure of this discussion paper is as follows. First, the concept of the 
leading with motivation will be examined in the framework of values of 
today’s society. Secondly, the review of recent research on military leader–
subordinate relationships will be presented. The article draws on prior three 
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research findings on motivation in Lithuanian Armed Forces performed in 
2016–2017 as well as newest paradigms in leading with motivation.
Leading with motivation is rarely used term in scientific literature however 
motivation is perceived as critical factor in leadership practice. This concept 
mainly is reflected in the framework of motivation and especially in the 
self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan 2000)3. According to this theory, all 
humans have three basic self-actualization needs: (1) experience feelings of 
autonomy; (2) experience feelings of competence; and (3) experience feelings 
of relatedness. The recent study by Rasskazova et al. shows that the needs 
tend to have parallel effects and «the more people report having all three 
types of experiences, the better off they are»4. At the same time the study of 
Ivtzan et al. (2013) found that middle-aged employees show higher levels of 
self-actualization than younger age workers5.
In our case we focused on three research projects that presented finding from 
different groups of military personnel: conscripts, volunteers and professional 
service and their motivational factors that are exploited in efficient leadership 
practice. Military personnel motivation varies significantly depending on 
the relationship with a military as an organization. The sample of the first 
research was conscripts. The reason for their service in the military is related 
to the duties as citizens; consequently motivation to participate actively and 
efficiently mainly is related with opportunity for socialization with peers 
and opportunity to prove itself in a new environment. As it was noticed by 
Ivtzan et al. (2013), the need for self-actualization in this group of young 
people is low, accordingly the leadership by example is the most efficient 
way for motivation.
The second research which results could contribute to leadership training 
and development was performed with the officer and servant of professional 
military service. On the contrary to conscription, professionally military 
3 Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human needs and 
the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227–268.
4 Rasskazova, E., Ivanova, T., & Sheldon, K. (2016). Comparing the effects of low-level and 
high-level worker need-satisfaction: A synthesis of the self-determination and Maslow need 
theories. Motivation and Emotion, 40(4), 541-555.
5 Ivtzan, I., Gardner, H. E., Bernard, I., Sekhon, M., & Hart, R. (2013). Wellbeing through self-
fulfilment: Examining developmental aspects of self-actualization. The Humanistic Psycholo-
gist, 41(2), 119-132.
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service offers long-term employment and requires from leaders different 
way of leading with motivation. The sample showed high levels of needs 
for self-actualization and transformational leadership was the most efficient 
in this context.
The sample of the last research was volunteer military forces. This longitudinal 
research provided opportunity not only to evaluate leader–subordinate 
relationships but also to evaluate the change of motivational factors over 
the past four years. In contrast to the professional military service where 
motivational factors are similar to other places of employment, motivational 
leadership in volunteer military forces is mainly related with participation 
and collaboration. Accordingly self-actualization is mainly driven by the need 
to feel relatedness and collaborative leadership showed the highest efficiency.
This overview of three complimentary research performed by Lithuanian 
Military Academy identify key shifts in leadership practice that make 
positive impact on subordinates’ motivation. Self-actualization as source of 
motivation has to be understood and incorporated into leadership training 
and development. At the same time, self-actualization needs are dissimilar 
in such diverse organization as military.
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 Decision-making during execution of operations is categorised as operational 
management6 according to NATO doctrine. Critical functions are coordination 
and synchronization of the joint force actions7. All this based on a plan where 
focus on effects and assessment of these effects plays a key role in managing 
the operation. The underlying assumption is that one based on the plan have 
sufficient control of the operational environment and consequently there is 
only a need for management of deviations. To have an extensive understanding 
of the operational environment, focusing on achieving required effects is a 
good thing, but if taken to far it backlashes and prevents the ability to make 
required adjustments due to altered circumstances. The hypothesis of this 
paper is that NATO current focus on effects based thinking during execution 
of operations hampers the ability to adapt to an ever changing and complex 
operational environment. The paper will focus on the operational level of 
war in a complex operational environment. It will explore the commander’s 
decision-making process as such, the assessment process and planning process 
and how it facilitates the ability to change8.
The decision-making process
In order to explore the hypothesis one neds to examine the NATO decision 
making process and how it accommodates change. The key words describing 
6 AJP 3-C, Studie draft, para 3.1.
7 Ibid, para 3.8.
8 The term «change» in this context covers the ability to identify altered circumstances that 
requires changes to the existing plans and directives.
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the execution phase of an operation according to this doctrine is efficiency, 
effectiveness and synergy. These are to be achieved through operational 
management9, which again is based on the operation plan. A plan characterised 
by commander’s intent, operational objectives with described decisive 
conditions and supporting effects10.
However, the challenges military operations face today is characterized by 
increasingly degree of complexity and change.11 The terminology used to 
describe the execution phase is more suited to an industrial process, where 
one more or less have control of all influencing factors. The doctrine tries to 
recognise this by focusing on assessment to adjust existing plans to exploit 
favourable situation or mitigate unfavourable ones. The question is whether 
this mindset accommodates a rapidly changing and complex operational 
environment.
NATO Joint task force headquarters decision-making process described 
doctrinally as a four-step process12, monitor, assess, plan and direct. The 
amount of change and complexity does not lend itself to be managed in one 
decision making process. Further, there is a discrepancy between doctrine 
and current best practice as conducted during NATO operations and exercises. 
Best practice operates with the decision-making horizons13. The challenge 
is that these horizons are not fully recognised as decision cycles so when 
supporting process are designed there are inconsistencies and there is a 
tendency to mix information between the time horizons during decision-
making. The paper will discuss these challenges and how to improve the 
decision-making process.
The assessment process
The assessment process is a vital part of the decision- making process. Changes 
to existing plans are based on the assessment. The NATO assessment proses 
9 Ibid, para 3.1
10 AJP-5, Planning
11 Joint Docrine Note 3/!!)
12 Ibid, AJP 3-C, 3.23 
13 Militære fellesoperasjoner- en innføring, Abstrakt forlag 2016, s 441
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consists of four steps measuring own progress14. The two first steps are part 
of and supports the planning phase of an operation. Based on the operational 
framework and desired effects15, measures of performance and effectiveness, 
and an information gathering plan are developed.
During the execution phase, data is received and analysed in what is termed 
campaign and operational assessments. The results of the assessment with 
recommendations, are validated by the commander in the assessment board 
as a starting point for further planning and adjustments to the operations 
plan. However, capturing changes in the operational environment is not 
only based on measurement of own progress. According to doctrine, the J2 
community conducts parallel comprehensive assessments of the opposing 
and other actors in the area of operations.
Although there are many similarities between the two assessment processes 
they deviate in focus. The J2 assessment is based on the commander’s critical 
information requirements dealing with capturing changes or confirming 
behaviour to opposing forces and other actors. It is trying to predict future 
actions. The operational assessment process on the other hand, tends to 
have a backward focus as it is based on analysis of historical data. The J2 
assessments are supposed to be included in the operational assessment, 
but what parts of the J2 analysis are included dependend on which decisive 
conditions and effects are being assessed. This paper will further explore 
the differences in the two assessment processes. It argues that both of them 
needs to be included in the assessment board to provide the commander a 
comprehensive basis for decisions on future planning requirements.
Planning process
NATO’s doctrine on planning is thoroughly described in Allied Joint Doctrine 
5 (AJP 5), and Allied Command Operations planning directive COPD. The 
process presents a comprehensive, detailed and effects based approach to 
planning. The focus however is manly on the planning stage of an operation. 
14 Ibid, s 462
15 Ibid, 425
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Very little is described doctrinally on planning processes during the execution 
phase of an operation. As previously stated NATO’s approach on decision 
making during the execution phase is on operational management. The 
paper will explore how this approach facilitates planning requirements in 
a rapidly changing operational environment and argues a requirement for 
stronger focus on planning with alternative planning tools.
In conclusion
The abstract is submitted for oral presentation as part of the War Studies or 
Command and Control working group.
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The use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) has become a 
controversial and heavily scrutinized subject amongst public and academic 
commentators. In recent years, increased focus has correctly been placed on 
the development and potential use of fully autonomous weapons. However, 
modern militaries have been employing weapons systems that require limited 
to almost no human input to function, such as the Iron Dome, Phalanx, and 
Predator weapons systems, for decades. The purpose of this paper is not to 
provide a normative critique of the use of LAWS in modern combat, but is 
rather a reflection that is meant to help policy makers weigh the costs and 
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benefits of using LAWS. Far from providing a comprehensive analysis, three 
sets of legal and ethical implications that stem from the use of LAWS, are 
explored by focusing on the ways that weapons and the laws of armed conflict 
influence warfare. The first implication is that despite being controversial, 
LAWS do not inherently violate the fundamental principles of the laws 
of armed conflict, meaning it would be difficult to ban their use without 
amending or perhaps breaking with the LOAC tradition. The second, is that 
the complex nature of LAWS means that commanders and operators must 
become experts on all the potential functions of a given LAWS to ensure 
that it is not used in such a way that would cause violations of the laws of 
armed conflict. Unlike simple weapons such as rifles or grenades, LAWS 
might respond in unexpected ways during a conflict. It also means that the 
military must trust the weapons manufacturer to disclose all information 
about their product’s functionality. The third implication is that the use of 
LAWS by one side in a conflict might cause the opposing side to target the 
weapon’s manufacturer or maintenance personnel, rather than the military 
operators or command bases in order to combat those weapons. The high 
degree of civilian input into the operation of LAWS means that civilians who 
produce and perform maintenance duties on LAWS not only run the risk 
of becoming the targets of attack, but legitimate targets under the current 
prescriptions of the LOAC. These implications may not outweigh the benefits 
of using LAWS in armed conflicts, but they provide reasons for military 
leaders and policy makers to consider the degree to which they should allow 
automated machines to fulfill battlefield tasks.
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In international peace operations Swedish military units, along with forces 
from other states, abide by so called Rules of Engagement (ROE). These ROE 
have come to existence based on not only legal but also on political and 
operational aspects. In Sweden, ROE’s did not exist in the national military 
context in the traditional sense until very recently. Because of this fact the 
ROE are not yet an everyday occurrence in the same fashion as in peace 
operations and in other military operations where coercion and use of force 
may be applied.
As a politico-military steering instrument often negotiated at grand strategy 
level troop contributing countries may have influence on the rules, at least 
is if being a member of the leading organisation running the operation with 
proxy from the UN. The one that have less or in reality no influence on the 
rules themselves are the soldiers that in the field, airmen in the air or seamen 
and marines in the naval domain, need to apply the implemented ROE. 
In fact, their position constitutes the background of the project; although 
soldiers and others should be able to trust the provided ROE and act according 
to them questions have been raised such as whether or not it is enough for 
them to rely on the rules only. In other words what is the status of the ROE?
Following this the main challenge and the purpose of the thesis is to discuss the 
status of the ROE in relation to mainly national but to an extent international 
law. Thus the research question of the project deals with the position of ROE 
in Swedish law and in the legal systems of fellow Nordic countries. The focus 
is, rather than aiming at discussing substantial and most often classified 
rules, on the process thus aiming at for instance the drafting process and 
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hierarchy of norms. More substance driven aspects, for instance how to ROE 
relate, or correspond, to established systems of international law, mainly 
UN Security Council resolutions mandates, International Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights Law are also of interest as they focuses on the content 
and the application of ROE more in detail. For the purpose of this project, 
partially because ROE are classified (secret), such aspect will be discussed in 
the thesis however not reaches the level of answering an earlier contemplated 
second research question.
Confirming legal aspects are not the only relevant foundations for the ROE they 
however put the ambit for both operational and political considerations, which 
accordingly have to be discussed in the project. Striking a balance between these 
considerations is a challenge in order to avoid either too rigid ROE – hindering 
the command to fulfil mission objectives – or too liberal ROE –with a risk, at 
least theoretically, that force could be used undesirably wide by the peace units. 
The Nordic countries often, but not always, contribute to the same peace 
operations why I have chosen three recent with different character and with 
different lead organisations exemplifying the processes; EU Navfor Atalanta 
(Somalia), NATO OUP (Libya), and UN MINUSMA (Mali).
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In international public law and the also in Polish domestic law is many 
legal acts about different aspects of the security. There is now a classic 
division of the continental law system that applies in Poland and common 
law system. The concept of the legal system can also be considered in terms 
of the division into subsystems. For example, in the case of a statutory law, 
this would be a generally applicable law, and the legislative law subsystem 
could be distinguished within it16. In Poland – according to the system of 
continental law – the legal system can be divided into public and private law. 
More specifically, the legal system can in turn be divided into branches (in 
other words, fields, disciplines), which regulate a separate set of legal norms, 
content related, containing common concepts and principles. The criterion 
of division is the subject of regulation. As a rule, the field that governs the 
foundations of public institutions, the principles of the political and socio-
economic system in the state is also distinguished. The main branches of 
law in Poland include civil, criminal and administrative law. That is why 
it is difficult to understand why security law, defense law, or military law 
has not been distinguished17.
In 2014 Parliament adopted amendments of few important acts in this area, 
e.g.: the Act of 14 December 1995 – The Office of the Minister of National Defence, the 
Act of 21 November 1967 – Universal duty to defend the Republic of Poland and the 
16 Wprowadzenie do nauk prawnych. Leksykon tematyczny, red. A. Bator, Wyd. Prawnicze Lexis-
Nexis, Warszawa 2008, s. 176.
17 However, it should be noted that there are scientific positions on these issues as separate 
disciplines, vide: Kitler W., Bezpieczeństwo narodowe RP. Podstawowe uwarunkowania. Kategorie. 
System, AON, Warszawa 2011; Aspekty prawne bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP. Część ogólna, red. 
W. Kitler, M. Czuryk, M. Karpiuk, Wyd. AON, Warszawa 2013; Metodologiczne i dydaktyczne as-
pekty, bezpieczeństwa narodowego, red. nauk. W. Kitler, T. Kośmider, Difin, Warszawa 2015; 
Prawo obronne, Praca naukowo-badawcza pod kier. M. Czuryk, AON, Warszawa 2013; Prawo 
wojskowe, pod. red. W. Kitler, D. Nowak, M. Stępnowska, WolterKluwer, Warszawa 2018. 
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Act of 29 August 2002 – Martial law and the competence of the Commander-in-Chief 
and his subordination to the constitutional authorities of the Republic of Poland. But 
new government is preparing new legal background for new command 
and control system. In general in the Republic of Poland exist more then 80 
(statutes, bills and regulations, without international acts) legal acts about 
some kind of national security.
Therefore, it should be considered whether such fragmentation of core 
issues and scattering in such a rich collection of acts is the right solution? 
Another problematic issue is the number of amendments to various laws 
rather than creating new ones. In this topic, the Constitutional Court ruled, 
stating that: «In preparing another amendment to the Act, editor should 
consider the possibility of developing a new law instead of amendment, 
if proposed changes can make its content opaque, change a lot of affect its 
structure or consistency».18
Although, in this branch of law would be place for the legal definitions, 
which are not exist in any other acts (e.g. entity, recognition, aggression, war, 
armed conflict, and under Polish law: state of war, «a time of war»). This makes 
it difficult not only for their use, but, what it is even more important, in 
the interpretation. In the article, the author wants to show some examples 
of these definitions (which exist in public international and domestic law), 
because the correct interpretation is great important for security (and) law...
The most important hypothesis of the article refers to the belief that there 
are all the bases and predispositions to distinguish the security law (and 
within it, for example the defense or military law).
18 Postanowienie z dnia 28 lipca 2015 r. sygn. akt K 53/13, dostępne na stronie internetowej 
pod adresem: http://trybunal.gov.pl/s/k-5313/ [06.08.2017].
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In education, the goal is to educate children such that a child becomes a good 
citizen. The aim of education is deeply anchored to the history of Western 
thinking. The foundational ideas were formulated with ancient Greek 
philosophy; especially the philosophy of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle play 
central role in Western education. Military education is connected to the 
general educational tradition which has several interesting consequences. 
A natural characterization of the aim of military education is the it aims 
to educate good soldiers. However, it is not clear enough what is a good 
soldier. A good soldier must be at the same booth a good warrior and a 
good human being. There may be some tension between warriorship and 
humanity. How to overcome the tension? A task of military education is to 
answer the question. Answering the question supposes deep philosophico-
pedagogical framework.
Military education is education into an occupation. The character of 
occupations varies and the skills primarily supposed in them varies form 
epistemic skills, like is the case in pure science, to practical skills, like is 
the case for craftsmen. So, depending on the character of the occupation 
the needed education varies a lot. It may consist in theoretico-conceptual 
education as is the case in philosophy, mathematics, and pedagogy, or it may 
consist in practico-functional education. In work life, the distinctions are 
not so clear. Teaching, even if it supposes deep conceptual and theoretical 
knowledge, is very practical occupation; and very many so called practical 
occupations suppose deep going theoretical and conceptual acuity. The 
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military profession is not a single profession but a family of professions 
whose theoretical and practical basis varies.
To understand this better we have to consider the notion of expertise which 
Dreyfus (2006) classifies into seven levels from novice to mastery and even 
to practical wisdom. The classification is based on the depth of the relevant 
knowledge and skills. A novice is a beginner who follows explicit rules. The 
rule dependency diminishes when higher levels of expertise are achieved. At 
mastery level, the knowledge and skills are of high quality, and eventually 
practical wisdom is the ideal level of expertise. There is a strong belief that 
experts solve the problems we face (Feyerabend 2006; Horkheimer & Adorno 
1944). However, it is a known fact that this trust is not well-founded. And 
already Kant said that we should not externalize our own thinking to experts 
but use our own reason which is a leading idea behind the Enlightenment.
Practical wisdom refers to the level in which theoretical, practical, and 
ethical deliberation meet each other. Especially ethical deliberation is part 
and parcel of practical wisdom. Ethical deliberation is context-sensitive 
commitment to the ethical good. The context-sensitivity is connected to 
Aristotelian contextualism characterized by Sookermany 2012. However, the 
ethical deliberation is essentially related to so called classical professions, like 
divinity, law, medicine, teaching, and military professions that constitute 
values of Western societies.
The notion of responsibility is central in understanding professions or, more 
generally, expertise. Responsibility can be classified technical and ethical. 
The technical responsibility refers, for example, to responsibility to update 
occupational knowledge and skills. That is, the trust of laymen on experts 
should be justified. Ethical responsibility refers ethicality of expert which 
is part and parcel of his or her professional competence. That is, besides 
epistemic and practical skills the ethical skills are expected. The notion of 
action competence characterizes the whole competence of an expert. The notion 
of action competence is a cluster notion which is characterized as holistic 
unity of fours aspects of action competence, namely physical, psychological, 
social and ethical action competence (Toiskallio 2017). Moreover, the notion 
of action competence is scaling notion which means that anyone can be 
neither completely action competent nor completely non-action competent. 
The relationship between the aspects is quite a difficult task to do. The 
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essential idea is that they are interrelated. The ethical aspect is extremely 
central in characterizing deeply actor’s humanity. Moreover, ethical aspect 
plays very central role in social life, especially in the dialog competence 
which is the foundational skill in all negotiations. Especially in the case of 
international crisis the dialog competence shows the power of ethicality and 
respect. (Heinonen 2017.)
Ethical action competence is not merely ideal action within an ethically 
complete world but it presupposes that the evil must be taken seriously. 
Conscience is our internal «moral alarm bell» which tells us that something 
is right or is not right. It is not possible to turn off the «moral alarm bell» and 
hence there are no moral holidays for us. (Pihlström 2014.) Ethicality that 
is foundation of ethical action competence is not mere ideal but concrete 
power in facilitating the negotiation processes. However, neither ethical 
action competence nor dialog competence are congenital skills but they 
have to be educated. The education presupposes deep understanding of the 
ethicality and human dignity which presuppose ethical action competence. 
(Värri 2017.) Practical problem-solving situations are not merely applications 
of the knowledge and skills but may also enrich our understanding of the 
foundational notions by extending the scope of applications of them as 
Ranta (2017) demonstrates.
The contexts of international disputes are messy. The international law does 
not offer a clear framework to analyze and solve international disputes. The 
genesis of international disputes have long history, and the solution may take 
extremely long time. There is no guarantee that consensus would be achieved. 
(Heiskanen 2017.) Moreover, the informational environment of international 
disputes is extremely complex: there are too little information, too much 
information but also intentionally messy information. This informational 
vagueness is reality which must be taken into account. The ethical action 
competence and dialog competence should be in action in such a messy 
context. (Wiewiura & Hendricks 2017). This create challenging environment 
for applications and for education. (Sookermany 2016.)
MILITÆRE STUDIER SE/2017
132
References
Dreyfus, Hubert (2006). How Far Is Distance Learning from Education? In: 
Evan Selinger & Robert P. Crease (eds.), The Philosophy of Expertise (pp. 358–369). 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Feyerabend, P., 2006. How to Defend Society Against Science. In: Evan Selinger 
& Robert P. Crease (eds.), The Philosophy of Expertise (pp. 196–212). New York: 
Columbia University Press.
Heinonen, Reijo E., 2017, Bridging the Gap of Understanding: Dialogue 
Competence in the Renewal of UN Peacekeeping and Civil Crisis Management, 
in Mutanen 2017.
Heiskanen, Veijo, 2017, The Scopics of International Conflicts, in Mutanen 
2017.
Horkheimer, Max & Adorno, Theodor W. (1972 [1944]). Dialectic of Enlightenment 
[«Dialektik der Aufklärung»], New York: Seabury.
Mutanen, Arto (ed.), 2017, Ethical Basis of Human Security – Towards Renewal of 
Peace Operations Training, FINCENT Publication Series 1/2017 (in press).
Pihlström, Sami (2014). Taking Evil Seriously. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ranta, Helena, 2017, Universality of Human Rights, in Mutanen 2017.
Sookermany, Anders McDonald 2011. What Is a Skillful Soldier? An 
Epistemological Foundation for Understanding Military Skill Acquisition in 
(Post) Modernized Armed Forces, Armed Forces & Society 38(4) (ss. 582–603).
Sookermany, Anders McDonald 2016. Military Education Reconsidered: A 
Postmodern Update. Journal of Philosophy of Education.
Toiskallio, Jarmo, 2017, From Ethics to Ethical Action Competence, in 
Mutanen 2017.
133
MILITARY SCIENCES – THE BACKBONE OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS? – BOOK OF ABSTRACTS ISMS 2017
Värri, Veli-Matti, 2017, Instrumentalization of Education As a Threat to a 
Good Life: An Introduction to Education in the Midst of Wicked Problems, 
in Mutanen 2017.
Wiewiura, Joachim S. & Hendricks, Vincent F., 2017, Opinions, Bots, and 
Public Spaces, in Mutanen 2017.
MILITÆRE STUDIER SE/2017
134
135
WG 6  
Security and Defence 
Policy and Strategy
Resilience in the Post-Truth World: 
integrating resilience in defense 
planning against information 
warfare
Janis Berzins
National Defence Academy of Latvia
janis.berzins01@mil.lv
Keywords: Information Warfare, Defense Planning, Resilience.
One of the main aspects of modern warfare is the idea that the main battle-
space is the mind. As a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by 
information and psychological warfare, aiming to achieving superiority in 
troops and weapons control, and morally and psychologically depressing the 
enemy’s armed forces personnel and civil population. The main objective is 
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to reduce the necessity of for deploying hard military power to the minimum 
necessary, making the opponent’s military and civil population to support 
the attacker in to the detriment of their own country, its values, culture, 
political system, and ideology.
It has the purpose of constructing a specific world view within the population, 
expressed ideologically by the political support for the interests of the 
opponent. The construction of enemies and the manipulation of reality is not 
a new thing and happens in the West too, although the process is different. 
The absolute freedom of information combined with the general public’s 
appetite for conspiracy theories and postmodern relativism. Combined with 
social media becoming one of the most important sources of information, 
the result is a situation in which everything is true and nothing is true at 
the same time.
This gives the possibility for establishing a narrative that serves as an alternative 
reality as military strategy, where the support for the strategic objectives 
of war by society in a country at war, in other words, the legitimization 
of war, is fundamental to achieving victory. In other words, the success of 
military campaigns in the form of armed conflicts and local wars is much 
dependent on the relationship between military and non-military factors 
– the political, psychological, ideological, and informational elements of 
the campaign – then on military power as isolate variable. Therefore, the 
security of information systems at a technological level and the willingness 
of citizens to defend their country at a cognitive level are fundamental 
elements for guaranteeing the security of any country.
To integrate resilience into defense planning against information warfare 
it is necessary to consider the following points:
1. Monitoring information environment and resilience:
• The concept „resilience to information warfare» must be operationalized 
by setting measurable criteria for monitoring it on a regular basis. For 
example, the audit of information related processes at a technological 
level and measuring the willingness to defend country, trust in state 
institutions and other indicators at a cognitive level.
• The comprehensive system of monitoring and analysis of hostile 
activities in information environment (must include such domains 
as cyber, media, social media) should be implemented.
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2. Enhancing resilience at a cognitive level:
• To explain adversaries’ strategic goals and tools of their implementation.
• To implement national level strategic communication programmes 
for winning hearts and minds of our own societies. The main task 
is to decrease the gap between governments and societies, which is 
the main vulnerability that can be used as a leverage by adversaries.
• To enhance critical thinking of our own societies. This is the best way 
how to provide information environment security while not giving 
up democratic freedoms.
• To enhance high-quality journalism, because media business logic and 
the mediatization of politics are two main drivers of the post-truth 
phenomenon.
• To look for ways how governments and societies could interact directly, 
without media, because this way politicians and state officials can 
explain their policies and also get direct feedback from societies.
Is this the beginning of meta warfare, in the sense that using military tools 
to achieve non-military objectives, non-military tools to achieve military 
objectives, and/or both at the same time in any combination is becoming 
the norm?
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The Russian defense industry is a critical segment of the country’s economy, 
employing at least 2.5 million workers, and accounting for 20 percent of 
all manufacturing jobs. The arms industry suffered considerably after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and subsequent years of 
neglect due to a precipitous drop in military spending. According to data put 
out by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), defense 
spending (in constant 2011 US dollars) fell from US$371 billion in 1988 to 
a low of US$21 billion in 1998. The resulting plunge in Russian defense 
procurement spending meant that the Russian arms industry had to find 
overseas customers or else face extinction. By the early 2000s, therefore, 
the Russian arms industry reportedly relied on arms exports for up to 80 
percent of its income, and securing overseas buyers was absolutely critical 
to the survival of the Russian defense industry.
By the late 2000s, however, Russian defense spending began to rise again, 
spurring a revitalization of the arms industry. Between 2004 and 2014, 
military expenditures grew from US$41 billion to US$91.7 billion (in constant 
2011 US dollars), according to SIPRI data; approximately 40 percent of 
spending goes to procurement, leading to a resurgence of domestic orders for 
armaments from Russia’s arms industries. Consequently, currently 75–80 
percent of defense industry output is for the Russian military, and about 
20–25 percent is exported.
As a result, the Russian arms industry has been experiencing something of a 
renaissance. The defense sector has continued to grow, despite the growing 
impact of falling oil prices and Western sanctions (imposed after Moscow’s 
annexation of Crimea) on the overall Russian economy. Domestic military 
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procurement spending is up considerably, reaching US$26.3 billion in 
2014. At the same time, overseas arms sales have remained strong, hitting 
US$13.2 billion that same year. Russia’s aircraft and air-defense (missile) 
sectors have been particularly powerful performers. For example, Russia’s 
United Aircraft Corporation (UAC, which incorporates the Sukhoi, Mikoyan, 
Ilyushin, Yakolev, Beriev, Irkut, and Tupolev aircraft firms), has achieved 
remarkable success in recent years, both in terms of number of aircraft 
produced and in terms of sales. UAC produces about 200 aircraft a year, both 
military and civilian, although 80 percent of UAC’s revenues currently come 
from military sales. Most of its output used to be exported, but currently 
purchases by the Russian military account for 80 percent of UAC’s income 
(mostly Su-27/-30/-35 fighters, as well as upgrades of MiG-29s).
While arms exports are not nearly as essential as before, they are nevertheless 
still important to the continued wellbeing of the Russian defense industry. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s share of all global arms 
transfers fell to around 12 percent (according to SIPRI); starting around 2000, 
however, Russian defense exports began to recover, and by 2014 it held a 27 
percent share in the global arms market, second only to the United States. 
According to Russian sources, in 2014 Russian defense firms exported more 
than $15 billion worth of arms to more than 60 countries, and signed almost 
$14 billion worth of new contracts.
In this regard, the Asia-Pacific market has been particularly crucial for 
Russian overseas arms sales. The Asia-Pacific is still Russia’s single most 
important market, despite some diversification of buyers. Between 2005 and 
2014, nearly two-thirds of all Russian weapons exports, worth approximately 
US$42.3 billion, were to this region, according to SIPRI. In particular, this 
region contains Russia’s two largest arms buyers, India and China, who 
together account for over half of all Russians transfers period (32 percent 
and 21 percent, respectively).
At the same time, the longer-term future of the Russian arms industry 
remains tenuous. In the first place, Western sanctions on Russia could also 
soon affect the defense industry. These restrictions have halted not only 
Western military exports (which help fill critical gaps in Russia’s defense 
capabilities) but also commercial high-tech transactions that could have dual-
use military applications. The Russian defense industry also faces critical 
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structural challenges as well, including inflation, high levels of debt, and the 
loss of qualified personnel. Many defense firms are still struggling to achieve 
profitability. More important perhaps, the manpower base within the Russian 
defense industrial base is aging rapidly; the average age of its scientists and 
engineers is now around 50 years, meaning that, in a few years, the Russian 
defense industry could face a severe shortage of technical personnel.
Consequently, the Russian arms industry could find that, once again, exports 
are more necessary than ever. In its efforts to secure increased overseas arms 
sales, certain factors are in its favor. Russian arms are reliable and relatively 
easy to operate. In addition, the Russian defense industry is increasingly 
emphasizing after-sales servicing, so MRO (maintenance, repairs, and 
overhaul) and upgrades are increasingly on hand. Most important of all, 
perhaps, Moscow offers many types of very capable weapons systems (such 
as the Su-30 multirole fighter and the S-300/-400 air-defense missile) with 
few restrictions and at very competitive prices.
The Asia-Pacific will continue to be a prime market for Russian arms sales. 
At the same time, former Soviet states – especially those now under the 
new Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – along 
with African countries, are likely to become growing customers for Russian 
arms. In general, therefore, one should expect that Russia would remain a 
powerful player in the global arms market.
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With much fanfare and a lot of publicity, NATO adopted its so-called Readiness 
Action Plan (RAP) at the alliance’s summit in Wales, September 2014. Since 
then, NATO has meticulously implemented the plan’s main ingredients. 
«Assurance measures» were put in place immediately after the summit as NATO-
troops were deployed to the East to do air policing, training, exercising, and 
maritime patrolling, and within weeks allies began implementing «adaption 
measures» setting up an enhanced NATO Response Force (e-NRF) and the 
so-called Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). Also, new multinational 
NATO headquarters (so-called NATO Force Integration Units – NFIUs) were 
established on the territories of nine eastern allies to accommodate and 
prepare the arrival of allied forces in the event of a crisis. On the surface of 
things, the allies responded swift and firmly to the new challenges posed by 
Russia’s aggressions in the Ukraine (see for instance Brooke-Holland 2016; 
Olshausen 2016; Ringsmose & Rynning 2017; Zapfe 2017).
Not everything is perfect in «NATO-land», however. As the RAP and additional 
measures are being implemented, it is becoming increasingly clear that the 
alliance’s plan for the Baltic Sea region has serious shortcomings. Russian 
A2/AD capabilities challenge the allies ability to deploy reinforcements to the 
Baltic States (see for instance Burton 2016); alliance authorities are struggling 
to identify and designate sufficient high-readiness follow-on forces; and 
almost three decades after the end of the Cold War, NATO is realizing that 
the logistical skills associated with the deployment of large force numbers 
and weapon systems have to be relearned. In short, if the security of the 
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Baltic States is to be based on more than thin «tripwire forces» (in the shape 
of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence – EFP), the alliance will need to do 
more.
The article starts out by briefly describing the initiatives taken by NATO in 
response to Russia’s aggressive behaviour in Eastern Europe. We provide a 
short account of the RAP and the EFP and present an overview of the bilateral 
initiatives taken by the U.S. with regard to the defence of the Baltic States. 
In the article’s second and third part, we zoom in on the challenges related 
to NATO’s Force Structure (NFS) and the NATO Command Structure (NCS). 
Based on interviews with senior NATO officials and military personnel based 
at NATO HQ (Brussels) and Allied Command Operations (ACO) (Mons), we 
identify areas where the alliance is still struggling to fulfil its plans. With 
regards to the NFS, we zoom in on force numbers and the alliance’s (in) 
ability to deploy to the East; in the section dealing with the NCS, we take a 
look at the effectiveness of the NFIUs. In the article’s fourth (and last) main 
section, we assess the alliance’s ability to counter a hybrid threat. Does the 
alliance have the doctrinal tools and mind set to fight and prevail in the 
grey area between outright war and peace?
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After the collapse of Soviet Union, the United States (U.S.) became the sole 
superpower in the international system. The U.S. still is one of the few 
countries in the world that can enact proactive, global grand strategy. With 
resurgent Russia flexing its military and diplomatic muscles in Eastern Europe, 
understanding grand strategies, understanding ideational foundations and 
rationale behind U.S. foreign policy towards Russia is important not only for 
countries in this region, which these U.S. strategies directly affect, but also 
for the global community of states, as interests of U.S. and Russia compete 
again not only in Europe, but in Middle East and elsewhere.
Grand strategies are comprehensive, long–term plans used to achieve preferred 
U.S. foreign policy goals; as Charles Krauthammer puts it, grand strategies 
discuss «the American role in the world». They discuss both domestic and 
foreign policy, the means and ends of U.S. involvement in the international 
system of states. This paper analyzes U.S. grand strategies U.S. has used in its 
foreign policy towards Russia from 2001 to 2017. It compares the policies of 
President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama, addressing following 
two research questions: What are the main contemporary U.S. grand strategies 
relevant in relations with Russia? What strategies has U.S. used in relations 
with Russia during Bush and Obama presidency?
The grand strategy classification used in this paper focuses on four elements 
that play role in U.S. foreign policy. Firstly, the role of U.S. leadership. Secondly, 
the role of democracy, liberal values and other idealist ideas. Thirdly, the role 
of cooperation. Fourthly, the role of soft and hard power in relations with 
other states. Depending on different emphasis on each element, different 
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U.S. foreign policies can be attributed to three grand strategies: primacy, 
liberal internationalism, and offshore balancing.
This grand strategy classification is used in content analysis to code and 
analyze U.S. National Security Strategies (NSS) published during presidency 
of George Bush and Barack Obama as well as to code and analyze speeches 
about Russia by both Bush and Obama. Altogether four NSS, two for each 
administration, are coded an analyzed. To analyze grand strategies towards 
Russia during Bush’s presidency 12 speeches and 4 short statements (used 
as a single unit of analysis) on Russia-Georgia War during August 2008 in 
speeches of George Bush are included in coding and analysis. To analyze 
grand strategies towards Russia during Obama’s presidency 17 speeches and 
4 short statements during Russia’s aggression in Ukraine (used as a single 
unit of analysis) of Barack Obama and 5 speeches by the Vice President Joe 
Biden, altogether 23 units of analysis, are used.
Using grand strategy classification in analysis of Bush and Obama NSS, the 
conclusion is that both Bush NSS 2002 and 2006 were leaning towards primacy. 
They contained multilateralist elements of liberal internationalism, but they 
emphasized unilateralism and military power far more than Obama’s NSS. 
Obama’s NSS were liberal internationalist. NSS 2010 was almost explicitly 
liberal internationalist, while NSS 2015 contained somewhat more references 
to primacist military power grand strategy element. Comparing grand 
strategies outlined in NSS with specific strategies towards Russia outlined 
in these documents, while overall NSS 2002 and 2006 emphasized primacy, 
in references to Russia there were no unilateralist and military primacist 
elements. Obama NSS 2010 was liberal internationalist and specific references 
to Russia were also liberal internationalist. Obama NSS 2015 was also liberal 
internationalist, but it did include increase in emphasis on primacist military 
power grand strategy element. The emphasis on primacist military power grand 
strategy element was even bigger in references towards Russia in this NSS.
Analysis of 12 speeches and four short statements during Russia-Georgia 
war indicate five stages in Bush’s foreign policy towards Russia. The first 
stage in foreign policy of Bush administration towards Russia was from 
2001 until mid-2003. It emphasized multilateral cooperation with Russia 
in order to address various global problems. The second stage was from 
June 2003 until mid-2006 and in this stage in his speeches Bush connected 
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democracy and human rights situation in Russia with cooperation between 
the U.S. and Russia offering strong criticism to Russia. The second stage in 
relations to Russia also corresponds to what various authors have described 
as the linkage strategy. However, the logic of this strategy proved to be false. 
Promise of cooperation, if Russia democratizes did not deliver and starting 
with mid-2006 a third stage – the drift – in relations between U.S. and 
Russia started. Bush’s speeches about Russia became vague and contained 
less grand strategy elements than speeches before and after this period. 
This drift ended in early 2008, when the forth stage in Bush’s foreign policy 
towards Russia started. This fourth stage was Bush’s reset. Bush returned 
to positive, multilateral agenda of cooperation with Russia, abandoning 
idealist values. However, Russia-Georgia war in August 2008 stopped this 
reset. After this war, the fifth stage started where Bush returned to idealist 
values and talked about multilateral cooperation. However, this time not 
with Russia, but against Russia. Although there were different stages in 
Bush’s foreign policy towards Russia, all of them were within confines of 
liberal internationalist grand strategy.
To analyze grand strategy towards Russia during Obama administration, 
23 units of analysis – speeches and statements – were used. First stage 
in Obama’s foreign policy towards Russia during 2009 was a proposal to 
cooperate multilaterally with Russia on issues where both states have similar 
interests. Obama also rejects primacy explicitly. However, in this stage Obama 
still retains cautious idealist rhetoric similar to Bush’s speeches. Second 
stage in started in 2009 and lasted until June 2013 and can be called Reset 
of relations. In this stage Obama emphasized multilateral cooperation and 
used dual track approach. This approach separated pragmatic cooperation 
with idealist values and problems with democracy and human rights in 
Russia. The logic of this stage was contrary to Bush administration’s. If Russia 
cooperated, it would see the benefits of increased cooperation that would 
come if Russia democratized. However, unlike Bush’s first stage which talked 
only about multilateral cooperation, this stage kept some occasional vague 
references to idealism. However, this logic was also flawed and did not deliver. 
Already before Russia’s aggression in Ukraine U.S. strategy towards Russia 
begun to change. Deteriorating human rights situation in Russia, Russia’s 
support to founder of WikiLeaks Snowden and increasing disagreements in 
Syria led to an increased emphasis on idealism in Obama’s speeches. The 
rhetoric on cooperation changed too. Obama talked more about «potential» 
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cooperation. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, March 2014 marks not only a 
fourth stage in foreign policy towards with Russia, but also an end to the 
liberal internationalist grand strategy. Obama starts invoking primacist 
military power grand strategy element in relations to Russia. Previously it 
appeared on few occasions, but now it played a prominent role. However, 
Obama talks not only about military power, he talks also about all other 
grand strategy elements, except unilateralism. While Obama emphasizes soft 
power in relations to Russia, he also emphasizes idealism and multilateral 
cooperation against Russia. Even burden sharing element of offshore 
balancing is occasionally invoked in this stage. This increased support to 
military power grand strategy element indicates that in this period Obama 
is leaning towards primacist grand strategy towards Russia.
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The institute for strategy (IFS) at the RDDC hereby propose to present a recently 
initiated research project to analyze the Danish governmental approach to 
the development of a more comprehensive cyber strategy. The purpose of the 
research is to investigate challenges (and advantages) to the initial doctrinal 
approach, which is to allocate responsibility for resilience to cyber events 
to individual societal sectors headed by their respective ministries while 
developing a framework for cooperation between sectors.
This will contribute to the stated #ISMS 17 purpose by demonstrating how 
military educational institutions can support development of national policies 
by applying military science to research of emerging challenges.
Background: In 2014 Denmark published its first cyber strategy as an 
intermediate answer to the emerging threats in cyber space to the state, 
citizens and businesses. The 2014-strategy was from the outset a temporary 
means meant to provide a basis on which to proceed to a more comprehensive 
strategy. This was originally scheduled to be presented in May 2017, but has 
been delayed as challenges in developing a comprehensive strategy has been 
realized (Forsvarsministeriet 2014).
Initially the Danish Centre for Cyber Security was established as a part of the 
Danish Defence Intelligence Service under the Ministry of Defence in order 
to protect against threats emanating from states and non-state actors while 
the National Cyber Crime Centre (NC3) was established as part of the police to 
investigate and prosecute criminal activities in cyberspace. This construction 
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reproduced the traditional relationship between state and citizen: Focusing 
on avoidance of disruptive events as the state provides protection against 
external threats and divides responsibility between military and police 
pending on the threats origin. However, the strategy did not cover another 
societal responsibility normally allocated to the state: The development of 
ressilience to overcome the effects of successful cyber attacks (Centre for 
Cyber Security 2015).
The Danish government has given the Danish Ministry of Defence the task to 
develop a new strategy which is much more focused on the resilience aspects. 
This will shift the focus from avoiding attacks to overcoming the effects of 
attacks and other cyber events that will eventually occur (Forsvarsministeriet 
2016).
Traditionally Danish planning and preparation for societal resilience has been 
conducted following a doctrine of decentralization (sektoransvarsprincippet), 
henceforth referred to as The Principle of Sectorial Responsibility or PSR. 
The PSR implies that the authority, company or institution that has the daily 
responsibility for an area also has the responsibility in case of a disruptive 
event, including planning how to uphold and resume provision of services 
within this area (Beredskabsstyrelsen 2006).
PSR was the backbone of Danish resilience planning during the Cold War. 
Although some difficulties were experienced regarding inter sectorial 
coordination, generally the doctrine was well suited to maintain resilience 
against relatively well defined external threats (mainly war and natural 
disasters) amongst providers of essential services who were generally owned 
or controlled by the government.
Based on these experiences, the Danish government stated that the cyber 
strategy is to be developed along the lines of PSR. However, two major changes 
challenge the PSR when it comes to countering cyber threats:
1. As cyber threats only come to fruition when successfully exploiting 
unidentified weaknesses of either software, organizations or both, they 
are by their very nature difficult to define in more than general terms 
prior to their effect being recognized. Hence, their first and second order 
effects are also difficult to foresee and prepare against.
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2. A large number of essential services has been transferred from the public 
to the private sector and many are not even owned by nationally based 
entities. This reduces the government’s ability to plan, coordinate and 
eventually command these service providers to take actions to improve 
societal resilience.
In literature on the state’s role resilience planning these two factors have led 
to the identification of the need to establish a governmental approach that 
involves both centralizing and decentralizing elements. The unforeseeable 
nature of disruptive events make them unavoidable. This changes the 
relationship between state and citizen as failure at some point must be 
expected. The state’s success in the role of protector hence also is measured 
by its ability to provide not only protection but resilience in a very complex 
environment of public and private actors (Herrington and Aldrich 2013) 
(Brassett and Vaughan-Williams 2015).
Theoretical literature on the topic suggests that a state should encourage and 
support a resilience mindset and active approach at the individual and private 
entity level in order to provide the necessary local knowledge and agility 
to respond to cyber events (Dunn Cavelty, Kaufmann, and Søby Kristensen 
2015). Also the state has a role in providing guidance and structures for 
communication, coordination and defensive efforts for all these individual 
efforts before an event. During trans-sectorial disruptive events the state 
has a role in gaining and maintaining situational awareness and allocating 
resources to mitigating and eventually overcoming events accordingly. In this 
regard, there is a tension between the need to centralize in order to maximize 
situational awareness and influence on the strategic and operational level 
and the need to decentralize in order to achieve necessary local knowledge 
and agility to react efficiently at the tactical level (Walker and Cooper 2011). 
As described above, the current Danish approach puts more emphasis on 
the perceived advantages of decentralization.
IFS’ research project is to
• explore theoretical literature on the topic,
• at the international level explore empirically other national approaches 
to the cyber challenges,
151
MILITARY SCIENCES – THE BACKBONE OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS? – BOOK OF ABSTRACTS ISMS 2017
• at the national level explore empirically the challenges and advantages 
of PSR experienced by key actors within both the public administration 
and the private sector.
The intended outcome is to be able to provide both strategic guidance and, 
where identified, best practices to the ongoing development of a new cyber 
strategy.
We suggest to submit the presentation under Defence Policy and Strategy. 
Secondarily under War Studies or Armed Forces and Society.
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The U.S. defence community is currently debating a range of capability 
requirements and top priority investments that will shape U.S. strategy 
and the use of force in the 21st century. Embedded in a broader conceptual 
umbrella of the Third Offset Strategy, the U.S. Department of Defence (DOD) 
seeks to develop technologically enabled novel operational and organisational 
constructs. Its strategic aim is to sustain U.S. military superiority over its 
capable adversaries at the operational level of war, thereby strengthening 
conventional deterrence. At the same time, the Third Offset strategy aims 
to revamp institutional agility in U.S. defence management to succeed 
in a dynamically evolving operational environment. By speeding up the 
implementation of organisational and conceptual innovation, a strategic 
technological advantage is sustainable. Strategic effectiveness of the Third 
Offset, however, will not only depend on the institutional agility and adoption 
capacity – the financial intensity and organisational capital required to 
adopt military innovations, but will also depend on the responses, resources, 
and counter-innovations by peer competitors. Notwithstanding the diffusion 
and convergence of novel technologies – electronic miniaturisation, 
additive manufacturing, nano-technology, artificial intelligence, space-like 
capabilities, and unmanned systems that are likely to alter the character 
of conflict over time, the patterns of «challenge, strategic response, and 
adaptation» will continue to shape the direction and character of long-term 
strategic competitions.
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Accordingly, this paper focuses on the evolving contours of the Russian 
strategic thought and responses toward the Third Offset strategy. It argues 
that while the U.S. Third Offset is a recent development, its core technological 
initiatives have been a significant cause of concern for Russia for a long 
time. In this context, Russian responses to counter these initiatives consist 
of two major elements:
 – The first one is ‘countering the Third Offset Strategy with the First 
Offset Strategy’, which means prioritizing the development of a wide 
array of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons systems. For Russia, 
maintaining a sophisticated arsenal of nuclear weapons can effectively 
offset conventional military innovations of the U.S., NATO, and China.
 – The second element of the response strategy is more ambitious, and 
carries greater technological risks. Russia began to counter many U.S. 
technological initiatives via similar indigenous programs, although 
more narrowly focused and smaller in scale. In October 2012, Russia 
established the Advanced Research Foundation (ARF) – a counterpart to 
the U.S. DARPA. The ARF focuses on similar areas such as the Third Offset 
Strategy, including hypersonic vehicles, artificial intelligence, additive 
technologies, unmanned underwater vehicles, cognitive technologies, 
directed energy weapons, and others.
Although in some programs, Russian military research and development are 
at initial stages relative to the U.S., in other areas such as directed energy 
weapons, rail gun, hypersonic vehicle; unmanned underwater vehicle programs 
are progressing into advanced stages. The key challenge for Russia, however, 
is a sustained resource allocation to translate these disruptive innovations 
into actual military capabilities.
To this day, Russian officials have not made public comments on the Third 
offset strategy. From the Russian point of view, the Strategy is still in its early 
formation stages, with intense discussions in the U.S. defence community, 
and subject to change under the Trump administration. However, the 
Russian military has been closely monitoring the Third Offset Strategy’s 
areas of technological development, supporting research by leading Russian 
academic institutions, while assessing its long-term consequences. According 
to the Russian writings, the Third Offset Strategy is viewed to be primarily 
‘anti-Chinese’ although it has significant strategic implications for Russia; 
much as the First and the Second Offset Strategies were ‘anti-Soviet’, but with 
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profound consequences for the rest of the world. In essence, the U.S. expects 
to leverage its technological superiority to offset the growing resources that 
China can channel into its defence sector. Like the first two strategies, the 
Third is emerging at a time when the U.S. is facing budgetary constraints, 
while the resources of potential U.S. adversaries are growing. In some aspects, 
the situation is even more complicated than in the past.
For Russia, key aspects of the Third Offset strategy that are of immediate 
concern include the Strategy’s effect on the strategic stability and its influence 
on the globalization of processes in the high technology industry. Russia views 
both its strategic and tactical nuclear forces as the cornerstone of its national 
security. Furthermore, Russian defense leadership closely monitors select 
U.S. R&D projects related to directed energy weapons, hypersonic weapons, 
and ballistic missile defenses, among others. While these technological 
initiatives have existed long before the Third Offset Strategy, they shape top 
priorities in the U.S. military innovation. At the same time, Russian experts 
have also noted the Third Offset’s emphasis on spin-on and spin-off effects 
from civilian science and technology bases for defense needs. From the 
Russian perspective, the U.S. could potentially establish additional export 
barriers for select technologies, previously considered as civilian, especially 
to peer competitors such as China and Russia. These concerns strengthen 
the cause of the proponents of more active import substitution policies, and 
contribute to increased interests in forming industrial partnerships with 
major developing countries, such as China and India.
In the long-term, Russian conventional capabilities will likely reflect investments 
and technological R&D milestones in the following priority areas:
 – Robotic and remotely controlled systems, including UAVs, as well as 
ground vehicles – combat, reconnaissance, logistical, which are currently 
undergoing vigorous testing;
 – New generation of electronic warfare systems and expanded capabilities 
in cyber-warfare;
 – Introduction of the advanced command and control systems, including 
battlefield internet;
 – Advanced long-range and ultra-long-range air defense and missile defense 
systems with ASAT capabilities, which will be used not just for air defense, 
but for gaining air superiority, offsetting the advantages of the Western 
adversaries;
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 – New generation of well-protected armored vehicles that will dramatically 
reduce losses in the local conflicts;
 – Advanced fighter aircraft capable of engaging the 5th generation Western 
fighters;
 – Hypersonic weapons as the main way to defeat future developments in 
foreign anti-air and missile defense systems;
 – Directed energy weapons programs designed to establish foundations for 
the future weapons development;
The implementation of these programs over the next decade may enable 
Russia to keep pace with disruptive innovations taking place in the U.S. Third 
Offset Strategy. At the same time, however, Russian investment into other 
power projection capabilities, including the new generations of the major 
surface combatants of the Navy, strategic airlift, amphibious capabilities are 
and will likely remain limited – aimed at maintaining the current potential 
at best. Such disparity in priorities seems to be defined by the ongoing 
confrontation with the West and the expected developments in defense 
technology, which make it necessary for Russia to concentrate resources on a 
limited number of strategically relevant projects. Under current conditions, it 
is very unlikely, and almost impossible for Russia to assume a role of a global 
military power capable of opposing the West in geographically distant areas. 
As described once by the U.S. President Barak Obama, Russia will remain a 
‘regional power’. Although Russian military capabilities in the areas along 
the Russian borders will likely remain formidable, their ability to maintain 
a presence and influence in the more remote parts of the world, including 
Southeast Asia will be limited.
That said, the Third Offset Strategy and concomitant Russian and Chinese 
countermeasures will shape East Asia’s strategic environment in the 21st 
century. First, the ongoing military innovation changes the dynamics of 
great power competition, and thus the character of future warfare. In this 
context, regional strategic competition will likely reflect asymmetric negation, 
strategic ambiguity, denial and deception, particularly in the emerging 
new domains of warfare: space, cyber-space, near-space, and underwater. 
With the widening operational requirements and diffusion of advanced 
technologies, Russia, China, and the U.S. will rethink existing concepts 
of operations, organisational force structures, training, and ultimately, 
military-technological acquisition priorities. Select military technologies 
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and capabilities will subsequently diffuse throughout other major powers 
in the region, reshaping military modernisation paths and patterns, while 
bringing about a complex set of new strategic and operational challenges.
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This submission seeks to serve two goals: first, to introduce a research plan 
on a project scrutinizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
role in European security in 2030 and, secondly, with the help of this case 
study, to discuss the ways strategic forecasting can contribute to an officer’s 
professional skills.
As of 2017, NATO faces unprecedented challenges both internally and 
externally. While NATO’s external security environment has during the 
recent years seen deteriorating level of stability due to increased tension 
with Russia and the mounting unrest in the Middle East, the organization 
at the same time is met with a challenging transformation from a crisis 
management organization to one focusing on collective defence. Moreover, 
tensions within the Transatlantic community due to American global military 
over-stretch and the growing frustration with the lack of European burden-
sharing have gradually intensified during the 2000s and turned into nearly 
an open quarrel since the start of the Trump Administration. Will these 
divisive trends continue within NATO? Are we going see a remarkable turn 
for more coherence during the coming decade?
The credibility of NATO, like any defence alliance, is constituted of two 
dimensions: political and military. On the political level, credibility follows 
above all from trust by the member states to the Alliance and foreign powers 
to execute common defence should a need to do so emerge. Militarily, NATO’s 
credibility and thereby its capacity for deterrence, collective defence and 
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crisis management is dependent on a demonstrable capability, readiness 
and usability of the member-states’ military force (Bartels 2014).
The idea of the research project is to anticipate the future prospects of NATO 
credibility from the political point of view. To be more precise, the project will 
scrutinize three issues: how central or coherent will NATO’s role in European 
security architecture be in 2030; what will be the key factors promoting 
internal cohesion and incoherence within the Alliance; and how will NATO’s 
relationship to the European Union be arranged in terms of security. The 
research material is constituted of public official documents produced by 
NATO and its key member states, elements of the public discussion and 
selected interviews conducted by the researcher.
In terms of method, the project seeks to observe the methodological principles 
of strategic foresight. The goal is to identify the most important megatrends 
affecting NATO’s future in European security and to identify indicators or 
warning signals predicting certain paths of development. The idea is not 
to produce an exact forecast of a particular future, but rather to sketch am 
outline or a range of possible futures. In addition, the possibility of various 
«black swans» – unexpected variables with potentially far-reaching effects 
– will be kept in mind throughout the process as well.
As said, the second function of the paper is to discuss the ways strategic 
forecasting can contribute to an officer’s professional skills. While forecasting is 
often seen as a key element in strategic studies and national defence planning 
in many countries, its reliable and successful exercise is notoriously difficult 
(see e.g. Choucri and Robinson [eds.] 1978 or Jervis 1991/92, 39–46). The wide 
range of possible approaches and the diverse levels of scholarly ambition of 
strategic forecasting (Schneider; Gleditsch & Carey 2010) does not make its 
understanding any easier for an officer studying or applying such research 
in his/her work. This submission seeks to promote a better understanding of 
strategic forecasting from an involved officer’s point of view by discussing 
its strengths, limitations, issues and the choices that are involved.
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This paper approaches military affairs from business architecture viewpoint 
trying to create a tool to help architects in analysing the enterprise situation and 
foresee challenges in implementing the command, control, communications, 
computers, and information systems (C4I). There is evidence of many failed 
C4I and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system implementations within 
armed forces. The paper is a part of the writers’ research in finding why so 
many information related development programs have faced challenges 
when implemented in military enterprises.
The design of research follows the approach of pragmatic worldview, using 
qualitative deduction in explaining how military affairs (business) have 
evolved through time and how that may affect the way C4I systems should 
be implemented. The paper assumes that evolution of military affairs can 
be explained by a confrontation situation defined by Clausewitz (1984) 
using a combination of the Ross et al. (2006) model for strategic operation 
methods and the Gattorna’s (2010) model for a strategic position in the 
competition. When main changes of military affairs from 30 years’ war to 
contemporary doctrines are studied through the hypothesis, a roadmap of 
evolution in military affairs emerges. The roadmap tool is further tested by 
three reductional experimentation cases.
MILITÆRE STUDIER SE/2017
162
The evolutionary architecture roadmap considers military affairs from 
confrontation, organizational structure, and a strategic resources approach 
focusing on the business level. The roadmap explains better the dynamic 
nature of business architecture thus avoiding the linearity of existing 
architecture frameworks. Consequently, a more balanced systems based 
model is proposed to the Military Science and business architecture body 
of knowledge.
For many military enterprise architects, it is challenging to define how the 
strategic posture and processes of the organization will adopt the tools and 
systems being rolled out. The roadmap for the evolution of military affairs 
helps the architect to assess the status of affairs. It also helps the architect 
to consider different approaches to develop military capabilities and the 
culture without creating insurmountable obstacles between the information 
systems and existing habits.
163
MILITARY SCIENCES – THE BACKBONE OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS? – BOOK OF ABSTRACTS ISMS 2017
Grand Strategy is Attrition. The 
Logic of Integrating Various Forms 
of Power in Conflict
Lukas Milevski
University of Leiden
lukasmilevski@gmail.com
Keywords: grand strategy, hybrid warfare, unrestricted warfare, military 
power, non-military power
For the past two centuries, military strategy has been studied thoroughly in 
a scientific manner to improve our actual conduct of war. Although many 
important debates persist in strategic studies, much common ground has also 
been established. This state of affairs within strategic studies emphatically 
does not extend to grand strategy. Despite being in use since the early 19th 
century, the term not only has not been studied scientifically, but its meaning 
has changed continuously. As a result the concept is taken for granted, even 
though there is no consensus on the actual meaning of grand strategy.
Grand strategy, it turns out, is one of the most slippery and widely abused 
terms in the foreign policy lexicon. The concept is often invoked but less often 
defined, and those who define the phrase do so in a variety of different, and 
often contradictory, ways…The result of all this is that discussions of grand 
strategy are often confused or superficial. Too frequently, they muddle or 
obscure more than they illuminate.
Two main understandings of grand strategy stand out. The first, an earlier 
definition which is less popular today, conceives of grand strategy as the 
integration of various forms of power—both military and non-military—in 
war. The second meaning is more popular today, especially in American 
academia, and conceives of grand strategy as an intellectual framework which 
sits above and directs foreign policy. The second interpretation is flawed 
as it essentially represents ideology, a level of thought on which reasoned 
debate, let alone compromise, is rarely possible. Treatises advocating one 
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grand strategy or another not only rarely engage other similar works but 
are often inherently flawed.
To my mind, one of the main problems with the idea of grand strategy is that 
it places a premium on a certain kind of intellectualizing. It is never enough 
just to call for a particular course of action; one has to justify the strategy by 
rooting it in a certain theory about what is at the bottom of international 
politics, or at least what is at the heart of the situation one is trying to deal 
with. Since the strategy needs to be simple and all-encompassing, there is 
a tendency for the theory to be framed in rather grandiose terms—that is, 
for the theory to overdefine or to misdefine the problem, and in any case to 
misdirect attention away from the real issues that policy should focus on.
This most common currently popular interpretation of grand strategy simply 
does not allow for scientific study.
The older understanding, which centered on the integration of military and 
non-military forms of power in war, can be studied scientifically but has not 
yet been studied in such a manner. This affords a significant opportunity to 
advance the scientific study of strategy, through the systematic development 
of grand strategy as a concept. Many important strategic theorists in the past 
have put forward definitions of grand strategy which adhere to this integration 
principle, such as maritime theorist Julian Stafford Corbett, military theorists 
JFC Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart, as well as modern day strategists Edward 
Luttwak and Colin Gray. Such a variant of grand strategy may be studied 
scientifically because it remains fundamentally strategic—that is, focused 
on instrumental logic within the unique context of war—in a way that the 
current, more popular form of grand strategy does not. However, no one 
has yet seriously examined how military and non-military power may be 
integrated. In 1992 Lawrence Freedman posited that «[t]he view that strategy 
is bound up with the role of force in international life must be qualified, 
because if force is but one form of power then strategy must address the 
relationship between this form and others, including authority.» Freedman’s 
challenge stands to this day.
This paper will lay out the basic instrumental logic of this integrated form 
of grand strategy. To do this, first the assumptions and basic capabilities 
which underpin military power will be explained through the examination 
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of military strategic theory, with reference to military history. It will be 
argued that military power is unique because it is the only form of power 
for which distinct modes of employment may be discerned: attrition and 
annihilation. Only military power has the ability to annihilate; only military 
force can impose control over the pattern of a war.
Non-military power can only impose or support attrition. This is the case 
because non-military power generally works by denying the enemy access to 
resources or other goods. Such strategies of denial require extended periods 
of time to take effect because the most significant factor is the rate at which 
the enemy’s stocks of those denied resources or other goods is exhausted. 
Due to the adversarial nature of war, such resource denial is effective usually 
only once the resources have been exhausted and the war effort itself is being 
inhibited, because the prospect of an externally imposed resource cap is not 
usually a sufficiently significant threat when compared to the wages of battle 
and military operations. Grand strategy, which integrates such non-military 
power alongside the use of military power, is therefore inherently attritional.
This conclusion is supported by examination of the specific instrumental 
logics of cyberpower and of economic and financial sanctions. The United 
States’ color war plans, devised in the 1920s and 1930s, represent a real world 
example of defense planning for strategy and grand strategy in practice, an 
example which not only corroborates the attritional nature of grand strategy 
but demonstrates that, due to this attritional logic, grand strategy is inherently 
situational and cannot nor should not be considered a universal solution.
This concept of grand strategy—integrating military and non-military 
power—bears considerable resemblance to two contemporary non-Western 
strategic ideas: Russia’s hybrid warfare and China’s three warfares or 
unrestricted warfare. If the logic of combining military and non-military 
power is inherently attritional, then both hybrid warfare and unrestricted 
warfare must also be attritional. Consequently the logic of these non-Western 
ideas will be examined, through the study of their practice if possible, to 
determine whether or not they are, in fact, attritional. This paper posits that 
these two non-Western strategic concepts are indeed attritional, but they do 
not necessarily appear to be so due to variations in practice when compared 
to the older Western concept of grand strategy. The prime variation is that 
both hybrid and unrestricted warfare operate mostly in peacetime, with 
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military action only as the culmination of a preceding longer period of 
pressure and attrition, whereas grand strategy is conceived largely within 
pre-existing adversarial relationships.
This paper will argue, first, that conceiving of grand strategy as the integration 
of military and non-military power is more useful than as an intellectual 
framework for foreign policy and, second, that its logic is inherently attritional 
due to the combination of wholly unlike forms of power. This attritional logic 
will be confirmed through the subsequent study of hybrid and unrestricted 
warfare, which also integrate military and non-military power and therefore 
also become attritional.
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Comparative strategy, understood as the analysis of two or more comparable 
national strategies, is increasingly evoked in the field of military education but 
it is rarely the object of a rigorous academic analysis. Political science already 
documented the need for scholars and practitioners to use comparisons in 
order to identify patterns and detect major changes. In the context of war 
colleges, strategic comparisons – whether from different regions of the 
world or from other historical periods – broaden the knowledge of officers, 
nurture their cultural awareness and bring them precious perspectives for 
their future responsibilities.
Comparative strategy is also a constant subject of military education because 
of the evolution of war colleges themselves: foreign participants from allied 
nations are more and more integrating the syndicates while faculty members 
can come from various countries, bringing with them diverse experiences 
and knowledge. Finally, educational programs and institutions specifically 
designed for an international audience (e.g. the NATO Defense College, the 
Baltic Defense College, the 5+5 Defense College, or the ongoing project of a 
Gulf Cooperation Council Defense College) have significantly changed the 
landscape of military education. Altogether, these developments have created 
a favorable environment for the development of comparative strategy as a 
strong sub-discipline of war studies.
However, because of the lack of methodology, comparative strategy is too 
frequently leading instructors and students to misinterpret the lessons of case 
studies. Issues such as the specific social and political contexts, the cultural 
differences, or even the linguistic subtleties of countries under study are 
too often underestimated, if not merely ignored. Concepts such as ‘national 
security’ – historically an American invention – or ‘deterrence’ – a notion 
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that cover different assumptions in Western countries or elsewhere – are 
misused in other national contexts where they do not systematically reflect 
a similar reality in the local military environment. As a result, officers too 
often reproduce their national framework to different countries facing 
different challenges.
Against that backdrop, my paper would offer an analytical framework of 
comparative strategy that would be of benefit to instructors and researchers 
in professional military education institutions. To that aim, the framework 
would stress the importance of several interrelated indicators, among them: 
the national strategic culture and its historical roots; the political system and 
its impact on civil-military relations; the social and religious environment 
susceptible to shape the security priorities of a country; or the local language 
and the way it influences the translation of strategic concepts.
To build this analytical framework, my paper would rely on previous teaching 
and research experiences. Specifically, I would look at selected case studies 
where US and NATO military concepts were sometimes used in other regions 
– here, the Middle East and the Gulf – without considering appropriately 
the local context. For instance, I would explain how the use of the concept 
‘deterrence’ has a very different meaning in Israel or Lebanon. Likewise, I 
would analyze the values and limitations of importing principles of military 
planning, or of security sector reform to Gulf countries through military 
education programs.
As a result, using a systematic methodology to draw comparisons between 
national strategies would enable officers to better grasp the value, as well 
as the limitations, of the analogies. Eventually, it would contribute to the 
reinforcement of comparative strategy as a rigorous sub discipline of war 
studies.
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The 1990s marked the decline of Canada as a substantial troop contributor 
in United Nations (UN) peace support operations for a variety of reasons. To 
begin, these operations were becoming more complex and dangerous. This 
was exemplified by the UN Security Council’s ground-breaking December 
1992 invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter for the humanitarian 
operation in Somalia. Subsequently, Canada’s UN engagements in Somalia, 
Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia were tumultuous, draining, and ultimately 
unsettling for a military accustomed to earlier UN operations that relied 
upon the traditional principles of consent of the parties, impartiality, and 
the non-use of force except in self-defence. Moreover, these operations 
coincided with what General Rick Hillier, when he served as Chief of the 
Defence Staff, retrospectively described as the «decade of darkness.» During 
the 1990s as the government tackled the deficit, the Department of National 
Defence’s budget dropped by 23 percent, with a resultant purchasing power 
loss of 30 percent. Concurrent with the financial cuts was a troop reduction 
from 88,000 personnel to 60,000 personnel as laid out in the 1994 Defence 
White Paper.
To compensate for these reductions and to take into account the changing 
context of peace support operations, the government offered a new conceptual 
approach in its 1995 proposal «Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the 
United Nations.» The document espoused a «vanguard concept», a well trained 
5,000 member force that could quickly enter zones of instability to prevent 
the spread of violence. Because the force would arrive early, combat was 
not to be expected. On the one hand, the proposal eventually meshed with 
Scandinavian initiatives and led to the creation of the Standby High Readiness 
Brigade for UN Peace Operations (SHIRBRIG). It was ready for operations 
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from 2000 to 2009 and then stood down. On the other hand, Canada’s zeal 
for participation in UN peace support endeavours had definitely ebbed 
over the decade. Though the Canadian military fielded 1,002 personnel in 
UN peace support operations in 1990, that number was 425 by the close of 
2000, and only 198 in 2002. Participating troop levels continued to decline 
over the next decade.
There were, however, new actors in the 1990s that might have been willing to 
take the place of Canada, and other countries, who were doing less and less 
peace support work: Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). These 
companies, epitomized by the South African firm Executive Outcomes (EO) 
and its contracts in Angola (1993–1995) and Sierra Leone (1995–1997), were 
well trained, well equipped, and not hesitant about working in a dangerous 
milieu and applying force therein. They were also not averse to casualties. 
Taking into account the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations, PMSCs seemingly possessed what states often lacked: «The United 
Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last decade, [that] 
no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to 
project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed.» 
Though, as we shall see, the UN did not engage PMSCs as providers of frontline 
peace support personnel in the 1990s, one proponent nevertheless made the 
industry’s benefits clear: «Write a Cheque, End a War.»
While a mission had not been launched at the time of writing, the Liberal 
Government, on 26 August 2016, did announce Canada’s desired return 
to UN peace support operations. Hence, this paper is an early intervention 
that investigates the conceptual and operational environment in which the 
Canadian military would likely be engaged should an endeavour be initiated. 
Indeed, there are several questions for Canadian policymakers and analysts 
to consider: Why did a frontline PMSC presence not come about in UN peace 
support operations in the 1990s? What roles do PMSCs nevertheless have 
today regarding UN peace support operations? How does the PMSC presence 
change the UN posture in the field? What might the implications be for the 
Canadian military should they work either to train peace support personnel 
or to serve in UN missions directly?
To investigate these questions, the balance of the paper has four parts. First, 
it presents the reasons why the PMSC presence did not come to fruition as 
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expected in light of the 1990s era challenges. While it considers state and UN 
factors, the paper particularly emphasizes the impact of interventions in the 
first decade of the 21st Century and the corresponding, defensively-minded 
regulations that came about. In these matters Canada was an active participant 
in shaping the PMSC industry. Second, the paper considers the role PMSCs 
play in training peace support personnel. Given that Canadian policymakers 
have espoused that Canada can provide peace support training, appreciating 
the implications of PMSC-supplied training funded by the United States will 
be key. Third, the paper identifies the increasingly protective and insular 
stance in UN activities in which PMSCs play a role. This PMSC informed 
protective posture is in keeping with the defensive focus instilled by states, 
but it is also in accordance with perpetuating commercial dynamics that 
may not be beneficial for the achievement of UN and Canadian objectives. 
The final part concludes and indicates implications for future Canadian 
policymaking. Overall, the Canadian government and its military must take 
these factors into account either through their own operations or through 
recognition that the utility of force may be limited in the strategic context.
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A future operational environment is characterized by increasing level of 
uncertainty and unpredictability; therefore, the Armed Forces will have to 
be prepared to participate in a much wider range of military operations than 
ever before. The Czech Armed Forces currently meet the requirements for 
providing a bigger contribution to the collective defense as agreed in the 
framework of NATO Defence Planning Process. However, balanced capability 
development needed for the full spectrum of potential future missions and 
operations has for years been neglected. This situation may be remedied by 
creating a set of scenarios that provide a clear vision on the tasks the Armed 
Forces may be called upon to fulfill in the future. Even though the Czech 
Republic, as a member of NATO, has currently the most reliable security 
guarantees in the history, joining the Alliance has not released the country 
from its own responsibility for a defense and particularly for a development 
of credible defense capabilities.
Capability- (based) planning in the Czech Republic’s defense sector requires the 
existence and application of many effective building blocks. Among others, 
there are «scenarios» or «snapshots of the next», which are inherently bound 
to this process. Scenarios do not represent the future as a whole, they also do 
not represent the future «as such», but rather as a possible, future-oriented 
construct of certain key factors in the specific circumstances, environment or 
conditions. Connected with this is the fact that every such scenario-construct 
is based on assumptions about how the future might one day look: what 
direction certain trends (adversary, his strategic or operational end state 
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and objectives, desired effects etc.) might take, what developments might 
remain constant, and which ones might change during the course of time.
In a practice, there are used basically two types of scenarios, exploratory 
and normative [1]. When creating the exploratory scenario, a prospective 
approach (from the present to the future) is used. An exploratory scenario 
can describe the picture of a possible future world or the possible evolution 
of the world from the present to the future. It can, therefore, use the forms 
of a descriptive or development scenario [2] or use both forms. Normative 
scenarios use retrospective procedure (from the future to the present). 
Exploratory scenarios deal with how the future may look and what future 
development can be, normative scenarios are about how the future should 
look and how can be achieved. Normative scenarios describe a desirable 
end state that represents the world after the crisis has been resolved, and 
by means of objectives and effects, it indicates a process to reach such end 
state. Normative scenarios are an appropriate tool for their subsequent use 
in a capability planning.
Scenarios in relation to the nation’s security interests and security threats 
will generally focus on geographical areas whose stability is important 
to securing the nation’s interests and where sources of threats may exist 
or be created. Among the geographic areas, it is necessary to assess other 
areas in which threats can be manifested. Such areas may include banking, 
telecommunication, strategic communications and other non-geographic 
areas. [3]
The internal structure of the scenarios allows them to be used for capability 
planning, operating concepts development, and operations planning. 
Therefore, there is no need to work always with a different type of scenario.
The exploratory part of the scenario consists of a description of historical 
developments leading to the crisis, a general description of the crisis situation, 
a structured description of the crisis situation using PMESII aspects (Political, 
Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure) and a description 
of the overall strategy of the hypothetical adversary – crisis maker. In the 
description of the overall strategy of the hypothetical opponent, there are 
presented his strategic and operational objectives and strategy that can be 
expected and the political and military implications of such strategy.
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The description of the individual strategic and operational end states, objectives 
and effects, the phasing of objectives and the graphical description of the 
individual objectives and their interrelations form a normative part of the 
scenario. This normative part expresses a possible way of resolving the crisis 
and creates the basis for setting tasks and requirements for capabilities and 
for developing crisis management plans.
The introductory part of the scenario usually presents a description of the 
strategic end state, indicating political, economic and civilian objectives and 
effects. In the next part, the military-strategic end state follows, proceeding 
from the strategic end state, objectives and effects.
In the following part of the scenario, there are expressed the interrelations 
of the individual objectives; the process of their achievement is described 
and divided into phases that can be assumed to be conducted in relation to 
the solution of the crisis. The graphical depiction of the interrelationships of 
individual objectives and the progress of their achievement, in the phases, 
is another part of the scenario.
The internal structure of the normative scenarios – end states, objectives 
and effects are elements that are used in the operations planning; they help 
form a part of the operational framework. The use of these elements creates 
a link between defense planning and operations planning. The internal 
structure of the scenarios is specific and its purpose is to create the conditions 
for determining the capabilities needed to achieve the objectives and effects 
described in the scenario.
Scenarios are a key element of Capability Based Planning, the launch of 
processes for force generation, development of tasks list and capability goals, 
the following capabilities development, and the development of investment 
plans. [4] For the practical use of the scenarios it is necessary to develop the 
scenarios into the required level of detail and fill them with real data.
Scenarios in this form are used by the Alliance to prevent or react to threat 
against a hypothetical adversary and at the same time, they serve as a possible 
recommendation for the nations to participate in defense in accordance with 
the Washington Treaty. The principle of collective defense is the cornerstone 
of NATO’s founding treaty, therefore its application affects all members of 
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the Alliance and each nation should participate in this task from its own 
perspective. Due to the growing demands of development new capabilities 
of the Czech Armed forces to ensure collective defense and defense of the 
own territory the military officials as well as academicians see existing 
Alliance’s generic scenarios as a possible key to its processing in its own 
security environment.
The subject of capability planning as well as scenario development is a 
solid part of education in the military career courses at the University of 
Defense as well as science activities at this institution within the framework 
of the long-term strategic project Strategic Alternatives (STRATAL) under the 
auspices of The Center for Security and Military Strategic Studies (CSMSS), 
Brno, Czech Republic. The results of these activities were presented at the 
III. International Scientific Conference «Defense and Strategy» held by the 
CSMSS in June 2017, with the main topic «Informing credible defense».
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After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent war in Eastern Ukraine 
in 2014 a fierce international debate on how to view Russia’s foreign 
policy has evolved. Much of the discussion has focused on Russia’s alleged 
«revisionist position» towards the present international system, which Russia 
considers too Western dominated, and Russia’s supposed «assertiveness» or 
«aggressiveness». (Piontkovsky 2015) (Kasparov 2015) (Bartles og McDermott 
2014) (Illarionov 2014) Part of this debate has focused on Russia’s alleged 
breaking or bending of international rules and concepts. (Allison 2014) 
(Lamont 2014) (Kupfer og Waal 2015)
However, if one takes a closer look at Russia’s policy vis-à-vis the Arctic, Russia 
does not look like a revisionist power. It looks more like a status quo power 
following a well established long-term strategy. (Staun 2017) Paradoxically, 
Russia has in the Arctic – all the time while it was ‘breaking the rules of 
the game’ in Ukraine – followed the ‘rules of the game’ in the Arctic. Thus, 
Russia has been a constructive supporter of the Arctic Council and the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council and it has strictly followed the process of deliniation of 
the undersea territory in the Arctic under the auspices of the UN Convention 
of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – off which it (the Soviet Union) has been a 
signatory part since 1982 – and met deadlines and requirements of the UN 
Committee on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). It has not bullied 
or threatened its neighbours and fellow members of the Arctic Council on 
Arctic affairs, at least not in connection with Arctic affairs.
At the same time, however, Russia has engaged in a rearmament process of 
opening military bases, introducing new weapons systems, engaged in massive 
snap drills and undertaken a large-scale rearrangement of its forces in the 
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High North. The question asked here is thus to what extent this rearmament 
of the Russian Arctic constitutes a break with the cooperative line, which 
until now has been the main tennant of Russia’s Arctic policy. Is it just a 
matter of time – a period of ‘all quit before the storm’ – until Russia is 
strong enough to use its steady growing military power in the Arctic for 
breaking rules and making territorial gains in that area also?
In order to discuss this, we will first 1) take a look at what Russia’s overall 
foreign and security policy goals and interets are and how the Arctic plays 
into this. This is done by analysing what their stated goals are in the main 
white papers and strategy documents which are open to the public, and by 
comparing this to what central Russian decisionmakers say publicly. 2) Then 
the stated goals are compared to the actual policy, which Russia leads in 
the Arctic, with a special focus on Russia’s rearmament in the High North.
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The ability to intercept communications has throughout history provided 
intelligence agencies with a powerful advantage in understanding an enemy’s 
intentions. Intelligence agencies have therefore continuously sought to advance 
their interception capabilities in order to keep up with the rapid evolution 
of communications technologies. Those who are privileged with interception 
capabilities adapted to the contemporary security environment – as well 
as the current communications trends – will necessarily also possess an 
advantage that contributes to increased intelligence power.
Two main developments are significant in this regard. First, the Internet 
has become the primary platform for communications and a reflection of 
merely all human affairs. Second, communication is transmitted via internet 
in fibre-optic cables. Subsequently, bulk interception capabilities – the ability 
to intercept and assess digital communications transmitted in fibre-optic 
cables has become the ultimate tool for intelligence collection.
Three commonly held assumptions dominate the discourse on bulk interception 
power today. The first assumption is that the primary function of bulk 
interception capabilities is to intercept vast amounts of communications 
and thereby constitutes a system for so-called mass surveillance. The second 
assumption is that bulk interception capabilities are a diminishing asset, 
due to widespread encryption and the difficulties of extracting any relevant 
information from the vast amounts of data transmitted online. Finally, the 
third assumption is that primarily the most powerful intelligence agencies 
engage in bulk interception of communications. This notion probably 
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stems from the revelations of the British and American bulk interception 
programmes by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden in 2013.
The reality of bulk interception has however changed significantly over the 
last two years. In fact, bulk interception systems have become a fundamental 
asset for any government seeking to extend its power to the digital domain. 
This paper therefore seeks to move the debate on bulk interception capabilities 
beyond these entrenched positions, by focusing on its strategic aspects, and 
pose the question: how can bulk interception capabilities contribute to 
intelligence power? This focus raises three sets of sub-questions. First, what is 
the utility of bulk interception capabilities? Second, what are the factors that 
affect the power of these capabilities? And third, how can bulk interception 
power be used strategically to enhance national intelligence power?
This paper argues that bulk interception has become an indispensable asset 
for intelligence agencies. Moreover, it asserts that in order to understand 
contemporary intelligence systems, we must also understand the power of 
bulk interception and its associated strategic features. This is articulated in 
three core arguments. First, bulk interception capabilities certainly increase 
intelligence agencies’ abilities to uncover potential threats from global 
terrorism, and is crucial in detecting and attributing Computer Network 
Operations (CNOs), as well as carrying out offensive cyber operations. Second, 
although several factors contribute to advancing the strength of national 
bulk interception power, the physical geography of internet infrastructure 
has significant impact on the utility of bulk interception systems. Third, bulk 
interception capabilities do not only contribute to intelligence power directly 
by detecting and mitigating threats to national security, but also indirectly 
by improving a nation’s position in international intelligence cooperation.
To demonstrate the importance of bulk interception power, the paper 
proceeds in two main parts. The first chapter provides a historical context 
of communications intelligence (COMINT). The historical background 
demonstrates that the evolution in telecommunications technology has 
favoured different interception methods, and thus also favoured different 
interception capabilities. The second chapter outlines the methodology and 
research design of the study and justifies the selected cases. Chapter three 
analyses the conceptual debate on intelligence power and argues that bulk 
interception capabilities should be integrated into the concept.
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The second part of the paper analyses the three articulated sub-questions 
in order to answer the research question. Chapter four examines the utility 
of bulk interception capabilities, and addresses some of the most common 
arguments against its efficacy. Chapter five identifies the factors that affect 
the power of bulk interception capabilities and argue that the geography of 
the Internet infrastructure is a significant factor in this regard. A comparison 
of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway serves to illustrate that countries are 
assigned to various conditions for success as «bulk interceptors». Finally, 
chapter six analyses how bulk interception capabilities contributes to 
intelligence power. This analysis is based on the preceding findings from 
the study of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, and examines how their bulk 
interception power has been, or could be, used strategically to enhance a 
nation’s intelligence power.
This qualitative study on bulk interception power contributes to the 
theoretical debate about intelligence power more broadly. It also proves 
the role intelligence agencies maintain in nation’s offensive and defensive 
cyber operations, through their bulk interception capabilities. Moreover, 
the paper demonstrates that the academic community engaged in research 
on strategic and geopolitical aspects of cybersecurity, and particularly those 
engaged in research on «cyber power» would benefit from including strategic 
aspects of intelligence into their analysis.
Strong indicators suggest that the power of bulk interception and its associated 
strategic features is likely to receive increased attention in military and security 
studies in the coming years. The digital dimension of conflicts is expected to 
increase, making bulk interception capabilities an indispensable asset, due to 
its position as the best available defence against disruptive cyber operations.
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In the conflicts and hotspots of the 21st Century, a number of terms have 
become increasingly salient. Some of these terms point to new strategic 
actors: foreign fighters, «little green men», «little blue men», «troll farms» 
and «useful idiots». Concepts like «hybrid operations» and «digital Pearl 
Harbour» have also emerged and gained footholds in strategic discourses.
These actors, arguably, signify a different character of war in comparison to 
that of 20th Century wars, the latter aptly characterised by General Sir Rupert 
Smith as «battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive 
deciding event in a dispute in international affairs …» That the character of 
war is different from age to age ought to be obvious. As Clausewitz argued, 
war «must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically 
change it». As he subsequently wrote,
the less intense the motives, the less will the military 
element’s natural tendency to violence coincide with 
political directives. As a result, war will be driven further 
from its natural course, the political object will be more 
and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the 
conflict will seem increasingly political (emphasis original) 
in character.
The distinction that Clausewitz suggested, between the logic and grammar 
of war, is in other words, an important aspect of how we understand war. 
And while the logic of war might be immutable, its grammar is necessarily 
different: differences in political aims and desired outcomes, the technological 
conditions of the age, the political-societal nexus, even the physical geographical 
contexts of different wars. All of these elements will shape the specific 
character of wars that emerge at different times and places.
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This study focuses on the challenge of strategy, given the character of war that 
this study accepts as the dominant characteristic of wars in the 21st Century. 
If strategy is the bridge that spans political purpose and military power, it 
ideally shapes – and is shaped by – the conduct of military operations that 
ought to lead towards the attainment of the political objective of the war in 
the first place. However, as has been argued elsewhere, strategy is already 
difficult enough. There are simply too many variables that operate in war 
for outcomes to be guaranteed. However, the existing body of literature on 
the concept of victory has focused principally, if not exclusively, on state-
centric wars. This study seeks to address the issue of strategy and victory 
in war in an age where the character of war arguably has changed, where 
state actors of war are supplemented by individual non-combatants (both 
mobilized by the state and self-mobilised), and new «instruments» of war 
emerge (for instance, fishing vessels).
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The purpose of this research is to highlight the significance of the theories of 
resistance that enable withstanding the impact of social influence transferred 
in mass communication and the implications for maintaining and improving 
information security strategies.
Various methods of resistance are exemplified, with special attention paid 
to theory of inoculation and theory of reactance which appear applicable 
in fighting against manipulative attacks in information warfare.
Social influence enables social processes taking place. It is a crucial factor 
of development regarding individuals, groups, or organisations hence the 
medium of interpersonal coordination. Without it, there wouldn’t have been 
possible to build society as it requires attitude change to become a part of 
every social group.
However, regarding national and international security there are several 
sources of influence – including governments and non-state actors – that 
can be challenging to international stability or pose a threat in their attempts 
to convince the mass society to change its attitudes or the behaviour with 
manipulative techniques.
Therefore the origins and the outcome of resistance in humans has been 
long researched in fields such as social psychology, sociology, political 
communication or marketing. With regard to military sciences persuasive 
techniques are valued, while far less focus is put on strategies of resistance 
to social influence and persuasion in particular. As though persuasion and 
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resistance are two parts of persuasive interaction, principles of theories of 
resistance seem to be underrated in terms of explaining social processes and 
answering questions, such as how resistance affects information security or 
what consequences of either developing or overcoming resistance to social 
influence can follow.
The subject of this paper requires hypothetico-deductive approach based on 
theories derived from social psychology. This research includes case studies 
and comparative analysis of the strategies and methods of resisting social 
influence and particularly persuasion.
Resistance with regard to attitude is developed under perceived social pressures 
on one’s beliefs, actions and emotions. Therefore resistance is founded on 
cognitive, behavioral and emotional grounds respectively.
Motives for resisting social influence includes several factors, such as individual 
differences, cultural dispositions, presence of allies, or the structure of the 
group. This research considers the possible perspectives of application the 
theory of reactance and the theory of inoculation in constructing strategies 
aimed to develop information competence in citizens.
Psychological resistance as a desire to counteract someone else’s attempt to 
limit one’s choices or ambivalence about change it covers a broad variety 
of definitions explains the motivational role of resisting social influence.
Reactance theory (Brehm 1966) comprises four components, namely: freedom, 
threat to freedom, reactance, restoration of freedom, where freedoms are 
beliefs about the ways in which one can behave. Reactance in this theory is a 
motivational state due to occur when a freedom is eliminated or threatened 
with elimination. This originates from the presumption that choice and control 
are highly valued in society. Social influence may be perceived as a threat to 
one’s freedom. It was discovered that social influence is more efficient when 
not threatening individual’s freedoms and the presence of options tends to 
reduce it, whereas domineering controlling language induces the reactance.
Overcoming reactance involves reverse psychology which is often used in 
marketing that creates a perfect world increasing dissatisfaction with the 
targeted audience own achievements hence trying to transform their reality 
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with the advertised products. Therefore if something is scarce, not much 
known it piques people’s curiosity e.g organisations, conspiracy theories, 
other pieces of information available only on the web.
Inoculation theory (McGuire, 1964) is based on the assumption that people’s 
beliefs can be inoculated against persuasive attacks through exposure to an 
initial attack that is easily resisted. According to McGuire, when people resist 
an initial persuasive message, they are likely to become more resistant to 
future messages, as they gain motivation and ability to build strong defences. 
This theory appears to be essential in the age of information warfare that 
involves public opinion and numerous channels of persuasive communication.
It was recognized that inoculation theory was applicable as a useful tool 
of preventing socially unacceptable or dangerous behaviour in numerous 
studies across different domains – from political communication, to health 
campaigns, to marketing communication. The hypothesis of this research 
states that this theory can be applicable in developing citizens information 
competence skills, such as critical analysis of information, hence immunizing 
them from becoming subject to manipulative attacks in information warfare. 
It is assumed that resisting social influence and persuasive attacks that 
challenge national stability and information security can be vital to developing 
information competence in citizens while information competency skills 
can be trained.
Likewise psychological reactance can be operationalized in information 
security, providing that both aspects – the motive and the outcome – are 
understood with all the implications.
Dual nature of the above-mentioned theories implies several consequences 
depending on the established goal. The resistance of an individual can be either 
built up or reduced. On the contrary, methods of overcoming resistance to 
influence is crucial to understanding how communication strategies should 
be managed not to be dismissed as persuasive.
The reference literature is divided in two groups. One highlights the theories 
and case studies as well as application of the theories in mass communication. 
The other gives an insight on the fields, in which the theories can be suitable 
and how it is related to information security.
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The article ends with a discussion of the prominent role of resistance to 
social influence in decision making of the individuals – be it a consumer 
decision or a political vote – and its significance for information security.
Form of presentation: research-based oral presentation supported by slide 
show.
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Instead of offence and defence, the concepts of denial and control present 
a potential alternative for researching military affairs. For centuries, this 
pair of concepts, defence and offence, has been used for analysing military 
build-up, strategies, and international relations, such as the offence-defence 
balance theories by Butfoy. However, the increasing blurred boundary 
between offensive and defensive military capabilities presents a significant 
obstacle for research, because many kinds of weapon systems and military 
assets can be interpreted as having the dual purposes of defence and offence. 
Therefore, it is difficult to determine the nature of a country’s military, as 
to whether it is offence or defence oriented. Status quo, whether changed or 
not, presents another criterion for identifying offence or defence orientation. 
This criterion, however, contains two drawbacks: contesting definitions of 
status quo and the need for real action. Major actors in a specific case may 
not share a consensus on the status quo, particularly in a dynamic situation. 
Additionally, as military capability can be applied in various ways, before 
real action is taken, it is not always certain as to whether a country’s military 
capability really challenges or reshapes the status quo.
Denial and control, a pair of concepts from naval strategies, present an 
alternative perspective for analysis. Based on the overall picture of military 
structure, denial refers to a military’s exclusion or disruption of an enemy’s 
presence in a specific space at a specific time, but where the former lacks the 
capability to take over the space. Control, a step further from denial, signifies 
a military not only excluding an enemy from a specific place but also securing 
the space for its own use. In the naval context, denial and control respectively 
correspond to distinct military structures, reviewed by Friedman. A denial 
oriented navy is composed of submarines, fast attack craft (FAC), and aircraft 
having the capacity to launch anti-ship missiles, torpedoes, and / or lay sea 
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mines, all of which to aim at attacking its adversary’s maritime activities, 
merchants, drilling platforms and other means of utilising maritime space, as 
well as the main platforms for their protection, major surface combatants. In 
contrast, a sea control oriented navy is usually composed of capabilities that 
not only exclude adversary naval activity but also protect its own activity. To 
deal with sea denial threats, there are various capabilities for anti-submarine, 
mine hunting, and air and missile defence on a variety of surface vessels, 
such as major surface combatants, aircraft carriers, minesweepers, which 
are also potentially supported by land-based, space-based or even cyber 
based capabilities. Apart from securing a certain body of water, a sea control 
oriented navy would possess other capabilities of using at sea, such as aircraft 
carriers, amphibious fleets, and sea lift for missions beyond the maritime 
domain. Undeniably, most navies are equipped with combined capabilities 
for both denial and control, but the mainstay of their naval composition 
would indicate a preference one way or the other. Furthermore, examining 
the balance between a state and its potential enemy would suggest whether 
denial or control were more feasible.
Air forces and armies can also be reviewed with in terms of the dual 
concepts of denial and control. A denial oriented air force would be aimed 
at air defence to deny or disrupt a hostile airpower from utilising the sky. A 
control oriented air force, however, focuses on first securing air superiority 
and then conducts missions to utilise the airspace, such as ground attack, 
airlift, and anti-ship missions. However, the composition of air forces could 
be misleading as most air forces possess airlift and other control oriented 
capabilities. Thus, to determine control or denial would mainly depend on 
their ability to achieve air superiority, a factor related to the balance between 
an air force and its adversary. As for land warfare, control would appear to be 
the common goal, because of the zero-sum nature of land control: one side’s 
withdrawal is usually followed by the other’s occupation. The increasingly 
longer ranges of weapons, land mines and guerrilla warfare, however, suggest 
the available denial operations for armies. The long-range artillery systems, 
rockets and missiles, can be used to deny or disrupt an enemy’s control over a 
territory, such as Iraq’s Scud missile attack on Israel and Saudi Arabia during 
the first Gulf War. This represents disruption only rather than preparation 
for invasion. By the same token, guerrilla warfare is used to undermine an 
adversary’s control over its territory, just as landmines obviously disrupt 
an enemy’s land use. The US’s difficult counter-insurgency operations in 
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Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the latest version of land denial through 
guerrilla warfare. Denial could also be appeared in a tight confrontation 
during peace time or impasse during wartime. For example, the no man’s 
land between both sides of the west front in the first world war, as well as 
the demilitarised zone between North and South Korea, represent areas 
which neither side could control due to the denial firepower from the other.
Regarding the use of the paired concepts of denial and control in national 
and international arenas, it is necessary to note that more than the sum 
capabilities of all three services need to be considered. It is also important 
to take geostrategic circumstances into account. Geographic conditions, for 
example, have a salient effect on whether an invader can establish control 
or not. The potential of third party involvement would have considerable 
influence over the meaning of denial and control in a regional or even global 
arena. This paper will conduct a general discussion on denial and control as 
an alternative research tool for military affairs.
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This paper investigates whether the recent British Armed Forces reforms 
(or retrenchment) Army 2020 and Future Reserves 2020 can work. Future 
Reserves 2020 will see a hoped for reserve of 30,000 part-timers try to fill in 
the capability gaps left by the sacking of 20,000 operationally experienced 
regular soldiers.
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Historian Peter Dennis wrote in the introduction to The Territorial Army 
1907–1940, that the Territorials, antecedents of the Army Reserve (AR) 
‘has had a chequered history. Apart from a short period immediately after 
its establishment, it has suffered from periodic indifference and neglect, 
and occasional hostility, both at the hands of the government and from 
the public.’19 Now once again the spotlight is well and truly back on the 
organisation in its supposedly new incarnation as the Army Reserve. The 
government’s Army Reserves 2020 and Future Reserves 2020 scheme will 
by 2018 have seen the sacking of 20,000 multi-tour veteran regular British 
soldiers to be replaced by 30,000 part-time AR soldiers (the new name for 
the Territorial Army (TA)); which together has contributed to making British 
combat power 20–30 per cent less effective.20
This paper, therefore, looks into whether history can determine if the AR 
will be able to step-up and fill the capability gaps left by the retrenchment 
of regular soldiers and become a better trained and more deployable force 
than the old Territorials. Plans and strategic intent on how to use the new 
smaller more reliant on reservist forces army, Royal Navy and Royal Airforce 
have appeared in government and Ministry of Defence publications.21 The 
new order of battle (ORBAT) is a four tier construct named the ‘Multi-Brigade 
ORBAT’ which comprises of a deployed force, a high readiness reserve force, 
a lower readiness reserve force and an extended readiness force. Within 
all of these tiers the AR feature as a component. The government have 
also stated, more worryingly, that the AR can be sent overseas with the 
minimal amount of pre-deployment training (PDT).22 However, it is hard to 
see that the AR is capable of fulfilling its stated roles. Moreover, surely it 
is not ethical to send these volunteers overseas with minimal PDT. The AR 
has a high readiness reserve force to be used as a spearhead force and who 
complete extra training over their 27-days commitment. However, even 
if the AR’s high readiness reserve did their extra training as well as their 
27-days commitment before deployment they would have only a few extra 
19 Peter Dennis, The Territorial Army 1907-1940 (Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society, 1987), 
p. 1.
20 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of 
Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: IISS, 2015), p. 68.
21 Ministry of Defence (MoD), White Paper, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued 
– Key Facts (London: MoD, 2013), p. 3.
22 MoD, Future Force 2020 Multi-Brigade ORBAT’, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/761/76107.htm [Accessed: 08/04/15].
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weekends training in preparation for this role. The White Paper on Future 
Reserves 2020 states that these volunteers would not receive Pre-deployment 
training before being deployed. It is difficult to think that these troops are 
going to be effective on a kinetic overseas deployment.23
To be able to carry out this research the training, pre-deployment training 
and deployment of the Army Reserves antecedents – the Territorials of 
the Territorial Force and Territorial Army, who provided the structure and 
framework of how the AR operate, is used from 1908 through to 2012. The 
paper also asks whether the AR can ever be trained to a higher standard than 
that achieved by their antecedents. If so how would this be possible when 
the organisation’s participants still operate with the same restrictions, such 
as having jobs and families, both demanding the reservists time. A model 
constructed for the research – ‘The Territorial Trinity of Commitments’, 
a three-sided triangle comprising of military training, employment issues 
and family issues reveals how much training a part-time soldier can achieve 
against the tensions inherent with the competing demands of having a 
fulltime job and a wife/husband and/or family.
This paper will also look at the kit and equipment issues that plagued the 
old Territorials who were always seen as a second class organisation, an 
organisation that only took funds away from the regular army; consequently, 
they always received second best and second-hand equipment, mostly 
obsolete, to train with.24 This beggared existence and the limits of training 
with poor equipment, in the past, forced unintended consequences. One of 
these unintended consequences came at the start of the Great War when Lord 
Kitchener, Secretary of State for War bypassed the Territorial Force to set-up 
a completely new army the ‘Pals Battalions’, a source of embarrassment and 
anger among the Territorials of that generation.25
The research contained within this paper reveals that due to the historical 
continuities from the Territorials through to the AR – 1908–2013 (they 
use the same framework of organisation for training and deploying as their 
antecedents did), will ensure that one of the only new things about the AR 
23 Ibid.
24 Ian F. W. Beckett, Territorials: A Century of Service (Plymouth: DRA Publishing, 2008), p. v-vi.
25 John Pollock, Kitchener (London: Robinson, 2002), p. 387.
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will be their re-branding. History shows that the same type of employers 
still support the AR (big business and the Civil Service) as they supported 
the Territorials of the past, although, as the world becomes more globalised 
historic support from big business is receding. Moreover, the same types of 
businesses still do not support the organisation, such as Small and Medium 
Enterprises, the self-employed and organisations such as the Trade Unions 
etcetera.26 Further to this the employer of the reservist also still has a massive 
say how much their employee could/can participate in Territorial/Reservist 
training. Furthermore, the volunteer’s family has a very strong influence upon 
a volunteer joining the part-timers, how much training they complete and 
how long the volunteer will serve. The AR’s still today only have to commit 
to 27 days training (as with the Territorials). If they are mobilised they still 
have to undertake theatre specific pre-deployment training lasting months 
not weeks or they will become a danger to themselves and other friendly 
soldiers. One major change though is that the cost of a reservist soldier is 
spiralling upwards sometimes costing thousands of pounds more to deploy 
than a regular soldier (discussed in my other paper).
The ancient Greek historian Thucydides when examining the origin of the 
Peloponnesian War said that human nature, being what it is, will do the 
same and similar things again. That is why his history was said by him to 
be a Kitema es aei – a possession for always – because we always make the 
same mistakes. The British government and British part-time soldiering are 
not exempt from this rule and are essentially prisoners of history.
26 Tim Corry, ‘How can Defence best work with Employers?’ SaBRE Official Blog, 18 Oct. 
2011, http://www.blog.sabre.mod.uk [Accessed: 08/01/14].
195
MILITARY SCIENCES – THE BACKBONE OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS? – BOOK OF ABSTRACTS ISMS 2017
When Soldiers Can Refuse to 
Surrender: A Moral Argument Based 
on Charles de Gaulle’s Resistance
Jean-Francois Caron
Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan
jean-francois.caron@nu.edu.kz
In liberal democracies, the nature of soldiers’ obligations is clear: they are 
bound to obey orders not only from their superior officers but also from 
duly elected public officials. This implies not only the obligation to wage 
war but also to stop fighting. Therefore, the military and its members are 
considered servants of the state and totally subordinated to the will of their 
statesmen, provided that their orders fall within the range of the military’s 
obligation to obey; that is, insofar as the orders are legal.
This broad understanding of the dynamic between the soldiers and their 
state can nonetheless be troublesome when perfectly legal orders create 
morally problematic situations, such as the orders that were given to 
the peacekeepers in Rwanda in 1994 and to peacekeepers a year later in 
Srebrenica to not protect the civilians from being massacred (Caron, 2017). 
Another problematic situation can occur when soldiers are ordered by their 
statesmen to stop fighting and to surrender to the enemy. We cannot ignore 
the fact that despite their obligation to obey their statesmen’s decision, in the 
past certain members of the military have chosen to resist what many have 
considered a terrible humiliation. Of course, some forms of resistance are more 
morally dubious than others. This was notoriously the case in Germany in 
1945, when some Nazi soldiers continued to fight in a more or less organized 
fashion through the Werewolf and Edelweiss Piraten organizations. Although 
this example might raise some eyebrows and be interpreted as unwarranted 
in light of the nature of what it sought to preserve, the question of military 
resistance after a peace treaty must also acknowledge what is probably the 
most admirable example of a military leader’s defiance of his government’s 
decision to surrender: Charles de Gaulle’s Appeal of 18 June 1940, which he 
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launched from London one day after Marshal Philippe Pétain announced 
the government’s intention to seek peace with the Nazis.
What needs to be realize is that de Gaulle and his followers’ decision to keep 
fighting the Germans was condemnable based upon the nature of soldiers’ 
obligations. According to it, Marshall Pétain’s surrender order was a legitimate 
one and, accordingly, all French soldiers should have obeyed it. However, 
knowing the consequences that this surrender had on the French people, 
this conclusion is obviously highly disputable from a moral perspective. If 
this example informs a moral intuition that refusing to surrender might 
be the right thing to do, there is a need to establish an objective normative 
theoretical framework that would allow us to determine when soldiers who 
serve liberal democracies have an obligation to disobey that does not rely 
solely upon the conventional nature of their duty to obey and disobey.
To identify these criteria, it is first necessary to understand the full meaning 
and normative implications of soldiers’ obligation to obey or disobey. The 
most accurate way to describe this dynamic between members of the military 
and their state would be through the use of a liberal theory of political 
obligation that is based on the notion of consent (Walzer, 1970). Under this 
logic, individuals’ duty to obey or disobey is founded upon their membership 
in a specific organization to which they have voluntarily pledged either to 
behave in a certain way or to respect a certain set of rules. One such set of 
rules is the military’s voluntary decision to accept its full subordination 
to the democratic sphere and the fact that its personnel is bound to obey 
the orders of statesmen notwithstanding what they personally think about 
such orders (Huntington, 1957). However, contrary to what some might 
think, this principle does not completely prevent members of the military 
from disobeying their statesmen simply because they have agreed to submit 
themselves to their will. Their obedience is applicable only insofar as they 
are ordered by their political officials to act in ways that are not blatantly 
illegal and contrary to the norms that they promised to uphold when they 
joined the military.
However, for reasons that will be evoked in this text and in light of de Gaulle’s 
decision to resist the Nazis, soldiers’ right to disobey cannot be limited to this 
legalist paradigm. This case study clearly illustrates that another fundamental 
element – one that is more important than the mere legal dimension of 
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an order – must be taken into account. This fundamental element must 
be soldiers’ obligation to respect orders insofar as such orders are moral. As 
this presentation will emphasize, the de Gaulle example shows that legal 
orders may not always be moral, which may transform soldiers into direct 
or indirect perpetrators of the same terrible crimes that they had pledged to 
prevent at the time of their enrolment. For the reasons that will be evoked, 
such a possibility is highly dangerous and ought to be corrected. The de Gaulle 
example shows that the obligation to disobey legal yet immoral orders must 
be the core element of soldiers’ right to disobey.
The entire challenge here is to determine the nature of such orders – which 
can be very different and opposed to legal orders – and to determine the 
circumstances under which a legal decision to surrender can be opposed by 
soldiers on the basis of its immorality. Only through this prism is de Gaulle’s 
disobedience defendable. As this text will argue, soldiers’ right to disobey 
a decision to surrender from that standpoint would be possible only if the 
peace that is sought by their elected officials would result in the establishment 
of a regime that would offend universal principles of justice and morality.
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In democratic regimes, Armed Forces as a part of the political system of a 
nation depend on legitimacy in order to justify their existence. After the end 
of the cold war in the 1990’s, communication is one of the prime means 
to achieve public legitimacy, reputation and trust (Deverell et al., 2014). In 
the last decades, there has been a growing interdependence between public 
spheres such as the political system and communication, culminating in the 
phenomenon of mediatization. The term mediatization stands for a merge 
of the political and the media reality, meaning that the public perceives the 
political reality mediated by the media and at the same time, a change of logic 
within the political system oriented towards the logic of the media system 
(Sarcinelli, 1998). Considering this, the meaning of political communication 
including the Armed Forces’ communication becomes obvious as it forms 
the most important basis for political legitimization processes. However, 
communication is not simply happening but needs to be adapted according 
to the message to be transmitted, the desired outcome and the target groups. 
For the Armed Forces, target groups vary. They have to address the whole 
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population in order to achieve legitimacy, but there is also a particular need 
to reach youth, as they are the future recruits, soldiers and cadre.
Today’s youth belongs to the generations of the Millenials, born between 
1977 to 1995, and generation Z, born 1996 and after (The Center for 
Generational Kinetics, 2017). They have grown up in a time where information 
is abundant and omnipresent, technology being the means to access the 
desired information. To these digital innates, technology and social media 
as part of it is natural and a way to interact with the world (Hershatter & 
Epstein, 2010). These postmodern generations have grown up in a world 
which through the internet and modern communication media seems to be 
of infinite expanse (ibid). To them, technology is just an extension of their 
physical reality and their bodily senses and the distinction between real and 
virtual world has become obsolete (ibid.)
Generations which find the answer to every question with just one click 
cannot be (exclusively) addressed via analog media. In order to activate 
these and upcoming generations for the military, they must be addressed 
via the media of their choice. For millennials and generation Z, these are 
social media. Armed Forces need to be present on these platforms if they 
wish to be noticed and to be taken seriously. If Armed Forces do not have 
a social media presence, they will either seem old-fashioned and/or address 
the wrong target groups. However, social media is not only populated by 
those two generations and/or future Armed Forces recruits. Numbers of the 
Swiss Facebook population of March 2017 show the demographics of the 
platform is composed of 8% 19 years and below, 30% 20–29 years, 42% 
30–49 years, and 20% age 50 and above (Bernetblog, 2017). This audience 
might and should notice the Armed Forces social media channels and will 
be impacted by them. However, these other generations might perceive an 
official Armed Forces social media presence very differently.
At its best, the official Armed Forces social media communication has the 
potential to bring the Armed Forces closer to the people and to enter into a 
dialogue with them. By creating interaction, participation and collaboration 
on social media platforms, the Armed Forces will potentially become a 
more transparent organization (Brainard & McNutt). A communication 
pattern which is aligned to the principles of participation, collaboration 
and deliberation and does not rely on reputation solely is oriented towards 
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the communication model of New Public Service (NPS) (ibid.). In contrast to 
the model of New Public Management, which imitates the communication 
behavior of private corporations and fosters reputation management more 
than civic responsibility, the NPS aims to address a nation’s citizens as 
inherently motivated democratic beings, which like to participate in democratic 
decision-taking (ibid). By doing this, it emphasizes the fact that the Armed 
Forces as part of the democratic political system do not define their missions 
themselves, but are remaining politically neutral and following the public 
will (Deverell et al., 2014). Such a correct understanding and execution of 
the principle of separation of powers added up with the willingness to lend 
the citizens a voice and to actually listen to them should lead to increasing 
legitimacy and trust into the Armed Forces.
To measure the effect of social media communication on the Armed Forces’ 
legitimacy, the Military Academy at the ETH Zurich has conducted a survey 
amongst the representative Swiss internet population aged 15 and above in 
July 2017 with 1200 participants. Based on this data, the paper will show 
whether and if yes what impact the official social media communication 
of the Swiss Armed Forces (SAF) has on the legitimacy of the SAF and on its 
reputation. The role of military sciences clearly lies in analyzing expected 
and unexpected effects and in providing the corresponding information 
to the Armed Forces leadership. Being on social media, the SAF need to be 
able to continuously adapt their communication behavior and to react to 
developments regarding simply platforms or, more important, to react to 
unintended consequences. Therefore military sciences need to deliver the 
data for future decisions. Besides that, the information must be included 
in the education of the Armed Forces personnel and in particular, its cadre 
personnel as they function as leaders, role models and ambassadors of 
the organization. By including the findings of military sciences into their 
education, they will find themselves to be taken seriously and to be respected 
members of the Armed Forces.
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The series of studies «Sicherheit» [Security] determine trends in the formation 
of opinion on foreign, security and defense policy in Switzerland. Each year 
in January circa 1200 Swiss will be interviewed by telephone. Partly the data 
set goes back till 1976 (Szvircsev Tresch, Wenger, Ferst, Pfister, Rinaldo, 2015). 
Especially in education and training of officers the study «Sicherheit» is an 
important and useful teaching aid. Within the study the current civil-military 
relations and the formation of opinion on foreign- and security policy are 
illustrated. Furthermore the publication is the best known ETH-study and 
it used by politicians, research-ers and the public in many cases. More over 
current political issue can be examined.
Switzerland is in the European comparison due to its neutrality and the 
fact that it is neither a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) nor an European Union (EU), a special case (Ferst, Szvircsev Tresch, 
2017). The Swiss Armed Forces (SAF) have often been used for domestic 
tasks since the establishment of the Swiss federal state in 1848. Thereby, the 
protection of the neutrality through the armed forces has great importance. 
Under protec-tion of the neutrality, border control, service of border control, 
securing Swiss airspace and airspace policing are included. In Switzerland, 
the fight at the boarder was the most important task for an independent, 
neutral and unoccupied state (Siegrist, 2008).
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In Switzerland the distinction between internal and external security has 
been relativized a long time ago (Haltiner & Kümmel, 2008). Between the 
SAF and the neutrality there is a close connection. Switzerland still has the 
conscription and the SAF have an important social role (Ferst & Szvircsev 
Tresch, 2017). Due to the neutrality Swiss are skeptical towards su-pranational 
institutions like the EU, NATO and the United Nations Organization (UNO).
Within the past forty years the global political situation and the security 
situation of Switzer-land have changed deeply. Are there any changes in 
foreign- and defense policy? The data of the study «Sicherheit» contain this 
information. Based on the data of the study „Sicherheit» the Swiss opinion 
towards the SAF, neutrality and supranational institutions (EU, NATO, UNO) 
over the past forty years will be shown. The items of the Swiss foreign policy 
include opinions about neutrality and cooperation with EU, NATO and UNO. 
The items of defense policy involve attitudes relating to the SAF. Table 2 
shows the used items. Because the data is not available every year, on the 
left side of the table, the available time period is expelled.
Table 2: Items of foreign- and defense policy (Szvircsev Tresch et al., 2017)
Period Policy sector Items 
1983–2017 Defense policy Necessity of armed forces 
1976–2017 Defense policy Social role of the armed forces 
1976–2017 Defense policy Support of the militia 
1983–2017 Defense policy Abolishing conscription 
1986–2017 Defense policy Opinion on defense expenditures 
1995–2017 Defense policy Trust in the SAF 
1986–2017 Foreign policy Evaluation of the global political situation 
1989–2017 Foreign policy Maintaining neutrality 
1993–2017 Foreign policy Identification function of neutrality 
1993–2017 Foreign policy EU-accession 
1993–2017 Foreign policy NATO-accession 
1983–2001 Foreign policy UNO-accession 
During 1976 till 2000 the support of the SAF and the neutrality is declining. 
During this peri-od Swiss tend to support an accession to EU, NATO and 
UNO (Haltiner et al., 2001; Haltiner et al., 2002). Whereas an accession 
to the European Economic Area (EEA) was denied in 1992 (Schweizer 
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Eidgenossenschaft, 2017c), in 2002 Switzerland became an UNO-member 
(Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft, 2017e). After 09/11 Swiss are more in favor 
of neutrality and the SAF. And they are more skeptical against the EU and 
the NATO (Szvircsev Tresch et al., 2016; Szvircsev Tresch et al., 2017). Based 
on the argumentation above, two hypotheses are provided.
 – H1: If Swiss support the SAF, they will support the neutrality too.
 – H2: If Swiss support the neutrality, they will deny accessions to the EU and NATO.
The global political situation, the security situation of Switzerland and the 
attitude of foreign and defense policy changed during the last forty years. 
Are there some key events, which are linked to the changed global political 
situation and the security situation of Switzerland? What are the relevant 
events of the Swiss foreign and defense policy of the last forty years?
In the era of globalization and international terrorism the internal and 
external security border are blurring. Many social scientists argue with an 
extended security concept (Daase & Rühlig, 2016).
Traditionally, Swiss still distinguish between internal and external security. 
In Switzerland respondents feel secure and trust their institutions (Szvircsev 
Tresch et al., 2017). On the other side, Swiss feel more insecure abroad. 
For example, one side of the feeling of insecurity abroad is illustrated in 
the adaption of general travel behavior. As a consequence of world-wide 
terrorism, in 2017 29% of the Swiss adapted their general travel behavior 
in the last two years (Ferst, De Rosa, Szvircsev Tresch, 2017). In 2017, 95% 
of the Swiss support neutrality and 76% support the Swiss economic and 
political independence. By contrast Swiss deny an accession to EU or NATO 
(Szvircsev Tresch et al., 2017).
Both the aim of foreign- and defense policy is the establishment of internal 
and external secu-rity. Key events can concern only foreign policy or only 
defense policy, or both. Relating the contend-related overlap an explicit 
distinction is waived. But there is made a distinction for the key events 
between national and international events. Naturally the selection of key 
events is selective and orientated on public reporting. Because of its length, 
the investigation period is divided in four periods (see table 1). 
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Table 1: Subdivision of the investigation period in four periods
Period National level International level 
1976–1991 …
1989 rejection of public initiative „Swit-zerland 
without an armed forces and for a comprehen-
sive peace policy»1
… 
1986 rejection of a UNO-membership2
…
…
…
1991 end of cold war3 
1992–2000 …
1992 rejection of EEA-membership4
1995 military reform „Armee 95»5 
1991 war in Yugoslavia6
…
… 
2001–2010 …
2002 Switzerland becomes UNO-member7
2003 Swiss accept the referendum about the 
military reform „Armee XXI»8
…
… 
2001 09/119, fight against international terror-
ism (wars in Afghanistan, Iraq)10
…
…
2008 global financial crisis11
2010 Euro-crisis12 
2011–2017 …
…
2013 rejection abolishing conscription13
…
…
…
2017 military reform „Weiterentwicklung der 
Armee» (development of SAF)14 
2010 upheaval in the EU15
2011 civil war in Syria, Islamic State (IS),
2011 Arab Spring16
…
2014 fight against IS17
2014 increased terroristic attacks in Europe18
2015 refugees crisis in Europe19
…
… 
Procedure
The approach of the paper is the following. At first the opinion of foreign- and 
defense policy will be summarized for each time period. Then the national 
and international key events will be discussed for each time period. Finally 
we proof, if the change in public opinion in foreign- and defense policy 
is linked by national and international key events. Furthermore the two 
hypotheses will be proven.
Conclusion
The conclusion will be presented at the upcoming ISMS conference.
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New world order brings new challenges and threats for international peace. 
Currently it is possible to mentioned several places over the world which can 
be named hot points for future conflicts. According to the M. Górnikiewicz 
forecasting preliminary model, the paper is dedicated to analyzing culture 
sub-consciousness codes of Nordic societies due to these challenges in the 
regional security area. Knowledge about decision making-process on every level 
should bring the preliminary image of potential «stimuli-response» actions.
The main topic for the study was a forecast for regional security of Nordic 
societies 2017–2020. The main research question was: how the international 
situation will evaluate in Nordic states in next three years due to regional 
security challenges? During the research, authors studied the impact of Brexit, 
war in Ukraine, last US presidential election and migration crisis in EU. For 
the purpose of the study authors used both theoretical and practical research 
methodology including: analysis, synthesis, comparison, observation. This 
work was possible thanks to dr M. Górnikiewicz preliminary model and 
wide knowledge and experience of prof. T. Szczurek. Both authors express 
hope that this paper should be useful for future, deeper research in similar 
scientific areas.
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How can we understand the social and economic dynamics that enables 
the operative space of the militant networks in northern Mali? The paper 
argues that jihadist militant groups are actors in local power struggles 
rather than ‘fighters’ or ‘terrorists’ with extremist ideological motivation. 
Understanding the conflicts in northern Mali requires an increased focus 
on the links between jihadist militant groups, local politics and criminal 
network activities in Gao and Kidal. In this paper, the argument is that social 
science research can support the analysis conducted in international military 
operations such as MINUSMA in Mali. Through application of concepts from 
social science, military analysts will increase their understanding of the 
dynamics in northern Mali.
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In the military context, organizing a task force to a mission is a critical 
function. In ad hoc situations, both the time to create the task force and the 
resulting group’s effectiveness are the main issues. To support the decision-
making in an ad hoc situation, some analytic support can be provided.
The basic organization in a military context is a hierarchical structure. The 
task forces are formed by commanding a task leader and assigning the needed 
supporting elements around the nucleus task group. While this may be an 
effective method of creating task forces, it becomes cumbersome in situations, 
where the number of task forces becomes large. From this point of view the 
hierarchic relationships could be seen more as a primary situation for the 
entire organization, which is actually just a resource pool for the task forces, 
which are the actual mission elements.
The typical issue in an effective organizing of a task force, or a project team, 
is the missing analysis of the existing relationships between the potential 
team members. The relationships are either regarded as strict command 
relationships, or less strict support relationships. However, there is a social 
aspect that is usually left unnoticed. The better the potential know each other, 
the better they can interact with each other in a collaboration situation. These 
relationships can be better seen in the social media connections.
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Selecting the most effective team from a larger social network has two 
different viewpoints. The team should be connected together in a proper 
way to enable co-operation. In addition, the individuals should have needed 
skills to complete the task. The selection problem arises from optimizing 
the combination of these two aspects. A modeling method is described for 
a situation where specific skills are required for different tasks in a project. 
A novelty in this paper is to consider also connections of the team members 
with a larger social network around the team.
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Every organization will have to deal with issues that are unpleasant. The 
Armed Forces in this respect have developed extended integrity procedures to 
tackle financially murky dealings, harassment and sexual violence, and abuse 
of the concipients of military assistance in mission areas. From a qualitative 
study (interviews) into whistle blowers and the integrity organization in the 
Netherlands Armed Forces it is concluded that whistle blowers are normal 
people acting in the context of integrity dilemma’s, that the basic problem 
is in the integrity of the organization, power and dependency relations and 
thus in the organizing of the integrity system, and therefore it is structurally 
hard to report abuses or moral wrongs.
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With the beginning of 2009, the Swiss Armed Forces (SAF) introduced 
measures for diversity management that are based on a command of the 
chief of the SAF from 2008. Implementing this management strategy can 
be considered as a response of the SAF to the more and more diverse society 
as well as increasingly complex and specific missions of the armed forces. 
In this process, diversity management as a HR-policy has an economic 
and a democratic component. This means that diversity management is 
not only based on a business imperative, but also on a moral one. On one 
side, a diverse workforce is expected to bring organizational advantages, 
on the other hand, an effective diversity management should reflect the 
social diversity of society (Kamarck 2015, Soeters & Van der Meulen 2007), 
especially an organization like the SAF with its conscription and militia 
force. Furthermore, widening the pool of human resources and knowledge 
is expected to contribute to job satisfaction and to more stability in work 
teams (Bundesrat [Federal Council] 2010).
However, various studies have shown that many diversity support programs 
do not conform social realty and that the chosen organizational measures 
are often inadequate and not expedient (Bonnet 2016). To get an idea of the 
concept of diversity management in the SAF and the measures that have 
been taken so far I conducted expert interviews with eight diversity officers 
from the Swiss Federal Administration and the Defence Department.
The interview results showed that the diversity officers agree on the common 
definitions of diversity management. That means that according to the 
interviewed experts, diversity management is about recognizing, handling 
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and promoting diversity, which should bring an economic advantage for 
the organization (business imperative), but it is also about guaranteeing 
equal opportunity (moral imperative). Also, they mentioned that diversity 
management depends on the understanding of leadership and management 
style and stressed the importance of military leadership culture and education.
According to the diversity officers, there are important legal bases and 
regulations that support fostering diversity and preventing discrimination. 
For example, the service regulations [Dienstreglement] of the SAF state that 
the duty of comradeship is an important obligation and a central value of 
the SAF and is imparted in the military education. It obliges the soldiers to 
«collaborate comradely» and to «mutually respect each other’s personality 
(…) regardless from military rank, political or religious beliefs, age, gender, 
language, origin and skin color» (Dienstreglement 04, 1994).
Even though legal bases and policies exist, the practical implementations 
sometimes bring some challenges that have to be overcome in order to promote 
an effective diversity management. First of all, the clash of cultures of the 
federal administration (of which the SAF are part of and thus subordinated 
to its personnel ordinance and other legal requirements) and the SAF with 
their different values is one problem. According to the interviewed diversity 
officers the Swiss Federal Administration is very progressive in general, whereas 
the armed forces are an organization with a strong basic need for regulation 
and routine. Thus, introducing new or alternative working models and the 
concept of diversity management itself (see Pinch 2006) is a big challenge just 
because of the nature of the military. Besides, the current political climate 
in Switzerland is not prioritizing diversity policies in federal departments 
and therefore financial and personnel resources are strongly limited. With 
this limited resources it is very hard to persuade the military management to 
promote diversity management, as one of the experts mentioned. The other 
diversity officers agreed that in this context the official commitment of the 
leaders would be crucial, but is often missed because other issues receive 
higher priority compared to diversity measures. The diversity officers see 
another problem in the lack of communication and missing information 
concerning employee’s knowledge about existing policies and their rights 
and obligations. This is due to the fact that there are basically no campaigns, 
flyers or educational courses that would sensitize not only the employees, 
but also their supervisors. And since the diversity officers have no direct 
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access to the decision makers, it is especially hard for them to prevail with 
their arguments. Thus, they recommended amongst other important points 
the significance of awareness-raising in order to combat prejudices, inform 
the employees about their rights and show leaders how to manage diversity, 
and emphasized that communication on all levels is essential.
In fact, next to the various legal regulations, diversity management is part 
of the leadership education program in the professional armed forces of 
the Swiss military. Furthermore, as already mentioned, the soldiers are also 
being sensitized to these values during their education in the lessons about 
the service regulations [Dienstreglement-Unterricht]. So there are already 
implemented measures that impart the moral aspects of diversity management. 
The question is: in what way do these diversity measures affect the inclusion 
and equal opportunity and treatment of minority groups?
Based on the findings from the expert interviews, I intend to pursue this 
questions by evaluating the perspective of different minority groups of the 
SAF. What are their attitudes towards the existing HR-policies and military 
guidelines which regulate the cohabitation and collaboration in heterogeneous 
groups? Do they feel integrated, included and given equal opportunities? 
What is their opinion towards the importance of diversity management as 
an educational element in their military education cycle? Where do they 
see potential for improvement?
The findings of these qualitative interviews with individuals and focus-groups, 
which I intend to present at the ISMS conference, will also be the basis for 
a standardized questionnaire that is supposed to evaluate the attitudes and 
experiences of a wider range of military members – regardless of their rank 
or minority status – towards this management strategy.
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The military classes in Poland we can define as classes of lower secondary 
and upper secondary schools, which carry out broadly understand the 
education in national and international area. The program of these classes 
is enriched with issues related to military defense, the history of the Polish 
army as well as the history of evolution of patriotic attitudes among children 
and young people in Poland. This way the classes are very popular among 
both teachers and students. And their functioning have strong influence of 
increasing aunity in the local society. In addition, the classes are an main 
factor of shaping an patriotic, civic and prosocial attitudes among Poles.
For the military classeswas developed in schools education programs based 
on the principles contained in the decree Ministry of National Defense 
Republic of Poland regarding the innovative programs of defense training 
and education for security.Programs were written by teachers of various 
subjects and specialties, so they address a wide range of security issues but 
are not prepared for military service. Prior to implementation, each of the 
programs had to be accepted to the Teaching School Council and administrative 
authorities responsible for education in the voivodeship.
The author of this article argue that these educational programscaused 
a significant changeof goals and values of the military classes students. 
It includedincreasing theirinterestsof patriotism and state securityissues. 
Therefore, the authorconductedin January and February 2017the scientific 
research which aim was to define socio-psychologicalprofile of the military 
classes students as well asdiagnose these values and goals. In the research 
were involved 200 students from uniformed school of onevoivodeship 
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andwererandomly selected. The used toolswas «The questionnaire survey for 
students of military classes» crated by the author, and included an survey 
questionnaire and scaling table.
The comprehensive analysis of the research results have allowed to answer 
onthe question: What is thesocio-psychological profile, values and goals of the military 
classes students? It came out that the military classes students are interested 
of military security issues. For them most important values were homeland 
and family. Also they were looking for carrier opportunity in the national 
defense administration. The least interest they shown in health problems.
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This paper will reveal the true costs associated with an overseas deployment 
of the modern part-time Army Reserve soldier, and why the price of using 
part-time soldiers can only ever increase. By looking back at the history of 
the deploying Territorial soldier from the Great War (1914–18), the Second 
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World War (1939–45) and the recent deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan 
(2001–13) this paper will chart the rising cost of using the supposedly 
cheaper option. For example, a Territorial Force soldier of 1914–18 could 
only claim for separation allowance for his wife and children, up to the age of 
14 years old, payments that never kept pace with the cost of living, and high 
wartime inflation. The story was a similar one for the Territorials of World 
War Two. However, for the contemporary Territorial Soldier during the ‘War 
on Terror’ (2001–2015) the TA could claim for loss of earnings, company 
cars, childcare, school fees, health insurance payments, and even civilian 
accommodation. Some of the claims are capped, however many claims can 
be pursued without financial limit. Moreover, the cost to the government 
does not stop at the individual part-time soldier’s claims. The business or 
place of work that employed the deploying part-timer was offered (and will 
be offered in the future) generous financial assistance packages which cover 
additional costs the company has regarding the deployment of a member of 
its staff. Furthermore, the business or place of work can claim one-off costs, 
all uncapped, for agency fees to find temporary replacements, advertising 
costs, financial assistance for retraining and pension contributions.
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This paper argues that to assess whether NATO partners can be considered 
as over- or under contributors to Western security, investigations should 
include contributions to other dimensions than military expenditures only. 
For instance, member states facing strong domestic opposition to military 
expenditures may contribute instead to non-military security dimensions, 
such as foreign aid, counter terrorist financing, export controls, or sanctioning 
non cooperative countries. To this end, the paper, first, extends the NATO 
burden sharing debate beyond the military by providing a conceptual model 
that, based on two distinctions, encompasses contributions to international 
safety and security on military as well as non-military dimensions. The first 
distinction is between system and environment, holding that safe systems 
are able to have desired effects on their environment, whereas, security 
denotes the inability of the environment to have an undesired effect on the 
system. The second distinction occurs between malicious and accidental 
harm, resulting in defining safety to designate the degree to which accidental 
harm is prevented, detected and reacted to, and security to designate the 
degree to which malicious harm is prevented, detected and reacted to. 
Furthermore, the model’s usefulness is demonstrated by putting forward 
how states may or may not improve organizing safety and security, based 
on investments in specific public goods. Finally, using four dimensions: 
military contributions (by means of defense expenditures), foreign aid (by 
means of overseas development assistance), combating terrorist finance (by 
means of compliance to financial standards) and carbon dioxide reduction 
(by means of metric ton CO
2
 reduction), we empirically analyze different 
national contributions to international security. In doing so, we strive to 
clarify that to meaningfully assess contributions to today’s new safety and 
security environment, the yardstick of military expenditures of two per cent 
of GDP, taken on its own, offers only narrow and one sided information.
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Paradigm shift for Peace Operations 
and the Role of Armed Forces in 
times of mixed migration flows: The 
Example of Austria
Dr. Markus Gauster, PhD
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The prospective new role for the Austrian Armed Forces in the context of 
the migration crisis; Structural changes and ist impacts for Austrian peace 
operations and tasks in the homeland; Coordination challenges of an Austrian 
Whole of Nation Approach to national and international crisis management.
The lack of security and future prospects for the population in several 
protracted conflicts in the larger European neighbourhood has generated 
«push factors» for migrants to seek refuge in EU countries, while Europe’s 
attractiveness has led to its appeal with a «pull factor». This «push and pull» 
combination has triggered a new wave of migration from the MENA region 
and beyond since 2015. From the European perspective, one focus should 
be to manage the root causes of migration by providing civil and military 
support, and engaging regional actors and transit countries to adequately 
control the migration flows within the region.
I argue that, instead of contributing substantially to diminish root causes 
for mixed migration flows, Austria’s engagement in front of the migration 
crisis has concentrated much more on adapting and changing its internal 
structures (several other EU countries showed comparable activities). As a 
consequence, Austria’s approach to internal security issues and (external) 
peace operations has shifted within only two years. One of the most striking 
changes generated by the migrant crisis is the new and enhanced role of the 
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military in the homeland that has led to a paradigm shift: Peace operations 
have gradually lost political relevance, while increasing migration flows 
(and terrorist attacks in Europe) represent a main driver for the military and 
the police to attract funding and human resources for prospective internal 
tasks. The role of the military in the homeland (in Austria and in the EU) to 
maintain law, social order and social cohesion has gained in relevance and 
is as important as contributions to international peace operations.
Arguments to support this paradigm shift are, e.g., the changing character of 
mid-term procurement and defence acquisition programs, the strengthening 
oft the provincial military commands and the formation of the „High 
Readiness Command» (Kommando Schnelle Einsätze / KSE). KSE is mainly 
adressing security-related incidents in the homeland. This underlines the 
shift from the (former) prioritisation of peace operations to a more balanced, 
homeland-orientated role of the military that is manifested in the „Teilstrategie 
Verteidigung». The forthcoming „Threat Assessment (Bedrohungsbild) for 
the Austrian Armed Forces» and the future „Military Strategic Concept» also 
support this shift.
In addition, I also argue that migration flows have contributed to the shift in 
the role, tasks and defence management of the military. These developments 
are not only touching the military but also implicate the necessity of an 
adequate change management for other Austrian ministries and NGOs that are 
active in peace operations, international policing, development cooperation 
and humanitarian missions. Whole of Nation Approaches (WoNA) to make 
use of synergies from all relevant Austrian stakeholders that are engaged 
abroad are currently under debate and have been put to test as a multiplier 
to improve effectiveness and efficiency of crisis and conflict management 
both in the homeland and in the theatres of peace operations.
However, the more actors involved, the more coordination is needed to achieve 
benefits. First, situations in which security, development and governance 
policies undermine each other can be balanced. Second, better use can be 
made of the – still scarce – resources. Third, synergies can be created 
through bringing together different stakeholders (state and non-state) in a 
particular policy field or network.
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There is no doubt that to maintain a resilient community and social 
coherence in Austria and in the European Union, a stable periphery is of 
utmost importance. Therefore, peace operations of the Austrian Armed 
Forces within the framework of UN, EU, NATO-PfP and OSZE will continue 
to be an indispensable tool for Austria’s security policy, but preconditions 
have changed.
To conclude, the research for this paper is focusing on the impacts of mixed 
migration flows (1) on structures, defence management and role of the 
Austrian Armed Forces, (2) for other relevant Whole of Nation-Actors in 
Austria, (3) on Austria’s Coordination and Change Management for external 
engagement, and (4) on the implications for managing the root causes of 
migration in countries of origin of migrants. By abstracting the findings from 
the respective conceptual, governmental, non-governmental, cultural and 
systemic levels, the aim is to shed some light on future centres of gravity, 
niches, limitations and options for armed forces and other relevant actors in 
Austria under the highlighted new circumstances and resource requirements 
for security and development policies.
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Purpose
This abstract focuses on the use of critical success factors in defence material 
projects. Abstract aims to identify what performance measuring is and how 
it could be used to support performance measuring in material projects in 
Finnish Defence Forces.
Research questions/methodology/approach
Main research question is «How critical success factors can support performance 
measurement in defence material projects?». Secondary research questions 
are 1) What are the critical success factors in defence material projects 2) 
How critical success factors can be used for measuring performance? 3) How 
to increase material project success?
Performance measurement is determined based on review of the literature. 
Empirical data on the subject is collected by conducting interviews.
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Theory and background
The performance measurement has become increasingly into general 
consideration. This has happened because public sector organisations are 
under pressure to increase efficiency.
The pioneer of the performance measuring theory (Management by Objectives) 
have been Peter Drucker who wrote Practice of Management (1954). Since 
then, several performance measurement systems have been developed such 
as, the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1996), the Navigator (Edvisson 
and Malone 1997), the Performance Pyramid (Lynch and Cross, 1991), the 
Performance Prism (Neely, 2002) and the SAKE (Rantanen, 2001).
The focus of performance measurement can have both organizational and 
individual perspectives. In the past years, there has been a growing body 
of literature that demonstrates a positive linkage between organisational 
performance and human capital.
Findings
The main result of the study shows that critical success factors in defence 
material projects are people of project, open environment and good atmosphere, 
sufficient resources, efficient use of resources, realistic and clear objective, 
successful definition of demands, detailed and updated plans.
The most important contribution from the critical success factors is that 
the organization can name the issues, which are important for the business 
and company strategy. Only a few factors should be considered as a critical 
success factors. Then it is possible that the performance can be really raised. 
The other management input is that selecting and choosing critical success 
factors allows to create a performance managements system, which can be 
used directly as a management tool.
The performance of projects can be measured with several different 
performance measurement tools. When planning implementation of a 
performance measurement tool, it is important that it meets the principles of 
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balanced measurement. Good and balanced performance measuring system 
can increase project success.
Conclusions and recommendations
Finnish Defence Forces are suggested to start new study, which objective is to 
create a performance measurement system for the defence material projects.
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Capability areas level and system capability level probabilistic modeling 
methods are extended with the use of analytical S-shaped growth curves. 
We illustrate how the derived results, i.e. system capabilities and derivatives 
of system capabilities, can be used to discover different caracteristics and 
trends from capabilitys areas level data.
The two most commonly used S-shaped growth curves are logistic and Gompertz 
curves. These growth curves have applications in many fields of technology 
and science: ecology, statistics and machine learning, medicine, chemistry, 
physics, linguistics, and economics and sociology (https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Logistic_function, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gompertz_function). 
These analytical functions enable mathematical investigation of different 
characteristics of processes which have a specific S-shaped form. The 
S-shaped functions describe many kinds of growth phenomena, typically 
slow at the beginning and also slow at the end of processes, because of some 
resource factors limiting the growth process. In this article we examine some 
applications for technology forecasting and capability modeling. Our case 
studies show that growth curves are very flexible, with different parameter 
values, and can be used for investigating derived quantities and for various 
other modeling purposes.
Forecasting by extrapolation is often used to forecast the future of the time 
series. In this paper we use the growth curves to model questionnaire data 
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where capabilities for 1, 10, and 20 years have been evaluated. In this case 
we have three unknown parameters and three time points. A consequence 
is that both the logistic and Gompertz curves give very similar results for 
interpolation and extrapolation for 1–30 years.
In addition to interpolation and extrapolation purposes, the analytic growth 
curves can be used for analysis of systems and capabilities. For example, 
additional systems or procedures can be added to a system of systems by 
using the analytical formulas for existing systems and using numerical or, 
again, fitted analytical formulas for new systems. Also, calculations for 
disposal of systems can be conducted more easily. In this paper, we use 
the growth curves to calculate analytical results for system capabilities and 
their derivatives. System capabilities are separate capabilities of systems, 
whereas high level capability values describe all the effects of systems use 
in a specific scenario and environment. System capabilities can be used to 
isolate the system itself from other factors.
The outline of this paper is as follows. First we present the mathematical 
background of the logistic and Gompertz growth curves and how the 
parameters can be determined in a case where data is available at three 
points enabling the use of the basic second order polynomial formula. We 
provide numerical results from a questionnaire data for calculating system 
capability values and their derivatives. The results are for three capability 
areas, three scenarios (Suojanen, et al., 2015), and two systems together with 
the combined use of the two systems. Finally we have same interpretations 
of the results where graphical system capability curves and their derivatives 
are used both for making conclusions and for visualization.
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Science and Military Education
According to Niiniluoto (1984) science is an ambiguous term that can refer 
to: science as an institution (such as universities), scientific research activity 
or the research process, scientific body-of knowledge i.e. generally accepted 
results in the scientific community at a particular moment; and the scientific 
method as a critical and intersubjective method for accepting beliefs. In terms 
of education, the body-of-knowledge meaning of science is clearly the most 
relevant one. Nonaka (1994) maintains that there are explicit knowledge 
than can be can be codified and transmitted e.g. through language and 
tacit, knowledge that is deeply rooted in action and is hard to formalise or 
communicate. Between tacit knowledge and scientific body-of-knowledge lies 
a practical, day-to-day knowledge that can be explicated but is not acquired 
by a scientific process and not part of scientific body-of-knowledge.
In contrast to civilian universities, military universities educate only for one 
organisation. In a civilian business school, one cannot educate students for the 
needs of any particular firm’s purchasing process while defence acquisition 
can meaningfully take as a starting point the current defence force acquisition 
process. However, that process is not in all detail research-based, indeed, 
there are as many slightly different processes across the countries that are 
every now and then changed.
The law of the Finnish National Defence University (2008/1121) defines as 
its educational task as «teach military science that is based on research and 
best practice» while the law on civilian universities (2009/558) only mentions 
research-based education. The Finnish law recognizes clearly both education-
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based on scientific body-of-knowledge and practical knowledge for the needs 
of Finnish Defece Forces.
Defence Acquisition
The Defence Acquisition University (2009) glossary defines acquisition as 
«The conceptualization, initiation, design, development, test, contracting, production, 
deployment, logistics support (LS), modification, and disposal of weapons and other 
systems, supplies, or services (including construction) to satisfy DoD needs, intended for 
use in, or in support of, military missions ». This definition consists of the life-
cycle phases (a) of not only weapons (b) but also other items that are used 
in military missions (c). In essence, this definition is concerned with the 
life-cycle of purchases for the military. An Australian Defence Procurement 
Review (Kinnaird, et al. 2003) abides by the definition above but uses the 
term «procurement», a practice that Cochrane (2010) accepts recognizes but 
condemns as erroneous. First, (c) implies that defence acquisition is defined 
by a specific military use and is a subset of more generic acquisition. Second, 
(b) begs the question: is every purchase made for the armed forces within 
the scope of (b), or only investment items that go through all phases, like 
the design and development.? Third, acquisition, in addition to purchasing, 
involves a life-cycle view (a).
The acquisition process only begins if a materiel solution is required (Brown, 
2010); even then, other DOTMLPF areas must also be taken into account in 
order to field a military capability. From a military capability viewpoint, the 
defence acquisition process is just one part of developing military capabilities, 
which in turn flow from the concept of operations and strategic guidance 
and, ultimately, the political level.
One way to assess the scope of a discipline and its related fields is to make a 
bibliometric study. For that purpose, a Scopus abstract search of articles and 
conference papers with the terms (defense OR defence) AND acquisition) between 
2004 and 2014 was done. These terms could be present in any order in article 
title, keywords or abstract. Limiting to only journal articles in English language 
and to relevant subject areas, for example excluding biology and nursing, the 
result was down 290 articles. Of these, 97 could be eliminated based on the title 
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and a further 100 articles were eliminated because they were magazine articles. 
Finally, the amount of defence acquisition-related articles (abstracts actually) in 
Scopus database published in English after between 2004 and 2014 was 93. The 
total of 93 articles translates to about nine articles per year – by all accounts a 
small number. If one would guess an average amount of work for a published 
article of half a year, then the journal articles in Scopus would correspond an 
average yearly effort of 4,5 men or scientist. By comparison, according to DAU 
(2013, p. 44) the U.S. defence acquisition workforce is 151 355 people and Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) staff is 722 people. Another comparison could be 
to Scopus hits for search terms «project management» (65,710) or even «reverse 
logistics» (1,639). The h-index in Scopus for the 93 articles was only 6, meaning 
that only six papers had six or more citations. Therefore, defence acquisition 
cannot be said to be a well-established academic discipline.
Table 1 shows the subject areas of the 93 articles, where there is both Scopus 
classification and a classification by the author to the subject areas of different 
business administration and engineering areas.
Table 1 Scopus subject areas. An article can have more than one subject area.
Author’s classification Scopus classification
Main or secondary topic Count Percent Subject Area Count Percent
Defense acquisition 26 16 % Engineering 45 36 %
Systems engineering 22 13 % Social Sciences 21 17 %
Operation analysis 13 8 % Business, Management and  Accounting 15 12 %
Political science 10 6 % Computer Science 12 10 %
Software engineering 9 5 % Decision Sciences 9 7 %
Administration 9 5 % Economics, Econometrics and Finance 7 6 %
Product development 8 5 % Arts and Humanities 5 4 %
Technology management 8 5 % Environmental Science 3 2 %
Project management 6 4 % Mathematics 3 2 %
Risk management 5 3 % Physics and Astronomy 3 2 %
Strategic planning 5 3 % Materials Science 1 1 %
Maintenance 4 2 % Multidisciplinary 1 1 %
Purchasing 4 2 %
Cost accounting 4 2 %
Remaining 24 topics 33 20 %
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According to Scopus subject classification, 46 % of the articles belong to 
engineering and computer science while slightly fewer than 20 % belong 
to business management in together with economics and the same amount 
to social sciences. According to author’s classification defence acquisition 
and systems engineering are top classes but if «something» management, 
administration and product development classes are combined, they together 
amount to 22 % being then largest. In addition to not being a well-established 
academic discipline, nor is defence acquisition an independent discipline but 
seems to be subdivision of on larger related disciplines where the contribution 
of engineering and especially systems engineering is very dominant and 
also management is clearly important. In addition to management, the 
social sciences also feature prominently, mainly due to the political science 
viewpoint.
The role of Defence Acquisition in Military Education
A key issue that determines the role of defence acquisition in military 
education is what role military personnel have in acquisition. While 
military competence is a requisite for military capability planning process, 
purchasing itself may to some extent be handled by civilian buyers. Military 
competence is also required defining the requirements. For military education 
of defence acquisition in Finland and in Sweden is included a one course 
on the subject with requirements definition emphasis at the MSc. level for a 
those of students that major in military technology while in Denmark there 
is not acquisition-related course nor a major in military technology. So in 
the end, even though defence acquisition is important from the defence 
spending viewpoint, it is not a part of most officers’ education at MSc. level.
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The military educational system in Denmark faces a challenge: coupling 
research and practice to ensure that knowledge from practice is rooted and 
used in research, and that research makes a positive difference in practice.
It is not a unique challenge. On the contrary. It is seen within many professions 
with strong roots in practice, including civil areas such as the training of 
nurses, pedagogues and primary school teachers.
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Within a Danish military context focus on these mechanisms has so far been 
limited, but changes to the training of officers – with the new accredited 
and, to some extent, research-based programme – have forced us to take a 
critical look at the system.
The aim of this presentation is first to explore how we, based on theories and experiences 
from other fields, can improve the connection between practice and research and second 
to give concrete examples of how this has been implemented in a military context at the 
Royal Danish Defence College.
In this connection, the discussion of Modus 2 (e.g. Gibbons 1994 et al., Scott & 
Gibbons 2001) – a theory on knowledge production – plays a main role. The 
Modus 2 concept concerns a form of knowledge production that is context- 
and problem-oriented and cross-disciplinary. Modus 2 knowledge is driven 
by a wish to solve specific problems. The knowledge obtained is convincing 
if it manages to solve the given problem. On this problem-oriented basis, 
Modus 2 knowledge production is often cross-disciplinary. The research is 
often conducted outside traditional university environments – for example 
in the industry or under the auspices of the Danish Defence. There is also 
such a thing as ‘post-academic’ research, where other stakeholders, besides 
researchers, help decide what to research.
The majority of all research projects conducted at the Royal Danish Defence 
College as well as large parts of practice-related military research in general 
are practice-oriented and focus on concrete problems to be solved. One can 
therefore argue that main aspects of the theory are useful in a military, 
practice-related reality. This presentation will compare some of the relevant 
theories used in the civil world, which may be translatable to a military 
context.
Furthermore, it will discuss how the task of coupling research and practice 
can be addressed more specifically and offer concrete examples of how the 
Royal Danish Defence College has managed to couple research projects, 
practice and education.
In addition, it will briefly touch on the possible schism between military 
research and civil research. The two often represent different starting points, 
focal points, traditions and practitioners, and thus also have different bases 
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for being integrated in and interacting with military practice, but can we 
really distinguish between military research and civil research?
The effort to couple research and practice in the Danish Defence is well 
underway and, to some extent, based on experiences, theories and methods 
from the civil world, which in itself is a subject for discussion.
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Bridging science and art, strategy is a core discipline in Military Studies. 
One of the greatest challenges to strategy is how to understand and handle 
complexity. The contemporary security context in which militaries engage 
is complex, just as militaries themselves constitute and represent complex 
actors. How to handle these different aspects of complexity should be at the 
forefront of the strategic agenda. Today complexity is widely acknowledged 
but poorly understood. There is hardly a strategic document out there that 
does not explicitly point to complexities in the contemporary security arena; 
however, very few make a concerted effort to explain let alone address that 
complexity. Gaskarth (2015) is among the few, who argue that complexity can 
and should be understood. Regular patterns can be identified, explained and 
predicted. That is the foundation for complexity strategy. This in turn, will 
enable militaries to better handle the contemporary complexity challenge.
The proposed paper first contextualises and then conceptualises complexity 
in Military Sciences. The strategic challenge, it identifies, is how to navigate 
in a complex security environment, where the armed forces have a series of 
diverse yet interconnected objectives to meet with limited resources. It goes 
on to suggest that contemporary complexity requires an inter-disciplinary 
strategic approach that bridges the art and science of Military Studies. 
Likewise, we should not strive for a single strategy identifying ends, means 
and ways for every single security challenge. For as Clausewitz (2010) reminds 
us: we must be concerned with realities not mere abstractions. In other 
words, strategy must reflect reality. As contemporary security challenges are 
interconnected, so must be our strategies. Moreover, strategy cannot only 
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respond in the short-term to ad-hoc events, if and when they occur, but must 
provide longer-term focus for the future. Thus, the challenge for today’s 
strategists is to carefully consider past, present and future complexity in 
strategic analysis, so as to avoid making ‘the right decision for circumstances 
that are about to become history’ (Bower and Christensen, 1995: 53). This is 
not to undermine the importance of military history or the strategic classics, 
but rather to stress their importance for strategic foresight.
To this end, the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College is 
currently developing a new research agenda and teaching portfolio. This will 
encompass – in the first instance – a module for our Masters in Military 
Studies and a simultaneous research project upon which this will be based. 
Peers from the International Society for Military Sciences are invited to join 
an informal network of scholars and practitioners working with issues related 
to ‘Strategy and Complexity’. The purpose of this undertaking is to further 
both research and teaching; to better understand and manage complexity 
in contemporary strategic study and practice; and ultimately, to ensure that 
our contribution to knowledge meaningfully prepares the armed forces to 
think and act strategically in a complex future.
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Culture: An Elusive but Inescapable 
Concept – Teaching at RMC, Canada
Ali Ghanbarpour-Dizboni, PhD
Associate Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston
dizboni-a@rmc.ca
This presentation will assess contrasting claims and methods on the place 
of culture or more specifically the importance of understanding the human 
terrain in strategic and security analyses. To this end, we take a selective 
look at the post 9–11 literature and the curricular developments in RMCC 
(Canada) in relation to the lessons drawn from various security missions in 
different regions -- especially the Middle East and North Africa. I suggest that 
a better grasp of the necessity of cultural interpretation should be sought 
at the junction point between Western/NATO experiences and the fine edge 
research on those lessons derived therefrom. Indeed, the necessity of this 
dialogue between theory and praxis persists considering challenges such as 
cultural intelligence, the meaning and role of the «strategic lieutenant» in the 
context of Revolution in Military Affairs, emerging trends in NATO-Canada 
security operations and comprehensive approaches to defence and security.
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This paper explores the use in military education of ‘life writing’ by soldiers, 
currently serving or retired, and works of fiction based on the soldier author’s 
personal experience of warfare. It focuses specifically on the use of these 
genres in teaching English as a second language (EL2), but also on how they 
are used to encourage, in the English classroom, officer cadets to reflect 
on topics from subjects taught by other military sciences. ‘Life writing’ is 
here used as an umbrella term which includes, but is not limited to, genres 
such as memoir and autobiography. The paper discusses life writing and 
fictional representations of war by authors with military experience as these 
genres are currently employed in the teaching of English at the Norwegian 
Military Academy and identifies potential avenues and strategies for their 
further use. By placing the focus on the genres and modes by which ideas 
of ‘character’ and (the history of) the profession is communicated to, by, 
and about the military profession, this paper examines how the subject of 
English contributes to the content and development of officer education.
Textual sources that describe personal experiences of war have broad 
application potential and are widely used by researchers from various 
disciplines as sources of information about the military, both for the insight 
these geopolitical documents provide and because they are readily available. 
They are also, as mentioned, used in military education as gateways for 
reflecting on the history of the profession, and on leadership, character, and 
military identity. Moreover, life writing by members of the armed forces 
construct and reproduce, and mediate to the public particular images and 
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understandings of the military and armed conflict, and these genres have a 
wide public appeal (the twenty-four memoirs by military personnel published 
in the UK between 2007 and 2012 alone have a market value of £5 million) 
(Woodward and Jenkings 2012b). In addition they perform an existential 
practice, as they constitute soldierly subjectivity as a coherent self. For 
these reasons, attention to the textuality and materiality of the documents 
and how they sustain practices of military self-representation is crucial for 
members of the military; the English classroom is an ideal setting for raising 
awareness of such practices amongst the readers of these texts, for example, 
through use of genre pedagogy and its attention to the social contexts of 
texts and its use of scaffolding techniques to focus students’ attention on 
structures of language.
Furthermore, while there is a plethora of studies on military life writing 
from the twentieth century, and a growing amount of research on works 
published after the turn of the millennium, there are as yet only indications 
about the profile of the soldier authors producing these documents, and 
there is a dearth of readership data (Kleinreesink; Woodward and Jenkings 
2012); recognising that subjectivity is produced through discourse (Allington 
and Benwell), a classroom focus on the reading experience of various types 
of life writing can contribute to understanding of how these genres are read 
by members of the military and thereby also to focus their further use in 
the military language classroom.
References
Allington, Daniel and Bethan Benwell. ‘Reading the Reading Experience: 
An Ethnomethodological Approach to «Booktalk». From Codex to Hypertext: 
Reading at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century. Ed. Anouk Lang. Amherst, MA: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2012.
Gullestad, Marianne. Everyday Life Philosophers: Modernity, Morality, and Autobiography 
in Norway. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1996.
Hyland, Ken. ‘Genre pedagogy: Language, literacy and L2 writing instruction.’ 
Journal of Second Language Writing 16 (2007): 148–164.
245
MILITARY SCIENCES – THE BACKBONE OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS? – BOOK OF ABSTRACTS ISMS 2017
Kleinreesink, Esmeralda. ‘Researching «the most dangerous of all sources»: 
Egodocuments.’ J. Soeters, P. M. Shields & S. Rietjens (ed.). Routledge Handbook 
of Research Methods in Military Studies. London: Routledge, 2014.
Sylvester, Christine. ‘War Experiences/War Practices/War Theory.’ Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 40:3 (2012): 483–503.
Woodward, Rachel and Neil K. Jenkings. ‘Military Memoirs, Their Covers 
and the Reproduction of Public Narratives of War.’ Journal of War & Culture 
Studies 5:3 (2012a): 249–59.
---. ‘«This place isn’t worth the left boot of one of our boys»: Geopolitics, 
militarism and memoirs of the Afghanistan war.’ Political Geography 31 
(2012b): 495–508.
MILITÆRE STUDIER SE/2017
246
Outsiders Inside: How Contracted 
Civilian Instructors From A Local 
University Understand Their Role As 
Military Educators
Ho Shu Huang
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological 
University, Singapore
ISSHHo@ntu.edu.sg
Keywords: Military Education, Contractors, Civil-Military Relations
Kelly C. Jordan defines military science as «a systemized body of knowledge 
regarding and relating to the theory, application, and employment of 
military units and weapons in land warfare … encompassing issues related 
to the follow areas: military leadership, military organization; military 
training and education; military history; military ethics; military doctrine; 
military tactics, operations, and strategy; military geography; and military 
technology and equipment.»
In this rapidly evolving security environment, the military’s ability to 
effectively carry out its mission is contingent on the expedient acquisition 
of relevant knowledge in this wide spectrum of areas. As the Call for Papers 
puts it, there is a need to «describe, understand and explain how science can 
contribute to prepare military units and their soldiers for the life and tasks 
of conducting military operations.» Some military professionals acquire this 
knowledge in the course of their work, or by independently keeping abreast 
of the latest developments by reading and contributing to military journals. 
As my colleague Henrik Paulsson points out in his proposal, the Internet has 
now also emerged as a dynamic platform to increase self-directed learning, 
and teaching, of this knowledge.
This year’s International Society of Military Society’s conference theme «Military 
Sciences – The Backbone to Military Educational Institutions,» however, 
rightfully emphasises the link between the military sciences and the military 
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schoolhouse. Professional Military Education (PME) institutions are key hubs 
in the knowledge acquisition process. Most military professionals still learn 
about the military sciences in academic courses at PME Institutions. There 
they are typically taught by full-time civilian or military faculty employed 
by the defence establishment. These instructors are the main conduits of 
the military sciences to the military professional.
There, however, exists only a small body of research on how these instructors 
perceive their role in educating military professionals. In particular, how 
do civilian academic instructors, ostensibly from a different «world» as 
classical civil-military relations posits, see their role as educators of military 
students? How do they function as «outsiders» in the traditionally close-knit 
world of «insider» brothers(and sisters)-in-arms? The only monograph which 
addresses the intersection of civilian academia and military education, Military 
Culture and Education, a collection of articles by US PME instructors on their 
experiences teaching in military schoolhouses, suggests civilian academics 
teaching military students is at best challenging and at worst a head-on 
culture clash. It appears there is a gap between civilian academics and the 
military in attitudes towards military education in the US PME ecosystem. 
Unsurprisingly, this reflects an ongoing debate on the value of academic 
military education there.
If civilians who work full-time in the military already face difficulties, what 
more civilian academic instructors who only enter the military «world» 
occasionally as guests? Not all states adopt an «in-house» approach to PME. 
Some small state militaries, for example, the Singapore Armed Forces 
(SAF), outsource the academic military education of its career soldiers to 
civilian contractors as this is a more cost-efficient way of providing it. A 
largely conscript and reservist-based force, career personnel form less than 
10% of the SAF’s total strength. As such, rather than incur large capital 
and manpower costs by recruiting their own academic faculty to provide 
academic instruction to its career personnel, the core of the SAF’s leadership, 
as is typical in other advanced militaries, the SAF contracts the teaching of 
all academic components in its professional military education to civilian 
providers, namely local civilian universities.
This short study seeks to explore how academic instructors from a local 
university contracted to teach military officers understand their role as 
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instructors. The principle lecturers of three undergraduate courses in 
military studies, military leadership and military technology run by the local 
university will be surveyed on their experience providing PME. It builds on 
existing literature on the perceived «civil-military gap» in military education 
by looking at the experience of small states like Singapore. Additionally, as 
outsourcing becomes an increasingly attractive solution to filling non-critical, 
non-operational military jobs because of its perceived cost-effectiveness, 
this study also hopes to expand the discussion from just focusing solely on 
the experience of civilian instructors who work full-time in the military to 
also include contractors who are temporarily parachuted into a military 
environment when classes are taught, but exit once they end.
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The UK has been one of NATO’s most devoted member states for decades, and 
is still one of only few European states to meet the Alliance’s requirement to 
spend 2% of GDP on defence. Its dedication to NATO has been demonstrated 
not only by involvement in operations such as Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan, 
but also more recently by support for deployments in Eastern Europe and 
the Baltic States. Despite some inevitable post-Brexit transformations, the 
UK’s loyalty to NATO is unlikely to wane. In fact, the UK has been advised 
to err on the side of caution in substituting a potential European void with 
blind support for American foreign and security policy (Chalmers, 2017).
Historically, the British strategic culture in multilateral military operations 
has not only placed high value on close civil-military relations and unified 
command structures, operational flexibility, strong adherence to LOAC 
principles and an intelligence-led approach to distinguish combatants from 
non-combatants, but also on legitimacy and public support for operational 
involvement (Egnell and Ucko 2016). However, with mixed performances 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, the British Army has faced criticism, and public 
support has dwindled as a consequence. In addition, the UK’s position as 
a trustworthy partner in the war on terror has limited its strategic and 
operational prospects (Finlan, 2013).
Thus far, the challenges of the international security environment have not 
brought about any fundamental changes in the culture of the British Army, 
which remains remarkably fragmented across regiments, held together by 
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an officer corps, all commissioned from the Royal Military Academy of 
Sandhurst (Finlan, 2013).
Established in 1947, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) was the 
result of a merger between the Royal Military Academy and a Royal Military 
College. RMAS still represents the hub of British Army Officer education 
and training today, and since its formation, the British officer training and 
education programme has witnessed a range of reform efforts. At the core 
of these reforms we find the continuous debates about the balancing act not 
only between academic education and military training, but also between 
budgetary, operational, and strategic realities (Downes, 1992). For decades, 
the art of compromising has been at the core of decisions to reform the 
Sandhurst programme, which has resulted in a rather unique approach 
of blended learning, where military training and academic education are 
integrated in a yearlong physically and intellectually demanding course.
This paper takes Sandhurst to the post-Afghanistan reality of cutting costs 
and balancing commitments (Chalmers, 2011) and demonstrates how the 
Sandhurst programme – and in particular the academic component – has 
been reshaped over recent years. The majority of the British Officer Cadets 
– rather uniquely for a military academy – have already completed an 
undergraduate degree prior to arriving at Sandhurst. This provides the 
Academy with a highly diverse group in terms of knowledge, interests and 
background; it offers the flexibility that the Army so badly needs in the 
contemporary security environment. All Officer Cadets follow an educational 
programme delivered by three academic departments; the Departments of 
Communications and Applied Behavioural Science, Defence and International 
Affairs, and Wars Studies. However, since 2015, the Academy also offers a 
parallel postgraduate certificate course in Conflict and Leadership Studies 
for students with a relevant undergraduate degree. The distinctiveness of 
the Sandhurst approach will be pertinent throughout this paper.
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Do we train our young officers in what they actually need? What do young 
officers in the Danish army struggle with these days? How do military 
academies follow up on the effect of the training?
The responsibility and assignments young officers have today has changed 
quite a lot. Missions, budget cuts and rationalizations have changed the 
everyday life for the officer into a «new normal». Nevertheless, how do 
they cope with this «new normal»? What characterizes the changes that our 
organization and the world is undergoing in a young officer’s perspective?
The educational system in the Danish Defense has also undergone huge changes 
in the last 10 years. New public management structures and rationalizations 
have forced training and educational institutions to explore and to find «the 
backbone» of the Army’s profession.
The research started because there was a need to minimize the disjuncture 
between the Army practice and the Army educational system. The presenter 
will introduce his methods and findings in order to investigate the backbone of 
our profession and thereby to create the best possible training and education.
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The research project was conducted as an action research project. The presenter 
has followed graduates from the Royal Danish Army Officers’ College in 
two different infantry regiments over a period of one year. With the goal of 
understanding these young officers challenges, assignments, responsibility 
and working methods in order to;
1. Develop these young officer’s competences to lead and command.
2. Improve the Royal Danish Army Officers Academy’s ability to educate 
future cadets, thereby helping them become great leaders.
3. Priming the cadets for the first year after school.
The main method used to understand and develop the groups of young officers 
was inspired by the action research and group supervision tradition. Each group 
met four times for a three-hour session with an experienced group facilitator.
The presenter will show and give examples of the successful program 
that has led to numerous changes and improvements in the training and 
education. The results of the project have been used to design the Diploma 
in Military Studies at The Royal Danish Military Academy and is used during 
the education to prime the cadets for their post-education Army service. The 
program has left a big footprint in the leadership development program and 
the competences provided there.
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The DEEP is a NATO initiative dating back ten years. It aims at fostering 
intellectual operability and officer professional military education (PME) 
to render NATO Partners and potential members capable of joining forces 
with NATO nations if need be, and to develop the practices and methods to 
ensure their own security. The Ukraine portion of the programme is the most 
significant. Administered by NATO and the Partnership for Peace Consortium, 
overseen by strong American and Polish interests, it is a manifestation of 
what the Alliance can do as a measure of assistance and reassurance to 
Ukraine. The DEEP is a tool to demonstrate NATO’s credibility and deterrence 
potential outside of Art. 5. This article speaks of the absorption challenges 
created by the multiplicity of events, and argues that the objective of creating 
self-sufficient and interoperable forces is impeded by the current conflict 
in the Donbas.
255
MILITARY SCIENCES – THE BACKBONE OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS? – BOOK OF ABSTRACTS ISMS 2017
The role of Game Theory in Military 
Education
George Kaimakamis
Hellenic Army Academy
gmiamis@sse.gr
Konstantina Panagiotidou
University of Patras
konpanagiotidou@gmail.com
Keywords: Game Theory, Military Education, Case Study
Game theory studies situations in which your payoff depends not only on 
your own choices but on the choices of others. It reveals how decision-makers 
interact and helps us to understand military, economic, social, political, 
international relations and biological Phenomena or systems. It provides 
a mathematical formulation for modeling these systems and generating 
solutions in competitive or conflicting situations.
The essential parts of a game are: players, actions, payoffs (payoff function), and 
information about the actions or/and payoffs (they could be known or not). These 
are collectively known as the rules of the game, and the modeler’s objective 
is to describe a situation in terms of the rules of a game so as to explain 
what will happen in every situation (which will happen at the time that the 
game starts). Trying to maximize their payoffs, the players will devise plans 
known as strategies that choose actions depending on the information that 
they have. The basic rationality principle of game theory states that each 
player acts to optimally accomplish his/her individual goal, taking into account that 
the others play in the same manner.
In this talk the necessity of Game Theory in Military Education will be 
presented. Military officers, who are aware of game theory techniques, are 
capable of conducting military operations and estimating the situations. 
The talk consists of two parts: in the first part basic ideas of game theory 
will be provided and in the second part examples studied in Hellenic Army 
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Academy are given. At the same time we will present the methods of Game 
Theory that could approach military operations, international affairs etc.
More precisely, the following case studies will be presented:
1. The task of optimally assigning military ordinance to enemy targets, usually 
called Weapon Target Assignment (WTA) problem --- The formulation of 
the Weapon Target Allocation problem considers a situation in which 
two or more teams of military units are involved, and when units in each 
team are simultaneously targeting units in the remaining teams in such 
a manner as to optimize some objective function. The objective function 
represents a measure of destruction of the targets, or other measures such 
as the cost of each weapon, may also be considered.
2. The task of air force operations against ground forces. In this case attacks on 
time critical targets, with emphasis on suppression of enemy air defenses 
interdiction, and anti-theater ballistic missile missions are modeled and 
analyzed. This combat is considered as a two-player game in which each 
player is free to choose from different strategies. Game theory provides 
the tools to calculate and evaluate optimal and suboptimal strategies 
for the players.
3. Find the potential strategies on Air-Land Combat Operations which is 
based on Lanchester’s Combat Law as a differential game. The serious 
issue is how to use and distribute combined strategies when offensive 
and defensive positions are taken in air and army forces on both sides
4. The modelling of the Battle of Bismarck Sea (World War II) as a two-person 
zero-sum game. The strategies of the enemies, the optimal solution are 
presented in comparison to what really happened.
5. The modelling of Cuban Missile Crisis --- The Cuban missile crisis began 
on 14 October, 1962 when an American U-2 spy plane discovered Soviet 
Union was attempting to install intermediate-range nuclear-outfitted 
ballistic missiles in Cuba. All the possible strategies of the players (two 
governments) are examined and the optimal solution (strategy) to this 
problem is found.
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This study presents the effects of the STANAG 6001 based hybrid English 
learning on reading proficiency, critical thinking and self-management in 
Japanese cadets studying English as a second language (L2) at the National 
Defense Academy of Japan.
Introduction
To promote and foster interoperability among the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and partner countries, the NATO has developed descriptors 
of Standardization Agreements of language proficiency as STANAG 6001 
to define the general English proficiency (non-military specific) of military 
personnel. According to the STANAG 6001 with respect to its vision of the 
Bureau for International Language Cooperation (BILC), the NATO partner 
nations have responsibility to develop their own national language learning 
curriculum and materials based on STANAG 6001, considering their own 
governmental policy, educational system and cultural background. Based on 
the STANAG 6001, many nations have developed their own national language 
learning curriculum and materials, and integrated learning of traditional 
face-to-face teaching and web-based learning has also been developed.
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A combination of traditional face-to-face teaching and alternative web-based 
self -learning in a single teaching and learning environment have been 
called blended learning (BL). The BL has been adopted in various levels of 
professional education, including English for specific purposes (ESL). For 
example, Sung et al. (2008), who examined the effects of blended learning 
in comparison to face-to-face lectures, found that students who studied 
in blended learning exhibited significantly higher levels of professional 
knowledge and satisfaction with comprehensiveness in blended learning 
programs, while no significant differences in self-efficacy were discovered 
between students in blended learning and the ones who only studied in 
face-to-face classroom situations.
More recently, synonymous to BL, many studies in language teaching and 
learning have focused on hybrid learning (HL) (Klimova and Kacetl, 2015). 
According to Bärenfànger (2005), the HL is not merely a combination of 
traditional face-to-face instruction and alternative web-based learning, but 
it provides more in-depth individual and flexible learning, which includes 
self-directed learning activities in addition to BL. According to Shams (2013), 
the hybrid English learning has positive impact on vocabulary learning and 
autonomy in language learning.
Although previous studies in language learning have shown the positive effect 
of HL, further research is needed to investigate how hybrid English learning 
adopts the STANAG 6001 based language learning for Japanese cadets. Thus, 
to measure the effect of the hybrid English learning on STANAG in Japanese 
cadets, this study was designed to examine the impact of hybrid learning on 
English reading proficiency, higher-order thinking and self-management in 
Japanese cadets. Particularly, the goal of the hybrid English learning in this 
study was set to improve reading proficiency and critical thinking, which 
were equivalent to the STANAG 6001 level 2.
Method
Participants and materials
The participants were Japanese cadets (N=120) studying at the National 
Defense Academy of Japan. Language learning materials used in this study 
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were developed specifically for Japanese cadets based on the STANAG 6001 
and the Language Standard Assessment Seminar (LSAS) by the BILC, at George 
C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany.
Procedure
To conduct this research, first needs analysis with questionnaire survey was 
performed. Second, in order to measure the current reading proficiency level, 
higher-order thinking level and self-management, participants were asked 
to complete an English reading test and questionnaire.
Next, the model of hybrid English learning curriculum and the sample of 
e-learning materials including progress and achievement tests were developed. 
After that, as a pilot study, sample of the STANAG simulated reading materials 
and tests (level 1, 2 and 3) were developed to test the validity and reliability.
All participants are studying reading English in both traditional face-to-face 
lectures and alternative e-learning as self-study. The textbook used in face-
to-face lecture (i.e. ‘Campaign’, 2006a and 2006b) and e-learning materials 
developed in this studies were both equivalent to STANAG 6001 level 2 and 
3. Although all participants were required to attend face-to-face lectures 
every week, each student were able to decide how many hours they study 
reading with e-learning materials outside the lecture. To assess the progress 
of English reading proficiency, higher-order thinking and self-management 
through the hybrid learning, the progress tests and questionnaire survey were 
conducted. The further progress test and achievement test will be conducted 
in the following academic term.
Analysis
The collected data was analyzed statistically with SPSS 24.0 and AMOS 24.0. 
First, to examine if there was significant difference in critical-thinking and 
self-management across the cadets with different academic achievements in 
reading, t-test across the cadets was performed. Next, the correlations across 
reading proficiency, critical thinking and self-management were examined. 
Last, the analysis of structural equation modeling (SEM) was performed to 
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explore the impact of hybrid English learning on developing the reading 
proficiency, critical thinking and self-management in Japanese cadets.
Results and Discussion
At the 9th Conference of International Society for Military Sciences, the detail 
of results including statistical data and further discussion of effect of hybrid 
English learning on reading proficiency, critical thinking, and self-management 
will be presented. The pedagogical implications will be suggested to develop 
further hybrid language learning for military in NATO nations.
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Educating Strategic Lieutenants as 
Security Professionals
David Last, PhD
Royal Military College of Canada
last-d@rmc.ca
Strategic lieutenants are a state’s investment in security. The traditional 
pattern of early career specialization, mid-career integration, and senior 
officer generalization does not optimize junior officer preparation for 
a career in security, which has never been about fighting and winning 
wars for the majority of the world’s forces (notwithstanding professional 
ideology). This chapter describes global patterns of officer education, and 
contrasts these with global patterns of officer employment. Based on a wide 
sampling of curricula, we can assert that pre-commission and subaltern 
education is dominated by technical and specialized education, across 
military, paramilitary, and police organizations. A similarly wide sample 
of security operations illustrates that war-fighting has little relevance to 
human-security, national security, and international security for most of 
the world’s security forces. There is therefore a global knowledge gap in the 
preparation of security professionals. The education of strategic lieutenants 
– junior officers prepared to think strategically about the nature and 
management of security problems beginning early in their careers – should 
begin with this gap. Tools of legitimation code theory (specialization planes 
and semantic waves) help to describe the ways in which different forms of 
knowledge are excluded from military education, exacerbating the gap in 
essential knowledge at each level of career development in most countries. 
Addressing the knowledge gap should begin by filtering big-power inputs, 
and conducting collaborative experiments to generate and share useful 
knowledge for the majority of countries. The framework for transmitting this 
knowledge might be a common curriculum (content, context, and pedagogy) 
that prepares young officers to think critically about political, economic, 
and social relations in order to achieve human and national security in a 
collaborative international environment. The example of EMILYO initiatives 
are extrapolated for other communities. Experiential learning, cross-cultural 
understanding, gender balance, and early international experiences are 
essential elements in teaching the strategic lieutenant.
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Roundtable debate on Sharing and 
Comparing Professional Military 
Education Curricula: Context, 
Content, Andragogy
David M. Last, 
Royal Military College of Canada
Last-d@rmc.ca
Anders McD Sookermany, 
Norwegian Defence University College 
asookermany@ifs.mil.no
This #ISMS17 panel will be part of an online, asynchronous, and continuous 
discussion amongst faculty of higher educational institutions charged with 
professional military education. 
A curriculum includes the context within which teaching and learning occur, 
the content of the material delivered, and the pedagogy or andragogy used. 
Military academies, staff colleges, and defence universities form a unique 
peer group amongst institutions of higher learning, and have important 
incentives to share and compare curricula, but also constraints on the ways 
in which they do so.  The aim of continuing discussion is to enable individual 
faculty members to access, share, and compare relevant curricula at other 
institutions, with the aim of improving the quality of the education they 
provide, particularly in the fields of military and security sciences.
The proposed panel at ISMS 2017 will highlight samples of shared content 
and provide a forum to discuss questions about access, constraints, and utility 
for sharing and comparing professional military education curriculum, at 
entry, mid-career, and senior officer level.
The panel will consist of:
1. Annemarie Peen Rodt, Invitation to collaborate on strategy and complexity
2. Kjetil Enstad, Report on Teaching Culture in Military Academies
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3. Anders McD Sookermany, Invitation to collaborate on a Handbook of 
Military Sciences
4. David Last, Invitation to discuss development of an international Doctorate 
of Military Sciences
5. David Last, Invitation to collaborate on an annual digest of military sciences
6. Jens Ringsmose, Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies
7. Mrs Frédérique Jacquemin, Senior Programme manager NATO DEEP 
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Learn to Learn Scientifically
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Keywords: educational system, science, intuitive mind, analytical mind, 
leader, role-playing,
It is needed 8–10 years to cultivate a professional military leader with a 
sound character. On the other hand, soldier may be ready for efficient and 
effective fight after only three to six months of training. Therefore, philosophy 
of the education must be shifted towards the military leaders. Theoretically, 
teaching function must be liberalized and individual student-oriented. 
Practically, it is hard to achieve that due to a many organizational and 
prescribed requirements burden on lecturers. Within military educational 
institutions rules daily routine and competitiveness does not exist anymore. 
Educational challenge is not strictly defined and nobody cares to find the 
motif to be useful or beneficial. Longer and more demanding task of creating 
competent and trustworthy leader requires application of science in an 
intelligent organization. How to create a world-class intelligent military 
organization? Officials working in military educational institutions have 
to think about that constantly. In order to be relevant and prepared for the 
unknown future military officers need to learn how to foresee or perceive.
Authors explore ideas and techniques of creative thinking for the purpose 
of implementing scientific way of teaching within military academies. 
Fundamental idea is found in establishing an interdisciplinary network of 
various fields of sciences for the purpose of creating teaching methodology 
suited for role modeling in curriculums of military educational institutions.
Role modeling is nothing but the famous phrase show by example, very much used 
in military training. Hence, lecturers in military education institutions are to 
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be role model of military leader. Secondly, they must apply scientifically-based 
educational theories. Than, they need to figure out audience’s capabilities and 
expectations. As psychologist Howard Gardner stated in his Theory of Multiple 
Intelligences, «Individualize your teaching as much as possible. Instead of ‘one 
size fits all,’ learn as much as you can about each student, and teach each 
person in ways that they find comfortable and learn effectively» (Gardner 2011). 
For example, interpersonal intelligence must be highly valued within military 
community because it determines the ability of person to work with a group 
in many different positions or operational and tactical missions.
Gardner also came out with a theory of 5 minds for the future leaders: 
(1) The Disciplined Mind – mastery of major school of thought and at 
least one professional art, (2) The Synthesizing Mind – ability to integrate 
different ideas into a coherent whole, (3) The Creating Mind – capacity to 
uncover and clarify new problems and phenomena, (4) The Respectful Mind 
– appreciation for differences among human beings, and (5) The Ethical 
Mind – fulfillment of worker’s and citizen’s responsibilities (Gardner 2009). 
These capacities perfectly fit to military leader mind and military educational 
system officials have to notice that. After all, it may be used as a template 
for choosing the right leaders.
Professional military education institutions recognize Military History as an 
excellent field to study and learn for whatever military branch. But spirit of 
the times in history is usually overlooked. So, beside political science, many 
other sciences have to be consulted within military history curriculum. It 
should be military psychology and pedagogy, sociology, economy, leadership 
and communication and so on. Therefore, building on a lecture plan, military 
historian must decide what other fields of sciences integrate in the lecture. On that 
way, working interdisciplinary, lecturer develops officer’s intuitive side of mind.
Science can play a meaningful role in military education only through 
meticulously prepared and applied scientific approach to teaching. Therefore, 
the most critical question is not what to teach but how to teach. Lecturers have to 
be key figures in advocating implementation of scientific methods of teaching 
within military education institutions. Various interactive student-oriented 
methods of instructions must be scientifically approved. The Scientific Method 
generally consists of six steps: (1) Define the problem, (2) Review information 
sources and literature, (3) Come up with hypothesis, (4) Do research in order 
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to test the hypothesis, (5) Determine and state the conclusion, and (6) Verify 
the conclusion (Van Otten, Leszczynski 2006).
Now, we can move to the general question what to teach. First, lecturer has 
to direct officers toward sound character, and that means to point out 
military traits, prudence and truth. Here, lecturer may start with Socratic 
philosophy emphasizing bad tendency toward wealth, satisfactions, and 
honor-seeking habits. The right character is the most important feature of 
a leader in an intelligent organization. Second priority is about particular 
science and subject-matter experts deliver a lectures needed for officer’s 
career. Consequently, educational system must provide military application 
for the purpose of the military operational functions. When a military leader 
possesses necessary capabilities and skills he will also know how to perceive 
and react on many future challenges.
To summarize conceptually, future professional military educational system 
must be based on four pillars: (1) Ethical Standards, (2) Scientific Method of 
Teaching, (3) Subject-Matter Expert Lectures, and (4) Military Application. 
The end product of this system of education is to be military leader capable 
to think not only analytically but also intuitively, as needed.
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Back to the Future: ‘Deployable 
Deterrence’ – How to train the 
«Strategic Lieutenant» in an 
uncertain environment
Dorthe Nyemann
Royal Danish Defence College
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Institute for Strategy, Royal Danish Defence College
jmst@fak.dk
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and subsequent annexation of Crimea 
in 2014, Norway, Sweden and Finland have scrambled to increase defence 
expenditures and revive some of the old, and, some thought, long gone, 
virtues of classical deterrence of a symmetric opponent. Sweden has 
reintroduced conscription and redeployed military personel to the island 
of Gotland in the Baltic Sea. Norway has invited the US Marine Corps to put 
up a rotational (but permanent) presence in Northern Norway close to the 
Russian border. And Finland has increased its reservist based conscription 
force from a wartime strength of 230.000 to 280.000 and in 2015 sent out an 
«extraordinary letter» preparing Finland’s up to 900.000 reservists of what 
to do in a «crisis situation». Denmark however, has been slow to adapt to 
the alleged new geopolitical realities. Officially due to defence procurement 
reasons – Denmark’s defence spending is agreed upon in broad based political 
agreements every 5 year, and the next agreement is due to be signed at the 
end of 2017. In reality, however, most of the Danish foreign- and security 
establishment still do not see a Russian military threat towards Danish soil – 
but only a threat toward the Baltic countries, which Denmark shall take part 
in deterring – and do not want to replace Denmark’s hard fought position 
as a «super Atlanticist» country with a globally deployable expeditionary 
force to be used for political gain whenever and wherever the US decides, 
in return for US protection and supposed influence in Washington. Thus, at 
present, and most likely also after the new defence agreement, Denmark’s 
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defence forces are being asked to do both: To be an expeditionary force 
equipped and trained for global deployment – by for example engaging in 
counterinsurgency operations and capacity building in operation Inherenct 
Resolve in Iraq and Syria. As well as to prepare for ‘deployable deterrence’ of 
a symmetric opponent (Russia) in Estonia under British command in NATO’s 
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).
But is it really possible for a country with the size of Denmark, and with its 
very limited defence budget, to do both without risking its overall durability? 
And if the Danish politicians decide that their military is to do both, how 
do you train your officer’s corps to be able to bridge both the demands for 
1) COIN, cimic work and capacity building in a failling state in the greater 
Middle East with all its secterian violence, religious divisions and endemic 
corruption, as well 2) engaging in classic deterrence against a modern, 
symmetric opponent, being deployed in an albeight friendly but still rather 
foreign country like Estonia with its possible «honeytraps», hybrid warfare 
and cyber threaths?
The article proceeds in four sections: 1) Firstly, it will discuss how the design 
of the Danish officer’s education during the Cold war, with its focus on 
territorial defence, reflected what strategical competences in the officer’s 
corps was imagined necessary at the time. 2) Secondly, it moves on to present 
the great changes to the Danish officers education during the 1990’s and 
2000’s due to Denmark’s increased focus on expeditionary forces and the 
new role of the «Strategic Lieutenant» in a multinational environment. 3) The 
article will discusses what could be termed «core competences» of a combined 
expeditionary and deployable deterrence army, where the officer’s corps 
should be able to do both with the same equipment and crew. Is it possible 
to pinpoint key components in strategical thinking that makes this possible? 
The article will conclude with reflections on how ongoing discussions on 
needed competences in the officer’s corps contribute to the correspondence 
between the states priorities and the education provided
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New Ways of Innovation: The 
irrelevance of military journals in 
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How has the advent of the internet shifted military debates on adaptation 
and innovation? How can small states take advantage of these changes? 
The internet offers many possibilities, but also challenges. There are many 
military journals which discuss innovation, ranging from those run by 
military institutions, such as Air & Space Power Journal and Parameters, to 
privately run such as Proceedings, and non-military academic journals, such 
as the Journal of Strategic Studies. Regardless of publisher, they require high 
academic quality, significant length, and peer-review: all time consuming 
aspects. To develop an idea from conception, to the writing, to finally 
publishing and distribution can take several months as best – and that is 
presuming that it will be read in the first place. Research shows that military 
officers rarely read single articles, and much less do so regularly. Even more 
problematic, the officers surveyed were active Command and Staff College 
and War College students. Mahnken and FitzSimonds even suggest that 
journals are poorly suited for dissemination of ideas within the officer corps. 
Adaptation and innovation needs debates and discussions to succeed and 
develop ideas, and those interested in the subject will go where the debate is. 
Thus, if journals are not suitable for these discussions because of complexity 
and the lack of readership, what alternatives are there? Both Adam Grissom 
and Stuart Griffin have stressed the importance of looking at bottom-up 
military innovation, and the same holds true for academic military writing, 
where there has evolved a bottom-up ecosystem. Early debates on tanks in 
the 1920s were conducted in journals, as was the Soviet discussion of the 
‘military technological revolution’ in the 1970s and 80s, however modern 
officers look elsewhere. From the refuge of Small Wars Journal during the 
271
MILITARY SCIENCES – THE BACKBONE OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS? – BOOK OF ABSTRACTS ISMS 2017
Iraq War and the birth of the COIN ‘movement’, to newer outlets such as 
blogs and the Defence Entrepreneurs Forum (DEFx), military officers have 
found alternative outlets to discuss and share ideas. With this in mind, how 
then can small states learn and adapt their existing structures to encourage 
debates on innovation that previously were conducted in journals? I argue, 
through the use of a case study on Australia, that it is possible to blend 
journals with official online forums, in addition to sanctioning and even 
cooperating with private initiatives. This enables utilizing the benefits of 
longer journal articles, while encouraging continuous debate with shorter 
articles. In addition, the Australian embrace of the DEFx has led to innovative 
suggestions and solutions from all ranks are able to be heard, understood, 
and implemented in a short period of time.
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Modern university pedagogy suggests that lecture’s role is changing from 
a knowledge distribution sessions towards support meetings for learning. 
Teachers often consider problematic to accomplish or control self-direction 
because it should originate from the individual learner. Some kind of 
agreement is needed to be established and fostered.
The National Defence University (NDU) trains officers for the Finnish Defence 
Forces (FDF) and the Border Guard. This paper presents NDU’s practices to 
enhance practices in science and technology education.
At the BA-level cadets gain tertiary qualifications and the fundamental skills 
and knowledge needed to undertake commissioned officer roles in the Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Frontier Guard. The three-year bachelor courses cover 
military strategy and tactics, military technologies, and military history. 
Academic studies are combined with leadership, communication, and military 
training. After master level professional and further academic studies are 
offered by the university.
With basic scientific education and selected technology-related courses, 
technology is an essential part of the general curriculum in cadets’ basic 
studies. Military technology is one of the choices at the major level studies. 
Generally learning aims for all science and technology related courses may 
be expressed as: 1) refreshing previous knowledge from school or previous 
studies, 2) understand and use relevant expressions to formulated problems/ 
solutions, 3) gaining new scientific knowledge, 4) understanding how 
technology utilizes scientific results, and 5) gaining the ability to manage 
practical exercises within the working environment.
MILITÆRE STUDIER SE/2017
274
At NDU in common Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics 
(STEM) studies, students has common courses for preplanned timing in each 
semester. The curricula at NDU define most of the courses in such a way 
that external ready-made material has only limited use. A well-prepared 
course ends to an assessment that reflects those concepts and skills that the 
lecturer has emphasized either in lectures or in the learning management 
systems (LMS).When the learner takes his responsibility for learning, then 
instructor’s effectiveness is not defined on the basis of what he or she does 
as a teacher but rather on what his or her students are able to do.
Teaching for learning
In a military context, all technology-related courses include multiple 
learning objectives, some of which can be considered as tacit knowledge, 
and as such they are largely unmeasurable. It is not enough that students 
have heterogeneous background in mathematical education as well as 
personal skills combined with attitudes towards different disciplines. More 
over continuous development in science and technology are often claimed 
to produce a knowledge explosion. Likewise, modern trends for university 
educations has established demands to improve people’s personal ability to 
learn scientific knowledge, to obtain new information, and to resolve real-world 
problems are widely expressed. It is not enough that officers receive up-to-
date professional knowledge; they must have the ability to react and apply 
knowledge and skills in totally new situations and unfamiliar environments.
Because cadets’ formal level of knowledge and personal interests vary, the 
requirements in common courses are set appropriately for non-physics or 
non-mathematics majors. According to the curricula and the semester plan, 
only compact and tightly scheduled science and technology courses are 
feasible. Therefore refreshing knowledge can be achieved without personal 
interest and utilization of own time. A relatively limited lecturing frame is 
use to present essential topics and introducing presence of (reading) material 
and homework in the LMS. Most homework is done in guided small groups 
led by peers.
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For active students this approach promotes constructivist student-centered 
methodology. It helps students to develop their skills in the discipline as 
well as their capabilities as team members. Such skills are useful to learn, 
not only to pass the course but also for the future profession.
In technology-rich courses teaching points out concepts and principles that 
are applicable to any device and will be relevant to the profession. This 
is done so that in practice oriented professional courses may utilize this 
knowledge constructive way.
Research problem
As a university institute, NDU measures student learning and gives grading. 
For any short science course a standard so-called general examination from 
disciplines introductory course is suitable to test knowledge level. But are 
we teaching for test or educating for learning?
In the technology courses learning goals can too specific and partly skill 
related. Therefore good assessment must be combination of multiple tests and 
may still be inadequate to measure all of the five long term aims proposed 
for technology related courses.
To find a feasible solution, selected tools for course planning, way of giving 
out courses, and finally making assessment are presented. Observations, 
educational interventions and other evaluation practice are presented. 
Selected literature finding are opened for further discussion.
Methodology
Action research is designed to bridge the gap between research and practice. 
It supports educators in seeking out ways in which they may systematize their 
problem setting and take further steps towards solutions, thus enhancing the 
quality of education. Kemmis and McTaggart propose that action research 
forms a spiral of process stages in which the process may not be as neat 
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as the spiral of self-contained cycles of planning, acting, observing, and 
reflecting suggests. Due to continuous renovation or society lead demands 
for curriculum, NDU’s education has also non research based interventions. 
Therefore the cycle nature in development exists, but a detailed presentation 
is not so useful to present. Observations, immediate feedback, examination 
material, and student feedback has been utilized to understand educational 
interventions effects on learning.
Measuring – assessment
Learners often claim that they can too many things and they did not learn 
anything or they were not happy with the teaching and therefore did not 
… Or they say it was great (and simple or easy)…A good assessment may 
include tools to know each student real learning curve. Assessment in a 
larger learning group is both time-consuming and resource-intensive. Due to 
personal differences in STEM-related skills among cadets only general grading 
in science related disciplines is achieved. True skill-related learning is hard to 
measure so selected things or practices are observed, and in most cases only 
brief feedback is given. At the master most of the courses are so technology 
oriented and most of the students are so ambitious to get a good record that 
other data must be utilized. Student feedback shows single (individual) but 
many written testimony for self-directed learning. They include statements 
like «model was so shortly presented that it was necessary to study the material by 
myself to gain the knowledge and skill to...».
Conclusions
Teachers must create a tool that support students’ individual learning. 
Further innovative ways are needed to encourage students’ willingness to 
use their foundational knowledge to perform complex tasks either in class 
or under realistic conditions.
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This paper explores how the Norwegian Military Academy (NMA) has 
adapted its PME to meet the requirements of changing security contexts. 
During the Cold War NMA’s task was to enable commissioned junior army 
officers to operate at the lowest tactical level in a territorial defence force of 
more than 200,000 troops, whose primary focus was on deterring a Soviet 
military intervention and defeating it, if deterrence failed. Each junior officer 
specialised in a designated task demanding largely military skills in the field 
of leadership and tactics. Some 20 years further in their career prosperous 
officers would complete a two-year Staff College education before being 
promoted to positions at the operational level.
In 2016, Norway’s major military operation took place in Northern Iraq 
supporting NATO’s effort to defeat ISIL. The Norwegian contingent consisted 
of 60 troops led by a NMA-commissioned major that had not yet attended 
Staff College. His tasks involved far more than military skills. It primarily 
involved adjusting the mission to the political context of the operation 
locally and in Norway, liaising with a myriad of actors (the operational HQ in 
Norway, allies, other military and civilian actors, state and non-state actors, 
etc.), and communicating in the media. In short, the contingent commander 
had to be strategic-minded and to operate in a civil-military theatre. Such 
expectations to young Norwegian army officers are not unique. Rather they 
have become the norm in almost every NATO-led operation for the past two 
decades – from Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and to the Baltics.
Hence, the NMA has aimed to develop strategic-minded lieutenants that can 
achieve mission objectives in a context that is highly influenced by civilian 
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actors. In addition to the traditional task of managing violence (Huntington 1964) 
on military targets, junior officers are also trained to cooperate with civilian 
counterparts for example by strengthening the officer corps’ communicative, 
socio-political and other civilian skills (Janowitz 1964). Moreover, whereas 
an instrumental understanding of competence sufficed for junior officers 
during the Cold War – in blunt terms to destroy given military targets – 
contemporary mission command requires additional competence. Junior 
officers are faced with multiple objectives of both a military and a civilian 
nature. To strike a good balance between these when giving orders to their 
soldiers, junior officers arguably need what Aristotle referred to as practical 
wisdom (Schön 1987, Kinsella & Pitman 2012).
The paper commences by outlining changes in the Norwegian strategic culture 
and how NMA has adapted to it. To this end the paper proposes a few distinct, 
yet mutually supporting, theoretically-grounded notions to conceptualise the 
expanding understandings of professional military competence departing 
from Huntington’s seminal idea that «the peculiar skill of the officer is the 
management of violence». The paper proceeds by outlining how such broader 
conceptions of professional military competence are cultivated at the NMA. 
This includes an example from an educational situation in a class-room, more 
specifically the planning and war-gaming of a Norwegian operation in Africa.
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It is not a platitude, but real: societies in the Western world are rapidly 
changing. Some regions are successful. They attract talented people and new 
businesses, and are the power houses of economic and societal development 
and change. This process is believed to accelerate even further, governed by 
a ‘feed-forward’ process: success breeds success [1]
These regions grow, densify and become ever more complex. This increasing 
complexity manifests itself at four fundamental levels [2]. Firstly the level of the 
‘physical and tangible’ assets: infrastructures (also underground), densification, 
multi-functionality and multiple use. Then there is ii) an ‘invisible layer’ of 
digital connectedness and services, iii) the level of governance, organization 
and participating citizens. Finally, iv) these cities should provide certainly 
attractive living environments for human beings. These four fundamental 
aspects of ‘smart cities’ are of course intimately interconnected. Any – either 
physical or not – intervention in these complex environments will require 
high levels of expertise and knowledge in a vast domain of scientific and 
engineering disciplines.
These cities will also be important theatres of operation for future military 
officers; in our context specifically the officers of the Corps of Engineers 
of the Royal Netherlands Army. Their education cannot cover all possible 
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expert fields that may be required for successful future operations, simply 
because there are too many of these, and many of them yet to be identified.
For the training of future officers of the Corps of Engineers, this means that 
they should be acquainted with these complex operational environments 
already early in their academic curricula. Their training should aim at three 
different and again firmly connected skills. Firstly they should have a firm 
background in the foundations of science and engineering, and be able to apply 
these in the context of the ‘Built Environment’. They should be able to make 
rapid assessments of an operational situation, based on ‘incomplete’ and 
sometimes ‘unreliable’ information and intelligence. Moreover, they are ought 
to understand and apply the activity of design of the built environment, either 
as actor within such environment, but also as the militaries that are intended 
to install – permanent and less permanent – structures like compounds, 
refugee camps or infrastructures. Finally, the successful execution of these 
tasks, requires in depth knowledge and experience with aspects like logistics, 
process management and environmental awareness.
Thus, the education of future officers of the Dutch Corps of Engineers, has 
been designed along three distinct tracks: science and engineering, design 
and process. These three tracks offer courses, laboratory training sessions and 
projects, that are founded within the aims of the particular track, though 
always providing the context of the other two tracks. Ideally, these tracks 
amalgamate within the future officer as a competent, scientifically trained and 
environment aware professional, who can operate in complex environments 
and take immediate decisions based on the (minimal) information available 
to her or him.
As an example we provide two case studies from the science and engineering 
track. The first case is in the context of the course ‘Geotechnical Engineering’. 
In their classes, students are taught a full, technical program on geotechnology 
and soil mechanics. The formal knowledge is examined in a traditional 
exam. Next to this, the students as a team, apply the acquired knowledge to 
a real situation (in this case the redesign of the quay wall at the Royal Naval 
College, KIM, in Den Helder).
The second example is a BSc thesis project on the quantification of the required 
evacuation area, when a WW2 bomb has been discovered. It is self-evident 
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that this study combines scientific aspects of blast and blast related injury 
with stakeholder aspects and design (of experiment).
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Every spring, approximately 1,000 graduates of the United States Military 
Academy at West Point are commissioned as new Second Lieutenants for the 
U.S. Army. The Academy’s faculty and staff devote countless hours to preparing 
cadets for this day, to ensure they have the intellectual tools, the leadership 
qualities, the basic military skills and physical conditioning necessary to move 
into critical positions as the Army’s most junior commissioned officers. And 
while these new Second Lieutenants will spend the first eight or more years 
of service focused on the tactical level of warfare and the demands of small 
unit leadership, the Academy’s core mission is to educate these future Army 
officers for strategic thinking and action. For some, this is a controversial 
claim. The word «strategy» is often treated as though it begins and ends 
at the highest levels of policy making. The president, supported by senior 
civilian and military advisors, develops national-level political objectives, the 
conceptual ways to achieve these objectives, and then mobilizes and deploys 
the resources necessary for executing the strategy. Approached from this 
perspective, young Army officers are merely the instruments of strategy. This 
paper challenges that view, explaining how the demand for strategic thinking 
at all levels in the U.S. Army shapes the academic program at West Point.
This paper has three main goals. First, it argues for a broader conception of 
strategic thinking and action than the one offered above, offering a way of 
understanding «strategic leadership» that is applicable to the education of 
officers before they are commissioned and that will be of value while they 
are serving in the junior officer ranks, as well as deep into their careers. The 
second goal is to explain how the West Point academic program seeks to 
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develop the capacity for strategic thinking in this university-age population of 
cadets. The third goal is to explain how the enduring problem of complexity 
in the operations conducted by the U.S. Army, and the uncertainty over 
what specific strategic problems Army officers will face in the future, are 
the drivers behind much of the education West Point cadets receive. While 
Afghanistan and Iraq have demanded that American Army officers focus on 
a particular set of strategic problems over the past fifteen years, educational 
leaders at West Point recognize that it is impossible to predict with certainty 
what kinds of challenges our current graduates will face over the course 
of their careers. Cadet education, therefore, must help them develop the 
ability to adapt to new and unforeseeable strategic problems that will arise 
in the future, a goal that is pursued through the broad liberal curriculum 
required of every cadet.
References
H.R. McMaster, «Thinking Clearly about War and the Future of Warfare – 
The US Army Operating Concept,» Military Balance Blog (October 23, 2014).
«What is Strategy,» IJ Briefs, Infinity Journal (April 3, 2013).
285
MILITARY SCIENCES – THE BACKBONE OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS? – BOOK OF ABSTRACTS ISMS 2017
The Importance of Professional 
Military Education (PME) in the 
Changing Context of War
Andre Foo Yong-De
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore
isandrefoo@ntu.edu.sg
There have been many changes to the strategic security environment in the last 
two decades. Technology as well as changes in the character of the profession 
of arms will necessitate greater investments by militaries in Professional 
Military Education in order to master the changes. This presentation, would 
therefore focus on two aspects that are the most critical at this juncture in the 
field of Professional Military Education. Firstly, the subjects that militaries 
would need to examine in the present day and age would require change, 
updates and additions and secondly, that Professional Military Education 
now needs to be more broad-based and inclusive.
With technology fuelling rapid changes and development in the battlefield, 
this also implies that the military organisations from which these changes 
and developments are derived from must also change as the nature, conduct 
and character of war changes. Professional military education and training 
must be progressive and keep up in order to keep ahead, or at the very least 
abreast of these changes. With technologies such as 3D printing and social 
media changing the spaces and nature where battles are fought, as seen in 
recent wars in Crimea, as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan, so must training 
and education within the military establishment keep up.
Courses taught also need to go beyond the traditional military history or 
campaign and war studies to other subjects that are relevant to the current 
age, an example of which would be the role of ethics in a battlefield space 
that has undergone change. These subjects also need to be updated and evolve 
according to the trends at the time. Thus, Professional Military Education, more 
so than ever before, needs to be the cornerstone of a military’s capabilities, 
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not just at formal military institutions, but also at the unit and even the 
individual levels.
Secondly, in recent decades, the lines between enlisted men and officers 
have blurred to the point where enlisted men as well as Warrant Officers 
are now carrying our tasks that were previously under the purview of a 
commissioned Officer. The increasing demands on enlisted men and warrant 
officers as equipment become increasingly sophisticated have also led an 
increase in professionalization in tasks as well as responsibilities. What 
this then implies is that professional military education cannot, and should 
not be limited to Officers alone, but must aligned across all ranks to even 
the most junior soldier, that while the scope of their learning might be 
different, learning must still take place in order for the intent and rationale 
for missions to be better understood across ranks and not just restricted to 
the Officer corps alone.
The presentation will thus seek to answer the two issues mentioned above: 
Firstly, the evolution of Professional Military Education and possible future 
issues it needs to address as well as the importance of the «whole of military» 
approach in ensuring every member of the military receives timely military 
education, from the enlisted men and Warrant Officers to the Commissioned 
Officers.
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